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Current with effective legislation through Chapter 925 of the 2024 Regular Session of the 113th Tennessee General Assembly. Please check to make sure there have been no changes since this time. You will find the official text of these and other statutes through LexisNexis here. The Tennessee Legislature Website also provides information on new and proposed legislation.
(a) The court of general sessions is vested with all of the jurisdiction and shall exercise the authority formerly conferred by law upon justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases, suits and actions. The jurisdiction, power and authority of the court shall be coextensive with the county.
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, judges of courts of general sessions have jurisdiction to try and dispose of violations of municipal ordinances where the sheriff of the county is acting under the authority of §§ 8-8-201 and 12-9-104; provided, that a certified copy of the ordinances of the municipality have been filed with the court. Judges of courts of general sessions shall direct the clerk of the court that all fines collected shall be paid over to the municipality and all court costs collected shall be paid and accounted for according to former § 16-15-703(d), to help administer the cost of enforcement; provided, that reasonable costs have been set by ordinance of the municipality.
(2) The judges of courts of general sessions of counties having a population of not less than fourteen thousand six hundred fifty (14,650) nor more than fourteen thousand six hundred seventy (14,670), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, have, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred above, concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court judge and chancellor in that county or counties in workers’ compensation cases, divorce cases and those powers specifically conferred upon both those courts of record under § 29-31-101.
(3) The judges of courts of general sessions of counties having a population of not less than nine thousand two hundred thirty (9,230) nor more than nine thousand two hundred fifty (9,250), according to the 1960 federal census or any subsequent federal census, have, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred above, concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit judge and chancellor in that county or counties in divorce cases.
(4) Judges of courts of general sessions in any county having a population of not less than seventy-seven thousand seven hundred (77,700) nor more than seventy-seven thousand eight hundred (77,800), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers conferred above, have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit judge and chancellor in that county in domestic relations cases.
(c)(1) All courts of general sessions in this state created by private act have the powers and jurisdiction conferred by this chapter and §§ 18-4-201 – 18-4-203, 20-12-143, 27-5-108, 40-1-109, 40-4-117 and former 40-4-118, and in addition, have such further powers and jurisdiction as may be conferred by the private act creating that court. It is not the intention of this chapter to divest any court of general sessions of any jurisdiction conferred by any private act.
(2) This chapter shall not diminish the powers, jurisdiction or provisions governing the operation of any court of general sessionscreated by private act. It is the intent of the general assembly that each court of general sessions of this state has all the powers and jurisdiction granted by the public acts and applicable private acts.
(d)(1) The jurisdiction of courts of general sessions, where they have been created, shall extend to the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in all civil cases, both law and equity; provided, that this section shall not apply to cases of forcible entry and detainer, in which the court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction; and provided further, that this section shall not apply to actions to recover personal property, in which the court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to award an alternative money judgment; and general sessions judges shall have jurisdiction to issue restraining orders and to enforce the penalty provisions for violation of those restraining orders.
(2) For the purpose of calculating whether a judgment entered by a court of general sessions is within or exceeds the monetary jurisdictional limits established for the courts by subdivision (d)(1), the following amounts shall not be included:
(A) Any amount awarded for attorney fees;
(B) Any court costs assessed by the court; and
(C) Any discretionary costs assessed by the court.
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an employee to or from the employee’s place of work, entering the workplace of an employee, following an employee during hours of employment, telephone calls to an employee, and correspondence with an employee, including, but not limited to, the use of the public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile or computer e-mail;
(2) “Credible threat of violence” means a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the person is under threat of death or serious bodily injury and that is intended to, and that actually causes, a person to believe that the person is under threat of death or serious bodily injury;
(3) “Employer” means any person or entity that employs one (1) or more employees and shall include the state and its political subdivisions and instrumentalities; and
(4) Deleted by 2011 Pub.Acts, c. 315, § 1, eff. May 27, 2011.
(5) “Unlawful violence” means assault, aggravated assault, stalking, intimidation, or extortion as prohibited by §§ 39-13-101, 39-13-102, 39-17-315, 39-17-309 and 39-14-112.
Any employer or employee who has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, or an organization that the individual is affiliated with, which can reasonably be construed to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence by that individual, or the organization that individual is affiliated with, at the workplace. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as authorizing a court to issue a temporary restraining order or injunction prohibiting speech or other activities that are protected by the constitutions of this state or the United States.
(a) Except for proceedings involving a nonresident respondent, the court of competent jurisdiction of the county where the unlawful violence or credible threat of violence occurred shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings under this chapter.
(b) For proceedings under this chapter involving a nonresident respondent, the court of competent jurisdiction where the petitioner’s workplace is located shall have jurisdiction, where the act involving unlawful violence or a credible threat of unlawful violence meets the elements for personal jurisdiction provided for under § 20-2-223(a)(3) or (a)(4).
Upon filing a petition with the court for an injunction pursuant to this chapter, the petitioner may obtain a temporary restraining order if the petitioner also files an affidavit that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof that an employee or employer has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence by the respondent and that great or irreparable harm will result to an employee or an employer if the injunction is not granted. The affidavit shall further show that the petitioner has conducted a reasonable investigation into the underlying facts that are the subject of the petition. A temporary restraining order granted under this chapter shall remain in effect, at the court’s discretion, for a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days, unless otherwise modified or terminated by the court.
Within ten (10) days of the filing of the petition under this chapter or as soon as practical thereafter, but in no case later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition, a hearing shall be held on the petition for the injunction. In the event a hearing cannot be scheduled within the county where the case is pending within the thirty-day period, it shall be scheduled and heard as soon as possible. The respondent may file a response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged unlawful violence or credible threat of violence or may file a cross-complaint under this chapter. At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat of violence, an injunction shall be issued prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence at the workplace or while the employee or employer is acting within the course and scope of employment. An injunction issued pursuant to this chapter shall have a duration of not more than three (3) years. At any time within the three-month period before the expiration of the injunction, the petitioner may apply for a renewal of the injunction by filing a new petition for an injunction pursuant to this chapter.
Upon the filing of a petition for an injunction under this chapter, the respondent shall be personally served with a copy of the petition, temporary restraining order, if any, and notice of hearing on the petition.
The court shall order the petitioner or the attorney for the petitioner to deliver a copy of each temporary restraining order or injunction, or modification or termination of the temporary restraining order or injunction, granted under this chapter, by the close of the business day on which the order was granted, to the law enforcement agencies within the court’s discretion as are requested by the petitioner. Each appropriate law enforcement agency shall make available information as to the existence and current status of these orders to law enforcement officers responding to the scene of reported unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as expanding, diminishing, altering or modifying the duty, if any, of an employer to provide a safe workplace for employees and other persons. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit an employer or employee from pursuing any other civil or criminal remedy provided by law.
As used in this chapter:
(1) “Abusive civil action” means a civil action filed by a plaintiff against a defendant with whom the plaintiff shares a civil action party relationship primarily to harass or maliciously injure the defendant and at least one (1) of the following factors are applicable:
(A) Claims, allegations, and other legal contentions made in the civil action are not warranted by existing law or by a reasonable argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law;
(B) Allegations and other factual contentions made in the civil action are without the existence of evidentiary support; or
(C) Issue or issues that are the basis of the civil action have previously been filed in one (1) or more other courts or jurisdictions by the same, and the actions have been litigated and disposed of unfavorably to the plaintiff;
(2) “Abusive civil action plaintiff” means a person who files a civil action that a court of record has determined to be an abusive civil action and against whom prefiling restrictions have been imposed pursuant to this chapter;
(3) “Civil action” means a civil action, as defined in Rule 2 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure;
(4) “Civil action defendant” means a person or persons against whom a civil action has been filed that a court of record has determined to be an abusive civil action and imposed prefiling restrictions against the abusive civil action plaintiff pursuant to this chapter;
(5) “Civil action party relationship” means the plaintiff commencing a civil action and the civil action defendant fall within one (1) of the following categories:
(A) Adults who are current or former spouses;
(B) Adults who live together or who have lived together;
(C) Adults who are dating or who have dated or who have or had a sexual relationship. As used in this subdivision (5)(C), “dating” and “dated” do not include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a business or social context;
(D) Adults related by blood or adoption;
(E) Adults who are related or were formerly related by marriage; or
(F) Adult children of a person in a relationship that is described in subdivisions (5)(A)-(E); and
(6) “Harass or maliciously injure” means the civil action determined to be an abusive civil action was filed with the intent or was primarily designed to:
(A) Exhaust, deplete, impair, or adversely impact the civil action defendant’s financial resources unless:
(i) Punitive damages are requested and appropriate; or
(ii) A change in the circumstances of the parties provides a good faith basis to seek a change to a financial award, support, or distribution of resources;
(B) Prevent or interfere with the ability of the civil action defendant to raise a child or children for whom the civil action defendant has legal custody in the manner the civil action defendant deems appropriate unless the civil action plaintiff has a lawful right to interfere and a good faith basis for doing so;
(C) Force, coerce, or attempt to force or coerce the civil action defendant to agree to or make adverse concessions concerning financial, custodial, support, or other issues when the issues in question have been previously litigated and decided in favor of the civil action defendant;
(D) Force, coerce, or attempt to force or coerce the civil action defendant to alter, engage in, or refrain from engaging in conduct when the conduct is lawful and is conduct in which the civil action defendant has the right to engage;
(E) Impair, or attempt to impair the health or well-being of the civil action defendant or a dependent of the civil action defendant;
(F) Prevent, interfere, or adversely impact the ability of the civil action defendant to pursue or maintain a livelihood or lifestyle at the same or better standard as the civil action defendant enjoyed prior to the filing of the action primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring the civil action defendant; or
(G) Impair, diminish, or tarnish the civil action defendant’s reputation in the community or alienate the civil action defendant’s friends, colleagues, attorneys, or professional associates by subjecting parties without knowledge of or not reasonably relevant to the civil action to unreasonably or unnecessarily complex, lengthy, or intrusive interrogatories or depositions.
This chapter shall only apply to a civil action filed by a plaintiff against a defendant or defendants with whom the plaintiff shares a civil action party relationship.
(a) If a civil action is filed and the defendant to the action believes it to be an abusive civil action, the claim may be raised by the defendant:
(1) In the answer to the civil action; or
(2) By motion made at any time during the civil action.
(b) The court may, on its own motion, determine that a hearing pursuant to § 29-41-104 is necessary to determine if the civil action is an abusive civil action.
a) If the defendant to a civil action alleges, either by answer to the civil action or by motion made at any time the action is pending, that the action constitutes an abusive civil action and that the person filing the action is an abusive civil action plaintiff, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the merits of the defendant’s allegations.
(b) At the time set for the hearing on the alleged abusive civil action, the court shall hear all relevant testimony and may require any affidavits, documentary evidence, or other records the court deems necessary.
At the hearing conducted pursuant to § 29-41-104, evidence of any of the following creates a rebuttable presumption that the civil action is an abusive civil action and that the person filing the action is an abusive civil action plaintiff and prefiling restrictions should be imposed upon the abusive civil action plaintiff:
(1) The same or substantially similar issues between the same or substantially similar civil action parties that are the subject of the alleged abusive civil action have been litigated against the civil action defendant within the past five (5) years in another court within the judicial district or another judicial district and the actions were dismissed on the merits or with prejudice against the civil action plaintiff;
(2) The alleged abusive civil action plaintiff has used the same or substantially similar issues that are the subject of the current civil action as the basis for an adverse complaint against the civil action defendant to a regulatory or licensing board and the regulatory or licensing board dismissed the complaint after a contested case hearing in compliance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5;
(3) The alleged abusive civil action plaintiff has been sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or a similar rule or law in another state or the federal government for filing one (1) or more frivolous, vexatious, or abusive civil actions within the past ten (10) years of filing the current civil action alleged to be abusive and the previous frivolous, vexatious, or abusive civil actions involved the same or substantially the same issues between the same or substantially the same civil action parties; or
(4) A court of record in another judicial district has determined that a civil action filed against the civil action defendant was an abusive civil action and is under or has been under prefiling restrictions in that judicial district.
(a) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a person filing a civil action is an abusive civil action plaintiff, and that any or all civil actions filed by the abusive civil action plaintiff against the abusive civil action defendant that are pending before the court are abusive civil actions, the civil actions shall be dismissed.
(b) In addition to dismissal of any pending abusive civil action within the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall:
(1) Tax all costs of any abusive civil action pending in the court at the time of the court’s finding pursuant to subsection (a) against the abusive civil action plaintiff;
(2) Award the civil action defendant reasonable attorney fees and all reasonable costs of defending the abusive civil action; and
(3) Impose prefiling restrictions upon any civil action the abusive civil action plaintiff attempts to file for a period of not less than forty-eight (48) months nor more than seventy-two (72) months.
(c) If a civil action defendant alleges that a claim is an abusive civil action or that the plaintiff is an abusive civil action plaintiff, and the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the action was not an abusive civil action or that the plaintiff is not an abusive civil action plaintiff, the court may grant to the plaintiff such remedies as may be just, including granting judgment in favor of the plaintiff, granting partial judgment in favor of the plaintiff, or allowing factual interpretations in favor of the plaintiff.
(d) If a civil action defendant alleges that a claim is an abusive civil action or that the plaintiff is an abusive civil action plaintiff, and the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the action was not an abusive civil action or that the plaintiff is not an abusive civil action plaintiff, the court may:
(1) Tax all costs related to litigating the issue of whether the action is an abusive civil action or whether the plaintiff is an abusive civil action plaintiff, against the civil action defendant who made the claim; and
(2) Award the civil action plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and all reasonable costs of defending the claim that the action was an abusive civil action or that the plaintiff was an abusive civil action plaintiff.
(a) Except as provided in this section, a person whom a court of record has determined to be an abusive civil action plaintiff and against whom prefiling restrictions have been imposed is prohibited from instituting a civil action against the abusive civil action defendant for the period of time the prefiling restrictions are in effect, or from continuing a civil action that was instituted against the same civil action defendant prior to the date the person was determined to be an abusive civil action plaintiff.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) and consistent with the Constitution of Tennessee, Article I, § 17, an abusive civil action plaintiff against whom prefiling restrictions have been imposed may seek permission to file a civil action using the procedure set out in subsection (c).
(c)(1) An abusive civil action plaintiff against whom prefiling restrictions have been imposed pursuant to this chapter who wishes to institute a civil action in a court of record during the time the abusive civil action plaintiff is under filing restrictions must first appear before the judge who imposed the prefiling restrictions to make application for permission to institute the civil action.
(2)(A) The judge may examine witnesses, including the abusive civil action plaintiff and the civil action defendant, to determine if the proposed civil action is or is not an abusive civil action and if there are reasonable and legitimate grounds upon which the complaint is based.
(B) There is a rebuttable presumption that any proposed civil action is an abusive civil action if any of the defendants in the proposed action were civil action defendants in one (1) or more of the actions that were the basis for the person being declared an abusive civil action plaintiff.
(3)(A) If the judge who imposed the prefiling restrictions believes that the civil action the abusive civil action plaintiff is making application to file will be an abusive civil action, the application shall be denied and the judge shall determine a time when the person may next make application to file a civil action.
(B) If the judge reasonably believes that the civil action the abusive civil action plaintiff is making application to file will not be an abusive civil action, the judge may grant the application and issue an order permitting the filing of the civil action. The order shall be attached to the front of the complaint when the abusive civil action plaintiff files the civil action with the clerk. The defendant to the action shall be served with a copy of the order at the same time the complaint is served.
(4) The findings of the judge shall be reduced to writing and made a part of record in the matter. If the abusive civil action plaintiff disputes the finding of the judge, the abusive civil action plaintiff may appeal to the presiding judge of the judicial district of the sanctioning judge. If the sanctioning judge is the presiding judge, the presiding judge shall randomly select two (2) other judges of courts of record in the judicial district to review the findings of the sanctioning judge. If there are not two (2) other judges in the judicial district available, the presiding judge may select a judge from an adjoining judicial district to review the findings. If the presiding judge or both reviewing other judges believe that the civil action the person is making application to file is not an abusive civil action, the findings of the sanctioning judge are overruled and both judges shall sign an order permitting the filing of the action. The order shall be entered and attached to the complaint and the defendant shall be served with a copy of the order at the same time the complaint is served.
(d) If the application for the filing of a civil action is granted pursuant to this section, the period of time commencing with the filing of the application requesting permission to file the action and ending with the issuance of an order permitting filing of the action shall not be computed as a part of an applicable period of limitations within which the civil action must be instituted.
(e) If after an abusive civil action plaintiff has made application and been granted permission to file a civil action pursuant to this section, the judge with jurisdiction over the action determines that the person is attempting to add parties, amend the complaint, or is otherwise attempting to alter the parties and issues involved in the civil action in a manner that the judge reasonably believes would make the action an abusive civil action, the judge may order a continuance or nonsuit of the action and return it to the presiding judge for further disposition.
(f)(1) If a civil action defendant is served with a complaint from an abusive civil action plaintiff who filed a civil action in a judicial district in which the person has not been determined to be an abusive civil action plaintiff, and the complaint does not have an attached order from the judge who imposed the prefiling restrictions, the civil action defendant may obtain a certified copy of the order finding the person to be an abusive civil action plaintiff in another jurisdiction and send it to the judge where the new civil action was filed and the judge who imposed the prefiling restrictions.
(2) If it is brought to the attention of the court, or on the court’s own motion, that a person against whom prefiling restrictions have been imposed has filed a civil action or continued a legal proceeding in the sanctioning judge’s judicial district, or in another judicial district, without application to do so being granted by the sanctioning judge pursuant to this section, or the abusive civil action plaintiff has attempted to file an action through another party, the court in which the civil action is pending shall dismiss the action or revoke the continuance. The sanctioning judge may take whatever action against the abusive civil action plaintiff deemed necessary for a violation of the court’s order.
(3) If an abusive civil action plaintiff against whom prefiling restrictions have been imposed files a civil action and the order granting permission to file the action is not attached to the complaint or served on the defendant, the defendant is under no obligation or duty to respond to the complaint, answer interrogatories, appear for depositions, or any other responsive action required by rule or statute in a civil action.
(g) If the judge who imposed the prefiling restrictions is no longer serving in the same capacity in the same judicial district where the restrictions were placed, any other judge in that judicial district may perform the review required and permitted by this section.
(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4. All pleadings and records filed in the chancery and circuit courts pursuant to this section shall be placed under seal and shall not be subject to public disclosure, in the same manner as those filed in juvenile court, unless otherwise provided by court order.
(b)(1) The prospective adoptive parent or parents, including extended family members caring for a related child, a licensed child-placing agency having physical custody of the child, the child’s guardian ad litem, or the department have standing to file a petition pursuant to this part or title 37 to terminate parental or guardianship rights of a person alleged to be a parent or guardian of the child, pursuant to § 36-1-117(a). The prospective adoptive parents, including extended family members caring for a related child, have standing to request termination of parental or guardianship rights in the adoption petition filed by them pursuant to this part.
(2)(A) When one (1) of the child’s parents has been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, or rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, from which crime the child was conceived, the child’s other parent has standing to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the convicted parent.
(B) When one (1) of the child’s parents has been convicted of one (1) of the offenses specified in subdivision (g)(11)(A)(ii), the child’s other parent has standing to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the abusive parent.
(C) When one (1) of the child’s parents or legal guardians has been convicted of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree murder of the child’s other parent or legal guardian, the child’s non-offending parent or legal guardian has standing to file a petition to terminate the parental or guardianship rights of the convicted parent or legal guardian.
(3) This section does not give a parent or legal guardian standing to file a petition to terminate parental or guardianship rights based on grounds other than those listed in subdivision (b)(2).
(4) The court shall notify the petitioning parent that the duty of future child support by the parent who is the subject of the termination petition will be forever terminated by entry of an order terminating parental rights.
(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:
(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and
(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child.
(d)(1) The petition to terminate parental rights may be made upon information and belief and shall be verified. If a parent whose parental rights are proposed for termination is the legal parent of the child, as defined in § 36-1-102, and if such parent is alleged to be deceased, then diligent efforts must be made by the petitioner to verify the death of such parent. Upon proof satisfactory to the court that such parent is deceased, no further action shall be required to terminate parental rights of that person.
(2)(A) The petition to terminate parental rights shall state:
(i) The child’s birth name;
(ii) The child’s age or date of birth;
(iii) The child’s current residence address or county of residence or that the child is in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency;
(iv) Any other facts that allege the basis for termination of parental rights and that bring the child and parties within the jurisdiction of the court;
(v) Any notice required pursuant to subdivision (d)(4) has been given; and
(vi) The medical and social history of the child and the child’s biological family has been completed to the extent possible on the form promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-1-111(j); provided, however, the absence of such completed information shall not be a barrier to termination of parental rights.
(B) Initials or pseudonyms may be used in the petition in lieu of the full names of the petitioners to promote the safety of the petitioners or of the child, with permission of the court;
(3)(A) The petition to terminate parental rights must state that:
(i) The Tennessee putative father registry has been consulted prior to the filing of the petition or will be consulted within ten (10) working days thereafter unless the biological father has been identified through DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 and that identification is set out in the petition; and a copy of the response to this inquiry shall be provided to the court immediately upon receipt by the petitioner; and
(ii) Notice of the filing of the termination petition has been provided to the Tennessee putative father registry if the child is less than thirty (30) days old at the time the petition is filed.
(B) The petition to terminate, or the adoption petition that seeks to terminate parental rights, shall state that:
(i) The petition or request for termination in the adoption petition, if granted, shall have the effect of forever severing all of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians to the child who is the subject of the order, and of the child to the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians;
(ii) The child will be placed in the guardianship of other person, persons or public or private agencies who, or that, as the case may be, shall have the right to adopt the child, or to place the child for adoption and to consent to the child’s adoption; and
(iii) The parent or guardian shall have no further right to notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child by other persons and that the parent or guardian shall have no right to object to the child’s adoption or thereafter, at any time, to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child, except as provided by contract pursuant to § 36-1-145.
(4) The petition to terminate parental rights, if filed separately from the adoption petition, may be filed as provided in § 36-1-114. If the petition is filed in a court different from the court where there is a pending custody, dependency, neglect or abuse proceeding concerning a person whose parental rights are sought to be terminated in the petition, a notice of the filing of the petition, together with a copy of the petition, shall be sent by the petitioner to the court where the prior proceeding is pending. In addition, the petitioner filing a petition under this section shall comply with the requirements of § 36-1-117(e).
(e) Service of process of the petition shall be made as provided in § 36-1-117.
(f)(1) A parent or guardian who is incarcerated at the time the parent is served with a petition to terminate parental rights shall receive notice that:
(A) A hearing will be held to determine whether the parent’s rights will be terminated;
(B) If the parent files a timely, written answer within thirty (30) days of service of the petition to terminate their parental rights, then:
(i) The parent must receive advance notice of the time and place of the hearing;
(ii) The parent has the right to participate in the hearing and to contest the allegation that the parent’s rights should be terminated. At the discretion of the court, such participation may be achieved through personal appearance, teleconference, telecommunication, or other means deemed by the court to be appropriate under the circumstances;
(iii) The parent may claim to be indigent and offer evidence of their financial circumstances and, if the court finds the parent to be indigent, the parent must be provided with a court-appointed attorney to assist the parent in contesting the termination of parental rights;
(iv) The parent has the right to offer testimony and other evidence at the hearing by all means permitted by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(v) The parent has the continuing responsibility to update the court and petitioner’s counsel with the parent’s current contact information and mailing address promptly upon the parent’s release from incarceration and upon any subsequent changes; and
(C) The rights specified in subdivision (f)(1)(B) may be voluntarily waived by the parent’s written or verbal statement or, if the court determines that the parent has waived the rights specified in subdivision (f)(1)(B), by the parent’s action or inaction, including the failure to timely claim indigency or file an answer to the petition to terminate parental rights. If the court determines that the rights specified in subdivision (f)(1)(B) have been waived, then the court may hear and decide the petition without the parent’s or guardian’s participation.
(2) If a parent or guardian was served with constructive notice and the petitioner did not know that the parent was incarcerated despite reasonable efforts to locate the parent, then the absence of this notice to the parent or guardian is not a basis to set aside the termination of parental rights or adoption.
(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another ground:
(1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has occurred;
(2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant to title 37, chapter 2, part 4;
(3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a child is alleged to be a dependent and neglected child, and:
(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian;
(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and
(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;
(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard;
(4) Under a prior order of a court or by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for adoption, a child has been found to be a victim of severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, and the parent or guardian has been found to have knowingly or with gross negligence either committed severe child abuse or failed to protect the child from severe child abuse.
(5) The parent or guardian has been sentenced to more than two (2) years’ imprisonment for conduct against a child that has been found under any prior order of a court or that is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102. Unless otherwise stated, for purposes of this subdivision (g)(5), “sentenced” shall not be construed to mean that the parent or guardian must have actually served more than two (2) years in confinement, but shall only be construed to mean that the court had imposed a sentence of more than two (2) years upon the parent or guardian;
(6)(A) The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court; or
(B) The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of one (1) or more criminal acts, under a sentence of six (6) or more years, and one (1) or more other grounds within this subsection (g) have been satisfied;
(7) The parent has been:
(A) Convicted of first degree or second degree murder of the child’s other parent or legal guardian; or
(B) Found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child’s other parent or legal guardian;
(8)(A) The chancery and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding, and the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts shall have jurisdiction in a separate, independent proceeding conducted prior to an adoption proceeding to determine if the parent or guardian is mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the child, and to terminate that parent’s or guardian’s rights to the child;
(B) The court may terminate the parental or guardianship rights of that person if it determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that:
(i) The parent or guardian of the child is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s or guardian’s mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future; and
(ii) That termination of parental or guardian rights is in the best interest of the child;
(C) In the circumstances described under subdivisions (8)(A) and (B), no willfulness in the failure of the parent or guardian to establish the parent’s or guardian’s ability to care for the child need be shown to establish that the parental or guardianship rights should be terminated;
(9)(A) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The parental rights of a person who is not a legal parent at the time of the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights of such person, or if no such petition is filed, then at the time of the filing of a petition to adopt a child, is the putative father of the child, may also be terminated based upon any one (1) or more of the following additional grounds:
(i) The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to make reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the child in accordance with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101;
(ii) The person has failed to seek reasonable visitation with the child, and if visitation has been granted, has failed to visit altogether, or has engaged in only token visitation, as defined in § 36-1-102;
(iii) The person has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child;
(iv) Placing custody of the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; or
(v) The person has failed to file a petition to establish paternity of the child within thirty (30) days after notice of alleged paternity, or as required in § 36-2-318(j), or after making a claim of paternity pursuant to § 36-1-117(c)(2);
(B)(i) For purposes of this subdivision (g)(9), “notice” means the written statement to a person who is believed to be the biological father or possible biological father of the child. The notice may be made or given by the mother, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, the prospective adoptive parents, a physical custodian of the child, or the legal counsel of any of these people or entities; provided, that actual notice of alleged paternity may be proven to have been given to a person by any means and by any person or entity. The notice may be made or given at any time after the child is conceived and, if not sooner, may include actual notice of a petition to terminate the putative father’s parental rights with respect to the child;
(ii) “Notice” also means the oral statement to an alleged biological father from a biological mother that the alleged biological father is believed to be the biological father, or possible biological father, of the biological mother’s child;
(C) For the purposes of this subdivision (g)(9), resuming or starting visitation or support after the filing of a petition seeking to terminate parental or guardianship rights or seeking the adoption of a child does not rectify a ground for termination pursuant to this subdivision (g)(9) and is not a defense to a ground for termination pursuant to this subdivision (g)(9);
(10)(A) The parent has been convicted of one (1) of the following offenses from which the child was conceived:
(i) Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
(ii) Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;
(iii) Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
(iv) Especially aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-534; or
(v) Especially aggravated rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-535; and
(B) A certified copy of the conviction suffices to prove this ground;
(11)(A)(i) The parent has been found to have committed severe child sexual abuse under any prior order of a criminal court;
(ii) For the purposes of this section, “severe child sexual abuse” means the parent is convicted of any of the following offenses, or an offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar, toward a child:
(a) Aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect or endangerment, pursuant to § 39-15-402;
(b) Aggravated rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-531;
(c) Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
(d) Aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-504;
(e) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1004;
(f) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1005;
(g) Incest, pursuant to § 39-15-302;
(h) Promoting prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-515;
(i) Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;
(j) Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
(k) Sexual battery by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-527;
(l) Statutory rape by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-532; or
(m) Trafficking for a commercial sex act, pursuant to § 39-13-309;
(B) Deleted by 2022 Pub.Acts, c. 937, § 4, eff. July 1, 2022.
(12) The parent or guardian has been convicted of trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309, or an offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar;
(13) The parent or guardian has been convicted on or after July 1, 2015, of sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, or a sex trafficking of children offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar to § 39-13-309;
(14) A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; and
(15)(A) The parent or legal guardian has been convicted of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree murder of the child’s other parent or legal guardian;
(B) Deleted by 2022 Pub.Acts, c. 937, § 5, eff. July 1, 2022.
(16) The court hearing the petition for termination of parental rights finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) The father engaged in an act of unlawful sexual penetration against the child’s mother by which the child was conceived and the father:
(i) Used force or coercion to accomplish the act;
(ii) Accomplished the act without the consent of the mother of the child and the father knew or had reason to know at the time of penetration that the mother of the child did not consent;
(iii) Knew or had reason to know that the mother of the child was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, physically helpless, or a vulnerable adult; or
(iv) Accomplished the sexual penetration by fraud; or
(B) The father engaged in an act against the child’s mother that resulted in:
(i) The child’s conception; and
(ii) The father’s conviction for or plea of guilty to a criminal offense.
(h)(1) The department shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition), and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption, under the following circumstances:
(A) In the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the department for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months;
(B) If a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant as defined at § 36-1-102;
(C) If a court of competent jurisdiction has made a determination in a criminal or civil proceeding that the parent has committed murder of a child, committed voluntary manslaughter of a child, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter of a child, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury or severe child abuse as defined at § 37-1-102 to a child. For the purposes of this subsection (h), such a determination shall be made by a jury or trial court judge designated by § 16-2-502 through an explicit finding, or by such equivalent courts of other states or of the United States;
(D) If a juvenile court has made a finding of severe child abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, then a petition required by this subdivision (h)(1)(D) must be filed within ninety (90) days of the finding;
(E) If a child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the department for six (6) months or more and the child’s parents have not made reasonable progress toward obtaining custody of the child during the six-month period; or
(F) If two (2) or more of the grounds for termination of parental rights set out in subsection (g) apply to the child’s parent.
(G) If a juvenile court has found there has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with a statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan in an order entered pursuant to § 37-2-409. The department must file a petition required by this subdivision (h)(1)(G) within ninety (90) days of the juvenile court’s finding.
(2) At the option of the department, the department may determine that a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents shall not be filed (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, shall not be required to seek to be joined as a party to the petition), if one of the following exists:
(A) The child is being cared for by a relative;
(B) The department has documented in the permanency plan, which shall be available for court review, a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or
(C) The department has not made reasonable efforts under § 37-1-166 to provide to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the department permanency plan, such services as the department deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.
(i)(1) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant and child-centered factors applicable to the particular case before the court. Those factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s minority;
(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;
(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;
(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the parent can create such attachment;
(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive relationship with the child;
(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;
(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic symptoms;
(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another person or persons in the absence of the parent;
(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;
(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable manner;
(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;
(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of the department;
(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest;
(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;
(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child or any other child;
(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and specific needs required for the child to thrive;
(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific needs and in which the child can thrive;
(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and safe for the child;
(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial support for the child; and
(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.
(2) When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1), the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.
(3) All factors considered by the court to be applicable to a particular case must be identified and supported by specific findings of fact in the court’s written order.
(4) Expert testimony is not required to prove or disprove any factor by any party.
(5) As used in this subsection (i), “parent” includes guardian.
(j) In the hearing on the petition, the circuit, chancery, or juvenile court shall admit evidence, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, and shall recognize the exemptions to privileges as provided pursuant to §§ 37-1-411 and 37-1-614.
(k) The court shall ensure that the hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best interest of the child. The court shall provide a ruling on the petition within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing and shall enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty (30) days of the ruling. If an order has not been entered within thirty (30) days from the court’s ruling, then the petitioner or respondent has grounds to request that the court of appeals grant an order expediting entry of the order. A termination of parental rights and a finalization of an adoption may be heard and decided in the same hearing if the court determines it is in the best interest of the child.
(l)(1) An order terminating parental rights shall have the effect of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian of the child against whom the order of termination is entered and of the child who is the subject of the petition to that parent or guardian. The parent or guardian shall have no further right to notice of proceedings for the adoption of that child by other persons and shall have no right to object to the child’s adoption or thereafter to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child. It shall terminate the responsibilities of that parent or guardian under this section for future child support or other future financial responsibilities even if the child is not ultimately adopted; provided, that the entry of an order terminating the parental rights shall not eliminate the responsibility of such parent or guardian for past child support arrearages or other financial obligations incurred for the care of such child prior to the entry of the order terminating parental rights.
(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (l)(1), a child who is the subject of the order for termination shall be entitled to inherit from a parent whose rights are terminated until the final order of adoption is entered.
(m) Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship of the child to a licensed child-placing agency or the department. Such guardianship shall include the right to place the child for adoption and the right to consent to the child’s adoption. Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship to any prospective adoptive parent or parents with the right to adopt the child, or to any permanent guardian who has been appointed pursuant to title 37, chapter 1, part 8. In any of these cases, such guardianship is subject to the remaining rights, if any, of any other parent or guardian of the child. Before guardianship or partial guardianship can be awarded to a permanent guardian, the court shall find that the department or licensed child-placing agency currently having custody of the child has made reasonable efforts to place the child for adoption and that permanent guardianship is in the best interest of the child.
(n) An order of guardianship or partial guardianship entered by the court pursuant to this section shall supersede prior orders of custody or guardianship of that court and of other courts, except those prior orders of guardianship or partial guardianship of other courts entered as the result of validly executed surrenders or revocations pursuant to § 36-1-111 or § 36-1-112, or except as provided pursuant to § 36-1-111(o)(4)(D) and (E), or except an order of guardianship or partial guardianship of a court entered pursuant to § 36-1-116; provided, that orders terminating parental rights entered by a court under this section prior to the filing of an adoption petition shall be effective to terminate parental rights for all purposes.
(o) If the court terminates parental or guardianship rights, under this part or title 37 or a consent is given pursuant to § 36-1-117(f) or (g), or if there have been surrenders of parental or guardianship rights of all other necessary parties, then no further surrender or consent of that parent or guardian shall be necessary to authorize an adoption; provided, that the adoption court may review and confirm the validity of any denials of parentage made by persons under any statutory provisions from outside the state of Tennessee.
(p) A copy of the order or orders obtained by the prospective adoptive parents terminating parental or guardianship rights under this section shall be filed with the petition for adoption.
(q) After the entry of the order terminating parental rights, no party to the proceeding, nor anyone claiming under such party, may later question the validity of the termination proceeding by reason of any defect or irregularity therein, jurisdictional or otherwise, but shall be fully bound thereby, except based upon a timely appeal of the termination order as may be allowed by law; and in no event, for any reason, shall a termination of parental rights be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after one (1) year from the date of the entry of the final order of termination. This provision is intended as a statute of repose.
(r) The disability of a parent or guardian alone shall not be considered for or against termination of parental or guardian rights unless the disability impacts the parent’s ability to care for the physical or psychological welfare of the child.
(s) For the purposes of all grounds for termination of parental rights described in subsection (g), a person is presumed to have knowledge that sexual activity leads to pregnancy. An adult has an affirmative obligation to inquire whether their sexual activity has resulted in a pregnancy, and a minor has such obligation upon attaining eighteen (18) years of age regardless of when the sexual activity occurred. A lack of specific knowledge of a pregnancy or birth of a child does not serve as a defense to a ground for termination of parental rights if the person failed to inquire, or failed to attempt to inquire, whether the person’s actions resulted in pregnancy or the birth of a child.
Absent an order of custody to the contrary, custody of a child born out of wedlock is with the mother.
As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Abuse” means:
(A) Inflicting, or attempting to inflict, physical injury on an adult or minor by other than accidental means;
(B) Placing an adult or minor in fear of, or in, physical harm or physical restraint;
(C) Causing malicious damage to the personal property of the abused party; or
(D) Intentionally engaging in behavior that amounts to financial abuse;
(2) “Adult” means any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, or who is otherwise emancipated;
(3)(A) “Court,” in counties having a population of not less than two hundred sixty thousand (260,000) nor more than eight hundred thousand (800,000), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters;
(B) Notwithstanding subdivision (3)(A), “court,” in counties with a metropolitan form of government with a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters and the general sessions court. In such county having a metropolitan form of government, a judicial commissioner may issue an ex parte order of protection. Nothing in this definition may be construed to grant jurisdiction to the general sessions court for matters relating to child custody, visitation, or support;
(C) “Court,” in all other counties, means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters or the general sessions court;
(D) “Court” also includes judicial commissioners, magistrates and other officials with the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the absence of a judge for purposes of issuing ex parte orders of protection when a judge of one of the courts listed in subdivisions (3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) is not available;
(E) In counties having a population in excess of eight hundred thousand (800,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, “court” means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relations matters or the general sessions criminal court. In such counties, “court” also includes judicial commissioners, magistrates and other officials with the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the absence of a judge for purposes of issuing any order of protection pursuant to this part when a judge of one of the courts listed in subdivisions (3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) is not available. Nothing in this definition may be construed to grant jurisdiction to the general sessions court, both criminal and civil, for matters relating to child custody, visitation, or support;
(F) Any appeal from a final ruling on an order of protection by a general sessions court or by any official authorized to issue an order of protection under this subdivision (3) shall be to the circuit or chancery court of the county. Such appeal shall be filed within ten (10) days and shall be heard de novo unless the order expires by operation of law, an order of protection granted pursuant to this part remains in effect during the appeal;
(4) “Domestic abuse” means committing abuse against a victim, as defined in subdivision (5);
(5) “Domestic abuse victim” means any person who falls within the following categories:
(A) Adults or minors who are current or former spouses;
(B) Adults or minors who live together or who have lived together;
(C) Adults or minors who are dating or who have dated or who have or had a sexual relationship. As used herein, “dating” and “dated” do not include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a business or social context;
(D) Adults or minors related by blood or adoption;
(E) Adults or minors who are related or were formerly related by marriage; or
(F) Adult or minor children of a person in a relationship that is described in subdivisions (5)(A)-(E);
(6) “Financial abuse” means behavior that is coercive, that is deceptive, or that unreasonably controls or restrains a person’s ability to acquire, use, or maintain economic resources to which the person is entitled, including using coercion, fraud, or manipulation to:
(A) Restrict a person’s access to money, assets, credit, or financial information;
(B) Unfairly use a person’s economic resources, including money, assets, and credit, to gain an advantage; or
(C) Exert undue influence over a person’s financial behavior or decisions, including forcing default on joint or other financial obligations; exploiting powers of attorney, guardianship, or conservatorship; or failing or neglecting to act in the best interest of the person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed;
(7) “Firearm” means any weapon designed, made or adapted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use;
(8) “Petitioner” means the person alleging domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense in a petition for an order for protection;
(9) “Preferred response” means law enforcement officers shall arrest a person committing domestic abuse unless there is a clear and compelling reason not to arrest;
(10) “Respondent” means the person alleged to have abused, stalked or sexually assaulted another in a petition for an order for protection;
(11) “Sexual assault victim” means any person, regardless of the relationship with the perpetrator, who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of any form of rape, as defined in § 39-13-502, § 39-13-503, § 39-13-506 or § 39-13-522, or sexual battery, as defined in § 39-13-504, § 39-13-505, or § 39-13-527;
(12) “Stalking victim” means any person, regardless of the relationship with the perpetrator, who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of the offense of stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315; and
(13) “Weapon” means a firearm or a device listed in § 39-17-1302(a)(1)-(7).
(a) Any domestic abuse victim, stalking victim or sexual assault victim who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of, domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense, may seek relief under this part by filing a sworn petition alleging domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense by the respondent.
(b) Any petition filed by an unemancipated person under eighteen (18) years of age shall be signed by one (1) of that person’s parents or by that person’s guardian. The petition may also be signed by a caseworker at a not-for-profit organization that receives funds pursuant to title 71, chapter 6, part 2 for family violence and child abuse prevention and shelters; provided, however, that a petition signed by a caseworker may not be filed against the unemancipated minor’s parent or legal guardian. In such case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, a copy of the petition, notice of hearing and any ex parte order of protection shall also be served on the parents of the minor child, or if the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent. In cases before the juvenile court where the department of children’s services is a party or where a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by the juvenile court, the petition may be filed on behalf of the unemancipated person by the department or the guardian ad litem.
(c) Venue for a petition for an order of protection, and all other matters relating to orders of protection, shall be in the county where the respondent resides or the county in which the domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or human trafficking offense occurred. If the respondent is not a resident of Tennessee, the petition may be filed in the county where the petitioner resides.
(a) If an order of protection is in effect at the time either the petitioner or respondent files a complaint for divorce, the order of protection shall remain in effect until the court to which the divorce action is assigned:
(1) Modifies the order;
(2) Dissolves the order; or
(3) Makes the order part of the divorce decree.
(b) If the court modifies the order or makes the order of protection part of the divorce decree, the court shall issue a separate order of protection.
(c) The clerk shall immediately forward a copy of any order of protection issued and any subsequent modifications to the petitioner, respondent, and the local law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction in the area where the petitioner resides in the manner provided by § 36-3-609(e).
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a petitioner from requesting relief under this part in a divorce action.
(a)(1) The office of the clerk of court shall provide forms that may be necessary to seek a protection order under this part. These forms shall be limited to use in causes filed under this part and they shall be made available to all who request assistance in filing a petition. The clerk may obtain the most current forms by printing them from the web site of the administrative office of the courts.
(2) The petitioner is not limited to the use of these forms and may present to the court any legally sufficient petition in whatever form. The office of the clerk shall also assist a person who is not represented by counsel by filling in the name of the court on the petition, by indicating where the petitioner’s name shall be filled in, by reading through the petition form with the petitioner, and by rendering any other assistance that is necessary for the filing of the petition. All such petitions that are filed pro se shall be liberally construed procedurally in favor of the petitioner.
(b) The administrative office of the courts, in consultation with the domestic violence coordinating council, shall develop a petition for orders of protection form, an amended order of protection form, an ex parte order of protection form and other forms that are found to be necessary and advisable. These forms shall be revised as the laws relative to orders of protection and ex parte orders of protection are amended by the general assembly. To the extent possible, the forms shall be uniform with those promulgated by surrounding states so that Tennessee forms may be afforded full faith and credit.
(c) The administrative office of the courts shall revise the petition for an order of protection form to fully advise the respondent of this part in language substantially similar to the following:
(1) If the order of protection is granted in a manner that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the respondent is required to terminate physical possession by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, of all firearms that the respondent possesses within forty-eight (48) hours of the granting of the order;
(2) It is a criminal offense for a person subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), to possess a firearm while that order is in effect; and
(3) The issuance of an order of protection may terminate or, at least, suspend the individual’s right to purchase or possess a firearm.
(d) These forms shall be used exclusively in all courts exercising jurisdiction over orders of protection.
(a) Upon the filing of a petition under this part, the courts may immediately, for good cause shown, issue an ex parte order of protection. An immediate and present danger of abuse to the petitioner shall constitute good cause for purposes of this section.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days of service of such order on the respondent under this part, a hearing must be held, at which time the court shall either dissolve any ex parte order that has been issued, or shall, if the petitioner has proved the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense by a preponderance of the evidence, extend the order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year, unless a further hearing on the continuation of such order is requested by the respondent or the petitioner; in which case, on proper showing of cause, such order may be continued for a further definite period of one (1) year, after which time a further hearing must be held for any subsequent one-year period. Any ex parte order of protection must be in effect until the time of the hearing, and, if the hearing is held within fifteen (15) days of service of such order, then the ex parte order must continue in effect until the entry of any subsequent order of protection issued pursuant to § 36-3-609. If no ex parte order of protection has been issued as of the time of the hearing, and the petitioner has proven the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court may, at that time, issue an order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year.
(c) The court shall cause a copy of the petition and notice of the date set for the hearing on such petition, as well as a copy of any ex parte order of protection, to be served upon the respondent at least five (5) days prior to such hearing. An ex parte order issued pursuant to this part shall be personally served upon the respondent. However, if the respondent is not a resident of Tennessee, the ex parte order shall be served pursuant to §§ 20-2-215 and 20-2-216. Such notice shall advise the respondent that the respondent may be represented by counsel. In every case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, when a petitioner is under eighteen (18) years of age, a copy of the petition, notice of hearing and any ex parte order of protection shall also be served on the parents of the minor child, or in the event that the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent, pursuant to the requirements of this section.
(d) Within the time the order of protection is in effect, any court of competent jurisdiction may modify the order of protection, either upon the court’s own motion or upon motion of the petitioner. If a respondent is properly served and afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to § 36-3-612, and is found to be in violation of the order, the court may extend the order of protection up to five (5) years. If a respondent is properly served and afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to § 36-3-612, and is found to be in a second or subsequent violation of the order, the court may extend the order of protection up to ten (10) years. No new petition is required to be filed in order for a court to modify an order or extend an order pursuant to this subsection (d).
(a) A protection order granted under this part to protect the petitioner from domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense may include, but is not limited to:
(1) Directing the respondent to refrain from committing domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense or threatening to commit domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense against the petitioner or the petitioner’s minor children;
(2) Prohibiting the respondent from coming about the petitioner for any purpose, from telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(3) Prohibiting the respondent from stalking the petitioner, as defined in § 39-17-315;
(4) Granting to the petitioner possession of the residence or household to the exclusion of the respondent by evicting the respondent, by restoring possession to the petitioner, or by both;
(5) Directing the respondent to provide suitable alternate housing for the petitioner when the respondent is the sole owner or lessee of the residence or household;
(6) Awarding temporary custody of, or establishing temporary visitation rights with regard to, any minor children born to or adopted by the parties;
(7) Awarding financial support to the petitioner and such persons as the respondent has a duty to support. Except in cases of paternity, the court shall not have the authority to order financial support unless the petitioner and respondent are legally married. Such order may be enforced pursuant to chapter 5 of this title;
(8) Directing the respondent to attend available counseling programs that address violence and control issues or substance abuse problems. A violation of a protection order or part of such order that directs counseling pursuant to this subdivision (a)(8) may be punished as criminal or civil contempt. Section 36-3-610(a) applies with respect to a nonlawyer general sessions judge who holds a person in criminal contempt for violating this subdivision (a)(8);
(9) Directing the care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the household. In no instance shall the animal be placed in the care, custody, or control of the respondent, but shall instead be placed in the care, custody or control of the petitioner or in an appropriate animal foster situation;
(10) Directing the respondent to immediately and temporarily vacate a residence shared with the petitioner, pending a hearing on the matter, notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary;
(11) Directing the respondent to pay the petitioner all costs, expenses and fees pertaining to the petitioner’s breach of a lease or rental agreement for residential property if the petitioner is a party to the lease or rental agreement and if the court finds that continuing to reside in the rented or leased premises may jeopardize the life, health and safety of the petitioner or the petitioner’s children. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(11) shall be construed as altering the terms of, liability for, or parties to such lease or rental agreement; or
(12) Ordering a wireless service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner pursuant to § 36-3-621.
(b) Relief granted pursuant to subdivisions (a)(4)-(8) shall be ordered only after the petitioner and respondent have been given an opportunity to be heard by the court.
(c) Any order of protection issued under this part shall include the statement of the maximum penalty that may be imposed pursuant to § 36-3-610 for violating such order.
(d) No order of protection made under this part shall in any manner affect title to any real property.
(e) An order of protection issued pursuant to this part shall be valid and enforceable in any county of this state.
(f) An order of protection issued pursuant to this part that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) shall contain the disclosures set out in § 36-3-625(a).
The court shall not require the execution of a bond by the petitioner to issue any order of protection under this part.
(a) All orders of protection shall be effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed one (1) year.
(b) The court may modify its order at any time upon subsequent motion filed by either party together with an affidavit showing a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the modification.
(a) If the respondent has been served with a copy of the petition, notice of hearing, and any ex parte order issued pursuant to § 36-3-605(c), any subsequent order of protection shall be effective when the order is entered. For purposes of this section, an order shall be considered entered when such order is signed by:
(1) The judge and all parties or counsel;
(2) The judge and one party or counsel and contains a certificate of counsel that a copy of the proposed order has been served on all other parties or counsel; or
(3) The judge and contains a certificate of the clerk that a copy has been served on all other parties or counsel.
(b)(1) As used in subsection (a), service upon a party or counsel shall be made by delivering to such party or counsel a copy of the order of protection, or by the clerk mailing it to the party’s last known address. In the event the party’s last known address is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry, the certificate of service shall so state. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. In order to complete service of process in a timely manner on a party who lives outside the county where the order was issued, the clerk may transmit the order to the sheriff in the appropriate county by facsimile or other electronic transmission.
(2) Notwithstanding § 16-15-902, an ex parte order of protection may be served within one (1) year of issuance.
(c) Notwithstanding when an order is considered entered under subsection (a), if the court finds that the protection of the petitioner so requires, the court may order, in the manner provided by law or rule, that the order of protection take effect immediately.
(d) If the respondent has been served with a copy of the petition, notice of hearing, and any ex parte order issued pursuant to § 36-3-605(c), an order of protection issued pursuant to this part after a hearing shall be in full force and effect against the respondent from the time it is entered regardless of whether the respondent is present at the hearing.
(e) A copy of any order of protection and any subsequent modifications or dismissal shall be issued to the petitioner, the respondent, the local law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction in the area where the petitioner resides, and any court other than the issuing court in which the respondent and petitioner are parties to an action. The petitioner and respondent shall notify the judge of any such court. Upon receipt of the copy of the order of protection or dismissal from the issuing court or clerk’s office, the local law enforcement agency shall take any necessary action to immediately transmit it to the national crime information center.
(a) Upon violation of the order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement, the court may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with the law. A judge of the general sessions court shall have the same power as a court of record to punish the defendant for contempt when exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this part or when exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a court of record. A judge of the general sessions court who is not a licensed attorney shall appoint an attorney referee to hear charges of criminal contempt.
(b)(1) In addition to the authorized punishments for contempt of court, the judge may assess any person who violates an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement a civil penalty of fifty dollars ($50.00). The judge may further order that any support payment made pursuant to an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement be made under an income assignment to the clerk of court.
(2) The judge upon finding a violation of an order of protection or a court-approved consent order shall require a bond of the respondent until such time as the order of protection expires. Such bond shall not be less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) and shall be payable upon forfeit as provided. Bond shall be set at whatever the court determines is necessary to reasonably assure the safety of the petitioner as required. Any respondent for whom bond has been set may deposit with the clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money in cash equal to the amount of the bond. The clerk of the court may deposit funds received in lieu of bonds, or any funds received from the forfeiture of bonds, in an interest bearing account. Any interest received from such accounts shall be payable to the office of the clerk. Failure to comply with this subsection (b) may be punished by the court as a contempt of court as provided in title 29, chapter 9.
(3) If a respondent posting bond under this subsection (b) does not comply with the conditions of the bond, the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the bond to be forfeited. Notice of the order or forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith by the clerk to the respondent at the respondent’s last known address. If the respondent does not within thirty (30) days from the date of the forfeiture satisfy the court that compliance with the conditions of the bond was met, the court shall enter judgment for the state against the defendant for the amount of the bond and costs of the court proceedings. The judgment and costs may be enforced and collected in the same manner as a judgment entered into a civil action.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or affect any remedy in effect on the effective date of this act.
(c) Upon collecting the civil penalty imposed by subsection (b), the clerk shall, on a monthly basis, send the money to the state treasurer who shall deposit it in the domestic violence community education fund created by § 36-3-616.
(d) The proceeds of a judgment for the amount of the bond pursuant to this section shall be paid quarterly to the administrative office of the courts. The quarterly payments shall be due on the fifteenth day of the fourth month of the year; the fifteenth day of the sixth month; the fifteenth day of the ninth month; and on the fifteenth day of the first month of the next succeeding year. The proceeds shall be allocated equally on an annual basis as follows:
(1) To provide legal representation to low-income Tennesseans in civil matters in such manner as determined by the supreme court as described in § 16-3-808(c); provided, that one-fourth ( 1/4 ) of such funds shall be allocated to an appropriate statewide nonprofit organization capable of providing continuing legal education, technology support, planning assistance, resource development and other support to organizations delivering civil legal representation to indigents. The remainder shall be distributed to organizations delivering direct assistance to clients with Legal Services Corporation funding as referenced in the Tennessee State Plan for Civil Legal Justice approved in March, 2001, by the Legal Services Corporation;
(2) To the domestic violence state coordinating council, created by title 38, chapter 12, part 1;
(3) To the Tennessee Court Appointed Special Advocates Association (CASA); and
(4) To Childhelp.
(a) An arrest for violation of an order of protection issued pursuant to this part may be with or without warrant. Any law enforcement officer shall arrest the respondent without a warrant if:
(1) The officer has proper jurisdiction over the area in which the violation occurred;
(2) The officer has reasonable cause to believe the respondent has violated or is in violation of an order for protection; and
(3) The officer has verified whether an order of protection is in effect against the respondent. If necessary, the police officer may verify the existence of an order for protection by telephone or radio communication with the appropriate law enforcement department.
(b) No ex parte order of protection can be enforced by arrest under this section until the respondent has been served with the order of protection or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of such order.
(a) A person arrested for the violation of an order of protection issued pursuant to this part or a restraining order or court-approved consent agreement, shall be taken before a magistrate or the court having jurisdiction in the cause without unnecessary delay to answer a charge of contempt for violation of the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement, and the court shall:
(1) Notify the clerk of the court having jurisdiction in the cause to set a time certain for a hearing on the alleged violation of the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement within ten (10) working days after arrest, unless extended by the court on the motion of the arrested person;
(2) Set a reasonable bond pending the hearing on the alleged violation of the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement; and
(3) Notify the person to whom the order of protection, restraining order or court-approved consent agreement was issued to protect and direct the party to show cause why a contempt order should issue.
(b) Either the court that originally issued the order of protection or restraining order or a court having jurisdiction over orders of protection or restraining orders in the county where the alleged violation of the order occurred shall have the authority and jurisdiction to conduct the contempt hearing required by subsection (a). If the violation is of a court-approved consent agreement, the same court that approved such agreement shall conduct the contempt hearing for any alleged violation of it. If the court conducting the contempt hearing is not the same court that originally issued the order of protection or restraining order, the court conducting the hearing shall have the same authority to punish as contempt a violation of the order of protection or restraining order as the court originally issuing such order.
(a) The petitioner’s right to relief under this part is not affected by the petitioner’s leaving the residence or household to avoid domestic abuse, stalking, sexual exploitation of a minor, sexual assault, or a human trafficking offense.
(b) The petitioner’s right to relief under this part is not affected by use of such physical force against the respondent as is reasonably believed to be necessary to defend the petitioner or another from imminent physical injury, domestic abuse, or sexual assault.
(a) Failure of a respondent to contest paternity in any proceeding commenced pursuant to this part shall not be construed as an admission of paternity by such respondent, nor shall such failure to contest be admissible as evidence against the respondent at any pending or subsequent paternity proceeding.
(b) Where paternity is contested in a proceeding commenced pursuant to this part, if the court orders the parties to submit to any tests and comparisons to determine parentage authorized by § 24-7-112, the court may grant an order of protection pending the outcome of any such tests and comparisons.
(a) After a person has been arrested for assault pursuant to Section 39-13-101, aggravated assault pursuant to Section 39-13-102, against a victim as defined in Section 36-3- 601(11), domestic assault pursuant to Section 39-13-111, or violation of a protective order pursuant to Section 39-13-113, the arresting officer shall inform the victim that the person arrested may be eligible to post bond for the offense and be released until the date of trial for the offense.
(b) Subsection (a) is solely intended to be a notification provision, and no cause of action is intended to be created thereby.
(a) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no victim shall be required to bear the costs, including any court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes or any other costs associated with the filing, issuance, registration, service, dismissal or nonsuit, appeal or enforcement of an ex parte order of protection, order of protection, or a petition for either such order, whether issued inside or outside the state. If the court, after the hearing,issues or extends an order of protection, all court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes and attorney fees shall be assessed against the respondent.
(b)(1) The clerk of the court may provide order of protection petition forms to agencies that provide domestic violence assistance.
(2) Any agency that meets with a victim in person and recommends that an order of protection be sought shall assist the victim in the completion of the form petition for filing with the clerk.
(3) No agency shall be required to provide this assistance unless it has been provided with the appropriate forms by the clerk.
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no domestic abuse victim, stalking victim, sexual assault victim, or victim of a felony offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 shall be required to bear the costs, including any court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes or any other costs associated with the filing, issuance, registration, service, dismissal or nonsuit, appeal or enforcement of an ex parte order of protection, order of protection, or a petition for either such order, whether issued inside or outside the state. If the court, after the hearing on the petition, issues or extends an order of protection, all court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes and attorney fees shall be assessed against the respondent.
(2) If the court does not issue or extend an order of protection, the court may assess all court costs, filing fees, litigation taxes and attorney fees against the petitioner if the court makes the following finding by clear and convincing evidence:
(A) The petitioner is not a domestic abuse victim, stalking victim, sexual assault victim, or victim of a felony offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 and that such determination is not based on the fact that the petitioner requested that the petition be dismissed, failed to attend the hearing or incorrectly filled out the petition; and
(B) The petitioner knew that the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or felony offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 was false at the time the petition was filed.
(b)(1) The clerk of the court may provide order of protection petition forms to agencies that provide domestic violence assistance.
(2) Any agency that meets with a victim in person and recommends that an order of protection be sought shall assist the victim in the completion of the form petition for filing with the clerk.(3) No agency shall be required to provide this assistance unless it has been provided with the appropriate forms by the clerk.
The purpose of this part is to recognize the seriousness of domestic abuse as a crime and to assure that the law provides a victim of domestic abuse with enhanced protection from domestic abuse. A further purpose of this chapter is to recognize that in the past law enforcement agencies have treated domestic abuse crimes differently than crimes resulting in the same harm but occurring between strangers. Thus, the general assembly intends that the official response to domestic abuse shall stress enforcing the laws to protect the victim and prevent further harm to the victim, and the official response shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated.
(a) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime involving domestic abuse, whether the crime is a misdemeanor or felony, or was committed within or without the presence of the officer, the preferred response of the officer is arrest.
(b) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that two (2) or more persons committed a misdemeanor or felony, or if two (2) or more persons make complaints to the officer, the officer shall try to determine who was the primary aggressor. Arrest is the preferred response only with respect to the primary aggressor. The officer shall presume that arrest is not the appropriate response for the person or persons who were not the primary aggressor. If the officer believes that all parties are equally responsible, the officer shall exercise such officer’s best judgment in determining whether to arrest all, any or none of the parties.
(c) To determine who is the primary aggressor, the officer shall consider:
(1) The history of domestic abuse between the parties;
(2) The relative severity of the injuries inflicted on each person;
(3) Evidence from the persons involved in the domestic abuse;
(4) The likelihood of future injury to each person;
(5) Whether one (1) of the persons acted in self-defense; and
(6) Evidence from witnesses of the domestic abuse.
(d) A law enforcement officer shall not:
(1) Threaten, suggest, or otherwise indicate the possible arrest of all parties to discourage future requests for intervention by law enforcement personnel; or
(2) Base the decision of whether to arrest on:
(A) The consent or request of the victim; or
(B) The officer’s perception of the willingness of the victim or of a witness to the domestic abuse to testify or participate in a judicial proceeding.
(e) When a law enforcement officer investigates an allegation that domestic abuse occurred, the officer shall make a complete report and file the report with the officer’s supervisor in a manner that will permit data on domestic abuse cases to be compiled. If a law enforcement officer decides not to make an arrest or decides to arrest two (2) or more parties, the officer shall include in the report the grounds for not arresting anyone or for arresting two (2) or more parties.
(f) Every month, the officer’s supervisor shall forward the compiled data on domestic abuse cases to the administrative director of the courts.
(g) When a law enforcement officer responds to a domestic abuse call, the officer shall:
(1) Offer to transport the victim to a place of safety, such as a shelter or similar location or the residence of a friend or relative, unless it is impracticable for the officer to transport the victim, in which case the officer shall offer to arrange for transportation as soon as practicable;
(2) Advise the victim of a shelter or other service in the community; and
(3) Give the victim notice of the legal rights available by giving the victim a copy of the following statement:
IF YOU ARE THE VICTIM OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, you have the following rights:
1. You may file a criminal complaint with the district attorney general (D.A.).
2. You may request a protection order. A protection order may include the following:
(A) An order preventing the abuser from committing further domestic abuse against you;
(B) An order requiring the abuser to leave your household;
(C) An order preventing the abuser from harassing you or contacting you for any reason;
(D) An order giving you or the other parent custody of or visitation with your minor child or children;
(E) An order requiring the abuser to pay money to support you and the minor children if the abuser has a legal obligation to do so; and
(F) An order preventing the abuser from stalking you.
The area crisis line is __________
The following domestic abuse shelter/programs are available to you:
____________________
____________________
(4) Offer to transport the victim to the location where arrest warrants are issued in that city or county and assist the victim in obtaining an arrest warrant against the alleged abuser.
(h)(1) For good cause shown, the court may issue an ex parte order of protection pursuant to § 36-3-605 upon a sworn petition filed by a law enforcement officer responding to an incident of domestic abuse who asserts in the petition reasonable grounds to believe that a person is in immediate and present danger of abuse, as defined in § 36-3-601, and that the person has consented to the filing in writing; provided, that the person on whose behalf the law enforcement officer seeks the ex parte order of protection shall be considered the petitioner for purposes of this part.
(2) The law enforcement officer may seek on behalf of the person the ex parte order regardless of the time of day and whether or not an arrest has been made.
(3) If an ex parte order is issued pursuant to this section outside of the issuing court’s normal operating hours:
(A) The law enforcement officer, judge, or judicial official shall cause the petition and order to be filed with the court as soon as practicable after issuance, but no later than two (2) business days after issuance; and
(B) The law enforcement officer shall use reasonable efforts to notify the person on whose behalf the petition was filed and provide the person with a copy of the ex parte order as soon as practicable after issuance.
(4) The court shall cause a copy of the petition, a notice of the date set for the hearing, and a copy of the ex parte order of protection to be served upon the respondent in accordance with § 36-3-605(c). A hearing on whether or not the ex parte order of protection should be dissolved, extended, or modified shall be held within fifteen (15) days of service of the order on the respondent. The person who consented to the filing shall be given notice of the hearing and the right to be present at the hearing. The procedures set forth in § 36-3-605 shall apply.
(5) Law enforcement officers shall not be subject to civil liability under this section for failure to file a petition or for any statement made or act performed in filing the petition, if done in good faith.
(a)
(1) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a criminal offense involving domestic abuse against a victim, as defined in § 36-3-601, has occurred, the officer shall seize all weapons that are alleged to have been used by the abuser or threatened to be used by the abuser in the commission of a crime.
(2) Incident to an arrest for a crime involving domestic abuse against a victim, as defined in § 36-3-601, a law enforcement officer may seize a weapon that is in plain view of the officer or discovered pursuant to a consensual search, if necessary for the protection of the officer or other persons; provided, that a law enforcement officer is not required to remove a weapon such officer believes is needed by the victim for self defense.
(b) The provisions of § 39-17-1317, relative to the disposition of confiscated weapons, shall govern all weapons seized pursuant to this section that were used or threatened to be used by the abuser to commit the crime; provided, that if multiple weapons are seized, the court shall have the authority to confiscate only the weapon or weapons actually used or threatened to be used by the abuser to commit the crime. All other weapons seized shall be returned upon disposition of the case. Also, the officer shall append an inventory of all seized weapons to the domestic abuse report that the officer files with the officer’s supervisor pursuant to § 36-3-619(e).
(c) The officer’s supervisor shall include the appended information on seized weapons in the compilation of data that the officer’s supervisor forwards to the administrative director of the court pursuant to § 36-3-619(f).
(a) A petitioner may, at the time of filing a petition for an order of protection, request that the court issue an order directing a wireless telephone service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to the petitioner if the petitioner:
(1) Is not the account holder; and
(2) Proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner and any minor children in the petitioner’s care are the primary users of the wireless telephone numbers that will be ordered transferred by a court under this subsection (a).
(b)(1) An order transferring the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner under subsection (a) must be a separate order that is directed to the wireless telephone service provider.
(2) The order must list:
(A) The name and billing telephone number of the account holder;
(B) The name and contact information of the petitioner to whom the telephone number or numbers will be transferred; and
(C) Each telephone number to be transferred to the petitioner.
(3) The court shall ensure that the petitioner’s contact information is not provided to the account holder in proceedings held under this section.
(4) The order must be served on the wireless telephone service provider’s agent for service of process.
(5) The wireless service provider shall notify the requesting party if the wireless telephone service provider cannot operationally or technically effectuate the order due to certain circumstances, including when:
(A) The account holder has already terminated the account;
(B) Differences in network technology prevent the functionality of a device on the network; or
(C) There are geographic or other limitations on network or service availability.
(c)(1) Upon a wireless telephone service provider’s transfer of billing responsibility for and rights to a wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner under subsection (b), the petitioner shall assume:
(A) Financial responsibility for the transferred wireless telephone number or numbers;
(B) Monthly service costs; and
(C) Costs for any mobile device associated with the wireless telephone number or numbers.
(2) A transfer ordered under subsection (b) does not preclude a wireless telephone service provider from applying any routine and customary requirements for account establishment to the petitioner as part of the transfer of billing responsibility for a wireless telephone number or numbers and any devices attached to that number or numbers, including, but not limited to, identification, financial information, and customer preferences.
(d) This section does not affect the ability of the court to apportion the assets and debts of the parties as provided for in law, or the ability to determine the temporary use, possession, and control of personal property under this chapter.
(e) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no cause of action shall lie in any court nor shall any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding be commenced by a governmental entity against any wireless telephone service provider, or its directors, officers, employees, agents, or vendors, for:
(1) Action taken in compliance with an order issued under this section;
(2) A failure to process an order issued under this section, unless the failure is the result of gross negligence, which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; or
(3) Providing in good faith call location information or other information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with subsection (a) or any rules promulgated under this section.(f) If an order of protection is issued, but a separate order under § 36-3-606(a)(12) did not issue at the time of the order, or if the order of protection was issued prior to the availability of the relief under § 36-3-606(a)(12), a petitioner may, at any time, petition the court issuing the order of protection to modify the order and require a wireless service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to the petitioner pursuant to this section.
(a) Any valid protection order related to abuse, domestic abuse, or domestic or family violence, issued by a court of another state, tribe or territory shall be afforded full faith and credit by the courts of this state and enforced as if it were issued in this state.
(b)(1) A protection order issued by a state, tribal or territorial court related to abuse, domestic abuse or domestic or family violence shall be deemed valid if the issuing court has jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of the issuing state, tribe or territory. There shall be a presumption in favor of validity where an order appears authentic on its face.
(2) For a foreign protection order to be valid in this state, the respondent must have been given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard before the order of the foreign state, tribe or territory was issued; provided, that in the case of ex parte orders, notice and opportunity to be heard must have been given as soon as possible after the order was issued, consistent with due process.
(3) Failure to provide reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard shall be an affirmative defense to any charge or process filed seeking enforcement of a foreign protection order.
(c) A petitioner may present a certified copy of a foreign order of protection to a court having jurisdiction of orders of protection in the county in which the petitioner believes enforcement may be necessary. The clerk of such court shall receive the certified copies of any foreign order of protection and any supporting documents used to show the validity of such order and shall maintain such orders, along with any submitted documents. No costs, fees or taxes shall be charged by the clerks for this service. If an enforcement action is instituted in the court pursuant to any such order, the clerk shall file the order and shall otherwise treat the enforcement action as a case, except that all court costs, fees and litigation taxes shall be taxed by the judge at the adjudication of the enforcement action. It shall be a defense to any action taken for the enforcement of such order that the order is not valid as provided in subsection (b) or (d). No person shall present a foreign order of protection to a clerk that the person knows to no longer be in effect. A foreign order of protection shall continue in effect for the period of time specified in the order, and, if no time limitation is so specified, then the order shall continue in effect for a period of one (1) year from the date on which it is first presented to a Tennessee court pursuant to subsection (c); provided, that a continuation of any such order may be granted by the court subject to the requirements set forth in § 36-3-605.
(d) A protection order entered against both the petitioner and respondent shall not be enforceable against the petitioner in a foreign jurisdiction unless:
(1) The respondent filed a cross- or counter-petition, or a complaint or other written pleading was filed seeking such a protection order; and
(2) The issuing court made specific findings of domestic or family violence against the petitioner.
(e) The clerk shall be under no obligation to make a determination as to the validity of such orders or documentation, but shall forward a copy of the foreign protection order and any supporting documentation filed with the order to the local police or sheriff’s office, as provided for in § 36-3-609.
(f) Deleted by 2011 Pub.Acts, c. 39, § 3, eff. April 5, 2011.
(g) Upon request, the clerk shall provide a copy of the order to the person offering the same showing proof of receipt by the clerk’s office.
(h) Deleted by 2011 Pub.Acts, c. 39, § 3, eff. April 5, 2011.
(i) Regardless of whether a foreign order of protection has been filed in this state pursuant to this section, a law enforcement officer may rely upon a copy of any such protection order that has been provided to the officer by any source and may also rely upon the statement of any person protected by a foreign order that the order remains in effect. A law enforcement officer acting in good faith shall be immune from civil and criminal liability in any action in connection with a court’s finding that the foreign order was for any reason not enforceable.
(a) The records of domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, and human trafficking service providers shall be treated as confidential by the records custodian of such shelters, centers, or providers unless:
(1) The individual to whom the records pertain authorizes their release; or
(2) A court approves a subpoena for the records, subject to such restrictions as the court may impose, including in camera review.(b) As used in this section, “human trafficking service providers” means agencies or groups that are incorporated as a not-for-profit organization for at least six (6) months, are tax-exempt under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 501), and that have provided services to victims of human trafficking.
(a) A county may establish an interagency domestic abuse death review team to assist local agencies in identifying and reviewing domestic abuse deaths, including homicides and suicides, and facilitating communication among the various agencies involved in domestic abuse cases.
(b) For purposes of this section, “domestic abuse” has the meaning set forth in § 36-3-601.
(c) A county may develop a protocol that may be used as a guideline to assist coroners and other persons who perform autopsies on domestic abuse victims in the identification of domestic abuse, in the determination of whether domestic abuse contributed to death or whether domestic abuse had occurred prior to death but was not the actual cause of death, and in the proper written reporting procedures for domestic abuse, including the designation of the cause and mode of death.
(d) County domestic abuse death review teams may be comprised of, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Experts in the field of forensic pathology;
(2) Medical personnel with expertise in domestic violence abuse;
(3) Coroners and medical examiners;
(4) Criminologists;
(5) District attorneys general and city attorneys;
(6) Domestic abuse shelter staff;
(7) Legal aid attorneys who represent victims of abuse;
(8) A representative of the local bar association;
(9) Law enforcement personnel;
(10) Representatives of local agencies that are involved with domestic abuse reporting;
(11) County health department staff who deal with domestic abuse victims’ health issues;
(12) Representatives of local child abuse agencies; and
(13) Local professional associations of persons described in paragraphs (1) to (10), inclusive.
(e) An oral or written communication or a document shared within or produced by a domestic abuse death review team related to a domestic abuse death is confidential and not subject to disclosure or discoverable by a third party. An oral or written communication or a document provided by a third party to a domestic abuse death review team is confidential and not subject to disclosure or discoverable by a third party. Notwithstanding the foregoing, recommendations of a domestic abuse death review team upon the completion of a review may be disclosed at the discretion of a majority of the members of a domestic abuse death review team.
(f) To complete a review of a domestic abuse death, whether confirmed or suspected, each domestic abuse death team shall have access to, and subpoena power to obtain, all records of any nature maintained by any public or private entity that may pertain to a death being investigated by the team including, but not limited to, police investigations and reports, medical examiner investigative data and reports and social service agency records, as well as medical records maintained by a private health care provider or a health care agency. Any entity or individual providing such information to the local team shall be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed for such action.
(g) To complete a review of a domestic abuse death, whether confirmed or suspected, each domestic abuse death review team shall have access to and subpoena power to obtain all records of any nature maintained by any public or private entity which pertain to a death being investigated by the team. Such records include, but are not limited to, police investigations and reports, medical examiner investigative data and reports, and social service agency reports, as well as medical records maintained by a private health care provider or health care agency. Any entity or individual providing such information to the local team shall not be held liable for providing the information.
(a) Upon issuance of an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the order shall include on its face the following disclosures:
(1) That the respondent is required to dispossess the respondent by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, of all firearms the respondent possesses within forty-eight (48) hours of the issuance of the order;
(2) That the respondent is prohibited from possessing a firearm for so long as the order of protection or any successive order of protection is in effect, and may reassume possession of the dispossessed firearm at such time as the order expires or is otherwise no longer in effect; and
(3) Notice of the penalty for any violation of this section and § 39-17-1307(f).
(b) The court shall then order and instruct the respondent:
(1) To terminate the respondent’s physical possession of the firearms in the respondent’s possession by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, within forty-eight (48) hours;
(2) To complete and return the affidavit of firearm dispossession form created pursuant to subsection (e), which the court may provide the respondent or direct the respondent to the administrative office of the courts’ website; and
(3) That if the respondent possesses firearms as business inventory or that are registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq.), there are additional statutory provisions that may apply and shall include these additional provisions in the content of the order.
(c) Upon issuance of the order of protection, its provisions and date and time of issuance shall be transmitted to the sheriff and all local law enforcement agencies in the county where the respondent resides.
(d) When the respondent is lawfully dispossessed of firearms as required by this section, the respondent shall complete an affidavit of firearms dispossession form created pursuant to subsection (e) and return it to the court issuing the order of protection.
(e) The affidavit of firearms dispossession form shall be developed by the domestic violence state coordinating council, in consultation with the administrative office of the courts. Upon completion, the form shall be posted on the website of the administrative office of the courts where it can be copied by respondents or provided to them by the court or the court clerk.
(f) In determining what a lawful means of dispossession is:
(1) If the dispossession, including, but not limited to, the transfer of weapons registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq.), that requires the approval of any state or federal agency prior to the transfer of the firearm, the respondent may comply with the dispossession requirement by having the firearm or firearms placed into a safe or similar container that is securely locked and to which the respondent does not have the combination, keys or other means of normal access;
(2) If the respondent is licensed as a federal firearms dealer or a responsible party under a federal firearms license, the determination of whether such an individual possesses firearms that constitute business inventory under the federal license shall be determined based upon the applicable federal statutes or the rules, regulations and official letters, rulings and publications of the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives. The order of protection shall not require the surrender or transfer of the inventory if there are one (1) or more individuals who are responsible parties under the federal license who are not the respondent subject to the order of protection.
(g) A firearm subject to this section shall not be forfeited as provided in § 39-17-1317, unless the possession of the firearm prior to the entry of the order of protection constituted an independent crime of which the respondent has been convicted or the firearms are abandoned by the respondent.
(h)(1) It is an offense for a person subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) to knowingly fail to surrender or transfer all firearms the respondent possesses as required by this section.
(2) A violation of subdivision (h)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation shall constitute a separate offense.(3) If the violation of subdivision (h)(1) also constitutes a violation of § 39-13-113(h) or § 39-17-1307(f), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.
(a) A person who petitions the court and is granted an order of protection, ex parte or otherwise, pursuant to this part is authorized to, for twenty-one (21) calendar days after that order of protection is granted, carry any handgun, as defined in § 39-17-1319, that the person legally owns or possesses so long as the person has in the person’s possession at all times while carrying the handgun a copy of the order of protection.
(b) A person who does not apply for a temporary handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1365 within the time period set forth in § 39-17-1365(a) shall not be authorized to carry a handgun under subsection (a) once that time period has expired.
(c) A person who has applied for a temporary handgun carry permit under § 39-17-1365 may continue to carry a handgun after the time period in this subsection (a) has expired while that application is pending, so long as the person has in the person’s possession at all times while carrying the handgun both a copy of the temporary handgun carry permit application receipt as provided by the department and a copy of the order of protection.
(a)(1) Notwithstanding § 36-3-608, a victim of any of the following offenses may file a petition for a lifetime order of protection against the offender who was convicted of the offense:
(A) A felony offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 1, 2, 3, or 5;
(B) Harassment under § 39-17-308(b); or
(C) Aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking under § 39-17-315(c) or (d).
(2) As used in this section, “victim” has the meaning given in § 40-38-203.
(b) A petition filed by an unemancipated person under eighteen (18) years of age must be signed by one (1) of that person’s parents or by that person’s guardian. The petition may also be signed by a caseworker at a not-for-profit organization that receives funds pursuant to title 71, chapter 6, part 2 for family violence and child abuse prevention and shelters; provided, however, that a petition signed by a caseworker may not be filed against the unemancipated minor’s parent or legal guardian. In such case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, a copy of the petition and notice of hearing shall also be served on the parents of the minor child, or if the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent. In cases before the juvenile court where the department of children’s services is a party or where a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by the juvenile court, the petition may be filed by the department or the guardian ad litem.
(c) Venue for a petition for an order of protection under this section, and all other matters relating to orders of protection, is in the county where the respondent resides or the county in which the offense occurred. If the respondent is not a resident of this state, the petition may be filed in the county where the petitioner resides.
(d) The court shall cause a copy of the petition and notice of the date set for the hearing on such petition to be served upon the respondent at least five (5) days prior to the hearing. The notice must advise the respondent that the respondent may be represented by counsel. In every case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, when a petitioner is under eighteen (18) years of age, a copy of the petition, and notice of hearing must also be served on the parents of the minor child, or in the event that the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent, pursuant to the requirements of this section.
(e) At the hearing on the petition, the court shall, if the petitioner has proved the respondent was convicted of an offense listed in subsection (a) and that the petitioner was the victim of the offense, issue a lifetime order of protection that remains in effect until the death of the petitioner or the respondent. If the petitioner has not provided proof that respondent was convicted of such an offense and that the petitioner was the victim of the offense, the court shall dismiss the petition.
(f) An order of protection granted under this section must:
(1) Prohibit the respondent from coming about the petitioner for any purpose, from telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(2) Include a statement of the maximum penalty that may be imposed pursuant to § 36-3-610 for violating such order; and
(3) Be valid and enforceable in any county of this state.
(g) A lifetime order of protection is effective and must be served as provided in § 36-3-609.
(h)(1) Upon violation of a lifetime order of protection, the court may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt and, following a contempt hearing as provided in § 36-3-612, punish the defendant in accordance with the law. A judge of the general sessions court has the same power as a court of record to punish the defendant for contempt when exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this part or when exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a court of record. A judge of the general sessions court who is not a licensed attorney shall appoint an attorney referee to hear charges of criminal contempt.
(2) In addition to the authorized punishments for contempt of court, the judge may assess any person who violates a lifetime order of protection a civil penalty of fifty dollars ($50.00). The judge may further order that any support payment made pursuant to an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement be made under an income assignment to the clerk of court. Upon collecting the civil penalty imposed by this subdivision (h)(2), the clerk shall, on a monthly basis, send the money to the state treasurer who shall deposit it in the domestic violence community education fund created by § 36-3-616.
(i) An arrest for violation of a lifetime order of protection issued pursuant to this section may be with or without warrant. A law enforcement officer shall arrest the respondent without a warrant if:
(1) The officer has proper jurisdiction over the area in which the violation occurred;
(2) The officer has reasonable cause to believe the respondent has violated or is in violation of a lifetime order for protection; and
(3) The officer has verified whether a lifetime order of protection is in effect against the respondent. If necessary, the officer may verify the existence of a lifetime order for protection by telephone or radio communication with the appropriate law enforcement agency.
(a) The following are causes of divorce from the bonds of matrimony:
(1) Either party, at the time of the contract, was and still is naturally impotent and incapable of procreation;
(2) Either party has knowingly entered into a second marriage, in violation of a previous marriage, still subsisting;
(3) Either party has committed adultery;
(4) Willful or malicious desertion or absence of either party, without a reasonable cause, for one (1) whole year;
(5) Being convicted of any crime that, by the laws of the state, renders the party infamous;
(6) Being convicted of a crime that, by the laws of the state, is declared to be a felony, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary;
(7) Either party has attempted the life of the other, by poison or any other means showing malice;
(8) Refusal, on the part of a spouse, to remove with that person’s spouse to this state, without a reasonable cause, and being willfully absent from the spouse residing in Tennessee for two (2) years;
(9) The woman was pregnant at the time of the marriage, by another person, without the knowledge of the husband;
(10) Habitual drunkenness or abuse of narcotic drugs of either party, when the spouse has contracted either such habit after marriage;
(11) The husband or wife is guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct towards the spouse as renders cohabitation unsafe and improper, which may also be referred to in pleadings as inappropriate marital conduct;
(12) The husband or wife has offered such indignities to the spouse’s person as to render the spouse’s position intolerable, and thereby forced the spouse to withdraw;
(13) The husband or wife has abandoned the spouse or turned the spouse out of doors for no just cause, and has refused or neglected to provide for the spouse while having the ability to so provide;
(14) Irreconcilable differences between the parties; and
(15) For a continuous period of two (2) or more years that commenced prior to or after April 18, 1985, both parties have lived in separate residences, have not cohabited as man and wife during such period, and there are no minor children of the parties.
(b) A complaint or petition for divorce on any ground for divorce listed in this section must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard if the parties have no unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age, and must have been on file at least ninety (90) days before being heard if the parties have an unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age. The sixty-day or ninety-day period shall commence on the date the complaint or petition is filed.
(a)(1) In all divorces sought because of irreconcilable differences between the parties, if the defendant is a nonresident, personal service may be effectuated by service upon the secretary of state pursuant to § 20-2-215.
(2) In lieu of service of process, the defendant may enter into a written notarized marital dissolution agreement with plaintiff that makes specific reference to a pending divorce by a court and docket number, or states that the defendant is aware that one will be filed in this state and that the defendant waives further service and waives filing an answer to the complaint. Such waiver of service shall be valid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the last party signs the agreement. The agreement may include the obligation and payment of alimony, in solido or in futuro, to either of the parties, any other law notwithstanding. The signing of such an agreement shall be in lieu of service of process for the period such waiver is valid and shall constitute a general appearance before the court and answer that shall give the court personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and constitute a default judgment for the purpose of granting a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
(3) No divorce heretofore granted shall be invalid because the agreement was signed and notarized or acknowledged prior to filing under prior law before the action was filed.
(b) No divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences unless the court affirmatively finds in its decree that the parties have made adequate and sufficient provision by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the equitable settlement of any property rights between the parties. If the court does not affirmatively find that the agreement is sufficient or equitable, the cause shall be continued by the court to allow further disposition by the petitioner. If both parties are present at the hearing, they may, at that time, ratify any amendments the court may have to the agreement. The amended agreement shall then become a part of the decree. The agreement shall be incorporated in the decree or incorporated by reference, and such decree may be modified as other decrees for divorce. Approval of the agreement by the court satisfies the requirements of Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee rules of civil procedure, and the court is not required to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the parties’ agreed amendment makes adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or whether the agreement is in the best interest of the parties’ children.
(c)(1) Bills for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard if the parties have no unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age, and must have been on file at least ninety (90) days before being heard if the parties have an unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age. The sixty-day or ninety-day period bills for divorce must be on file shall commence on the date the original bill was filed and not on the date the bill was amended to include the ground of irreconcilable differences.
(2) A divorce decree or order issued prior to March 22, 1996, in which the hearing for such divorce occurred before the specified time periods required by this subsection (c), shall remain valid and the parties shall remain divorced. Likewise, all other issues resolved in the divorce decree, order or agreement, such as distribution of marital property, alimony, child support and custody, shall remain valid and in full force and effect.
(d)(1) A bill of complaint for divorce where the respondent has been personally served or acknowledged as set out in subsection (a), which includes the ground of irreconcilable differences, may be taken as confessed and a final decree entered thereon, as in other cases and without corroborative proof or testimony, §§ 36-4-107 and 36-4-114 to the contrary notwithstanding.
(2) For purposes of this section, “without corroborative proof or testimony” means that the petitioner shall not be required to testify as to the material facts constituting irreconcilable differences or any attempts to reconcile such differences.
(e) If there has been a contest or denial of the grounds of irreconcilable differences, no divorce shall be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. However, a divorce may be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if a properly executed marital dissolution agreement is presented to the court.
(f) Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in § 36-4-101 or § 36-4-102.
(g) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary requiring mediation, the filing with the court of a properly executed marital dissolution agreement and, if there are minor children of the marriage, a properly executed parenting plan shall serve to remove any requirement that the parties shall attend mediation. If the court does not approve either the marital dissolution agreement or the parenting plan, then any requirement to attend mediation shall be reinstated as of the date of the court’s rejection of either agreement.
(a) A divorce may be granted for any of the causes referenced in § 36-4-101 if the acts complained of were committed while the plaintiff was a bona fide resident of this state or if the acts complained of were committed out of this state and the plaintiff resided out of the state at the time, if the plaintiff or the defendant has resided in this state six (6) months next preceding the filing of the complaint.
(b) For the purposes of this section, any person in the armed services of the United States, or the spouse of any such person, who has been living in this state for a period of not less than one (1) year shall be presumed to be a resident of this state, and the presumption of residence shall be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of a domicile elsewhere.
(a)(1) The complaint for divorce shall set forth the grounds for the divorce in substantially the language of § 36-4-101 or § 36-4-102, and pray only for a divorce from the defendant, or for a divorce and such other and further relief to which the complainant may think to be entitled. In cases wherein an answer is filed, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, require the complainant to file a bill of particulars, setting forth the facts relied on as grounds for the divorce, with reasonable certainty as to time and place.
(2) The complaint for legal separation shall set forth the grounds for legal separation in substantially the language of § 36-4-101, and pray for such further relief to which the complainant is entitled. In all cases where an answer is filed, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, require the complainant to file a bill of particulars, stating the facts relied on as a ground for legal separation, with reasonable certainty as to time and place.
(b)(1) The complainant shall also allege the full name of the husband, the full maiden name of the wife, their mailing addresses, dates and places of their birth, race or color of each spouse, number of previous marriages of each spouse, date and place of the marriage of the parties, the number of their children who are minors at the time of the filing of the complaint, and any other litigation concerning the custody of those children in this or any other state in which either party has participated, as specified in § 36-6-224. Further, at the time a complaint or pleading is filed under this part, the filing party shall, simultaneously with the initial complaint or pleading filed by that party, file with the clerk a separate document that contains the full names and social security numbers, current mailing addresses and dates of birth of the husband, the wife, and those of all children born of the marriage. The filing party shall provide to the clerk one (1) eight and one-half inch by eleven inch (8 ½ ″ x 11″) envelope labeled with the names of the parties, which shall be marked with the docket number. The clerk shall file stamp the document and the envelope, store the document in the envelope, which shall be sealed, and place the sealed envelope in the case file. The social security numbers and other information filed with the clerk shall be available to the clerk of court for processing of documents and legal actions such as, but not limited to, divorce certificates, garnishments, and income assignments. On request, the sealed information shall be made available to the department of human services and any other agency required by law to have access to the information, and to other persons or agencies as ordered by the court. It shall be mandatory that every complaint filed under this chapter shall contain the foregoing information or that such information is provided by the parties and is contained in the court’s records as described above prior to the entry of the final decree of divorce, unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the court that such information could not be obtained by the complainant or petitioner by exercising due diligence or after the court has granted a reasonable time to amend the complaint. In lieu of a mailing address, either party may designate an agent for the service of process throughout the proceedings and, except as provided in subdivision (b)(2), the name and address of such agent shall be the only address used for the designating party in all petitions, pleadings, motions and orders relating to such divorce action.
(2) If the complainant or the defendant shows to the satisfaction of the court in which the petition is filed that the residential address of the other party is relevant and necessary in order to prove the allegations contained in the complaint or to ascertain information necessary to determine value and/or ownership of property, or to ascertain other data necessary to evaluate and agree upon a property division or custody or defend against such allegations, the court may order either party to reveal such residential address to the other party.
(3) If the complainant elects to designate an agent for service of process in lieu of the mailing address as authorized by this subsection (b) but does not designate a specific person, the complainant’s attorney shall be deemed the complainant’s agent for service of process.
(c) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the plaintiff or other party shall not be required in those counties having a divorce proctor to file an affidavit swearing that the defendant is not in the military service where:
(1) The complaint states facts that would make the defendant ineligible for military service; or
(2) The residence address of the defendant is set forth in the complaint, and:
(A) The defendant has been personally served with service of process, or has been mailed a copy of the complaint by a divorce proctor;
(B) The defendant has actual notice of the commencement of the suit;
(C) Proof of mailing to the defendant of notice of the suit is exhibited to the court; or
(D) The defendant is represented by an attorney.
(d) Upon the filing of a petition for divorce or legal separation, and upon personal service of the complaint and summons on the respondent or upon waiver and acceptance of service by the respondent, the following temporary injunctions shall be in effect against both parties until the final decree of divorce or order of legal separation is entered, the petition is dismissed, the parties reach agreement, or until the court modifies or dissolves the injunction, written notice of which shall be served with the complaint:
(1)(A) An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from transferring, assigning, borrowing against, concealing or in any way dissipating or disposing, without the consent of the other party or an order of the court, of any marital property. Nothing herein is intended to preclude either of the parties from seeking broader injunctive relief from the court.
(B) Expenditures from current income to maintain the marital standard of living and the usual and ordinary costs of operating a business are not restricted by this injunction. Each party shall maintain records of all expenditures, copies of which shall be available to the other party upon request.
(2) An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from voluntarily canceling, modifying, terminating, assigning, or allowing to lapse for nonpayment of premiums, any insurance policy, including, but not limited to, life, health, disability, homeowners, renters, and automobile, where such insurance policy provides coverage to either of the parties or the children, or that names either of the parties or the children as beneficiaries without the consent of the other party or an order of the court. “Modifying” includes any change in beneficiary status.
(3) An injunction restraining both parties from harassing, threatening, assaulting or abusing the other and from making disparaging remarks about the other to or in the presence of any children of the parties or to either party’s employer.
(4) An injunction restraining and enjoining both parties from hiding, destroying or spoiling, in whole or in part, any evidence electronically stored or on computer hard drives or other memory storage devices.
(5) An injunction restraining both parties from relocating any children of the parties outside the state, or more than fifty (50) miles from the marital home, without the permission of the other party or an order of the court, except in the case of a removal based upon a well-founded fear of physical abuse against either the fleeing parent or the child. In such cases, upon request of the nonrelocating parent, the court will conduct an expedited hearing, by telephone conference if appropriate, to determine the reasonableness of the relocation and to make such other orders as appropriate.
(6) The provisions of these injunctions shall be attached to the summons and the complaint and shall be served with the complaint. The injunctions shall become an order of the court upon fulfillment of the requirements of this subsection (d). However, nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude either party from applying to the court for further temporary orders, an expanded temporary injunction, or modification or revocation of this temporary injunction.
(7) The temporary injunctions provided in this section shall only apply to the spousal parties named in the petition and shall not apply to any third party named in the petition; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection (d) shall preclude any party from applying to the court for an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief against any other party named in any petition as provided by law or rule.
(a) In any action for divorce, legal separation or separate maintenance, the court may award alimony to be paid by one spouse to or for the benefit of the other, or out of either spouse’s property, according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties. The court may fix some definite amount or amounts to be paid in monthly, semimonthly or weekly installments, or otherwise, as the circumstances may warrant. Such award, if not paid, may be enforced by any appropriate process of the court having jurisdiction including levy of execution. Further, the order or decree shall remain in the court’s jurisdiction and control, and, upon application of either party, the court may award an increase or decrease or other modification of the award based upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances; provided, that the award is subject to modification by the court based on the type of alimony awarded, the terms of the court’s decree or the terms of the parties’ agreement.
(b) The court may, in its discretion, at any time pending the final hearing, upon motion and after notice and hearing, make any order that may be proper to compel a spouse to pay any sums necessary for the support and maintenance of the other spouse, to enable such spouse to prosecute or defend the suit of the parties and to make other orders as it deems appropriate. Further, the court may award such sum as may be necessary to enable a spouse to pay the expenses of job training and education. In making any order under this subsection (b), the court shall consider the financial needs of each spouse and the financial ability of each spouse to meet those needs and to prosecute or defend the suit.
(c)(1) Spouses have traditionally strengthened the family unit through private arrangements whereby one (1) spouse focuses on nurturing the personal side of the marriage, including the care and nurturing of the children, while the other spouse focuses primarily on building the economic strength of the family unit. This arrangement often results in economic detriment to the spouse who subordinated such spouse’s own personal career for the benefit of the marriage. It is the public policy of this state to encourage and support marriage, and to encourage family arrangements that provide for the rearing of healthy and productive children who will become healthy and productive citizens of our state.
(2) The general assembly finds that the contributions to the marriage as homemaker or parent are of equal dignity and importance as economic contributions to the marriage. Further, where one (1) spouse suffers economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage, the general assembly finds that the economically disadvantaged spouse’s standard of living after the divorce should be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
(d)(1) The court may award rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, transitional alimony, or alimony in solido, also known as lump sum alimony or a combination of these, as provided in this subsection (d).
(2) It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse, who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated, whenever possible, by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative alimony. To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse’s standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
(3) Where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible, in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in subsection (i), the court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B).
(4) An award of alimony in futuro may be made, either in addition to an award of rehabilitative alimony, where a spouse may be only partially rehabilitated, or instead of an award of rehabilitative alimony, where rehabilitation is not feasible. Transitional alimony is awarded when the court finds that rehabilitation is not necessary, but the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, legal separation or other proceeding where spousal support may be awarded, such as a petition for an order of protection.
(5) Alimony in solido may be awarded in lieu of or in addition to any other alimony award, in order to provide support, including attorney fees, where appropriate.
(e)(1) Rehabilitative alimony is a separate class of spousal support, as distinguished from alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and transitional alimony. To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse’s standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
(2) An award of rehabilitative alimony shall remain in the court’s control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances. For rehabilitative alimony to be extended beyond the term initially established by the court, or to be increased in amount, or both, the recipient of the rehabilitative alimony shall have the burden of proving that all reasonable efforts at rehabilitation have been made and have been unsuccessful.
(3) Rehabilitative alimony shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Rehabilitative alimony shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated.
(f)(1) Alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, is a payment of support and maintenance on a long term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient. Such alimony may be awarded when the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible, meaning that the disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the spouse’s standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
(2)(A) An award of alimony in futuro shall remain in the court’s control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.
(B) In all cases where a person is receiving alimony in futuro and the alimony recipient lives with a third person, a rebuttable presumption is raised that:
(i) The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or
(ii) The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.
(3) An award for alimony in futuro shall terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient. The recipient shall notify the obligor immediately upon the recipient’s remarriage. Failure of the recipient to timely give notice of the remarriage shall allow the obligor to recover all amounts paid as alimony in futuro to the recipient after the recipient’s marriage. Alimony in futuro shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated.
(g)(1) Transitional alimony means a sum of money payable by one (1) party to, or on behalf of, the other party for a determinate period of time. Transitional alimony is awarded when the court finds that rehabilitation is not necessary, but the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, legal separation or other proceeding where spousal support may be awarded, such as a petition for an order of protection.
(2) Transitional alimony shall be nonmodifiable unless:
(A) The parties otherwise agree in an agreement incorporated into the initial decree of divorce or legal separation, or order of protection;
(B) The court otherwise orders in the initial decree of divorce, legal separation or order of protection; or
(C) The alimony recipient lives with a third person, in which case a rebuttable presumption is raised that:
(i) The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or
(ii) The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.
(3) Transitional alimony shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Transitional alimony shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated in the decree.
(4) The court may provide, at the time of entry of the order to pay transitional alimony, that the transitional alimony shall terminate upon the occurrence of other conditions, including, but not limited to, the remarriage of the party receiving transitional alimony.
(h)(1)(A) Alimony in solido, also known as lump sum alimony, is a form of long-term support, the total amount of which is calculable on the date the decree is entered, but which is not designated as transitional alimony. Alimony in solido may be paid in installments if the payments are ordered over a definite period of time and the sum of the alimony to be paid is ascertainable when awarded. The purpose of this form of alimony is to provide financial support to a spouse, to enable the court to equitably divide and distribute marital property, or both.
(B) Alimony in solido may be awarded for attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings through the date of the final hearing and any proceedings brought pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. When determining whether attorney fees and expenses should be awarded as alimony in solido, the court shall consider the following:
(i) The factors enumerated in subsection (i);
(ii) The total amount of attorney fees and expenses incurred and the total amount of attorney fees and expenses paid by each party in connection with the proceedings;
(iii) Whether the attorney fees and expenses requested are reasonable under the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct; and
(iv) Whether the attorney fees and expenses were necessary.
(2) A final award of alimony in solido is not modifiable, except by agreement of the parties only.
(3) Alimony in solido is not terminable upon the death or remarriage of the recipient or the payor.
(i) In determining whether the granting of an order for payment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature, amount, length of term, and manner of payment, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other sources;
(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such party’s earnings capacity to a reasonable level;
(3) The duration of the marriage;
(4) The age and mental condition of each party;
(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;
(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage;
(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible;
(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 36-4-121;
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party;
(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and
(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
(j) Where the lump sum amount of retirement or pension benefits or of balances in an individual retirement account, §§ 401(k), 403(b), 457 (26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b) and 457), respectively, or any other tax qualified account has been considered by the trial court, and determined to be marital property to be divided, the distributions of such lump sum amounts necessary to complete the division of property, whether distributed in a single payment or by periodic payments, shall not be considered income for the purpose of determining a spouse or ex-spouse’s right to receive alimony or child support, but the income generated by the investment of such lump sum awards shall be considered income for such purpose.
(k) The court may direct a party to pay the premiums for insurance insuring the health care costs of the other party, in whole or in part, for such duration as the court deems appropriate.
(l) To secure the obligation of one party to pay alimony to or for the benefit of the other party, the court may direct a party to designate the other party as the beneficiary of, and to pay the premiums required to maintain, any existing policies insuring the life of a party, or to purchase and pay the premiums required to maintain such new or additional life insurance designating the other party the beneficiary of the insurance, or a combination of these, as the court deems appropriate.
(m) The order or decree of the court may provide that the payments for the support of such spouse shall be paid either to the clerk of the court or directly to the spouse, or, in Title IV-D cases, the order or decree of the court shall provide that payments shall be paid to the central collections and disbursement unit, pursuant to § 36-5-116.
(n) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties as to support and maintenance of a party.
(o) Any order of alimony that has been reduced to judgment shall be entitled to be enforced as any other judgment of a court of this state and shall be entitled to full faith and credit in this state and in any other state.
(a)(1) In a suit for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance, where the custody of a minor child or minor children is a question, the court may, notwithstanding a decree for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance is denied, award the care, custody and control of such child or children to either of the parties to the suit or to both parties in the instance of joint custody or shared parenting, or to some suitable person, as the welfare and interest of the child or children may demand, and the court may decree that suitable support be made by the natural parents or those who stand in the place of the natural parents by adoption. Such decree shall remain within the control of the court and be subject to such changes or modification as the exigencies of the case may require.
(2)(A)(i) Except as provided in this subdivision (a)(2)(A), neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody is established, but the court shall have the widest discretion to order a custody arrangement that is in the best interest of the child. Unless both parents have agreed to a custody arrangement and parenting plan, orders for custody arrangements must include written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the basis for the order. Unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child where the parents have agreed to joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child. For the purpose of assisting the court in making a determination whether an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may direct that an investigation be conducted. The burden of proof necessary to modify an order of joint custody at a subsequent proceeding shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
(ii) Unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that custody shall not be awarded to a parent who has been convicted of a criminal offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 5, against a child less than eighteen (18) years of age.
(iii) Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) shall apply only to persons who are convicted on or after July 1, 2006. Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) and this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to prevent a parent from being granted visitation with the child; provided, however, that any visitation shall be supervised.
(iv) If it is determined by the court, based upon a prior order or reliable evidence, that a parent has willfully abandoned a child for a period of eighteen (18) months, as the term is used in § 36-6-406(a)(1), then, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the abandoning parent’s residential time, as provided in the permanent or temporary parenting plan or other court order, shall be limited. This subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) shall not be construed to prevent such a parent from being granted limited visitation with the child. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) shall be construed to apply to children in the legal custody of the department of children’s services.
(v) If prior to awarding joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, the court finds one (1) parent is under indictment for the offense of aggravated child abuse under § 39-15-402, child sexual abuse under § 37-1-602, or severe child sexual abuse under § 36-1-113(g)(11), the court shall not award the parent under indictment any type of custody during the pendency of the indictment unless the presumption created by § 36-6-112(c)(2) is overcome; provided, however, that the court may grant the parent supervised visitation with the child. If the court finds that a parent to whom some form of custody has been ordered is indicted for one (1) of the offenses set out in this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(v), that finding shall constitute a material change in circumstance for the purpose of modifying any existing child custody orders.
(B)(i) If the issue before the court is a modification of the court’s prior decree pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a material change in circumstance. A material change of circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child. A material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to, failures to adhere to the parenting plan or an order of custody and visitation or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the best interest of the child.
(ii) In each contested case, the court shall make such a finding as to the reason and the facts that constitute the basis for the custody determination.
(iii) Nothing contained within this subdivision (a)(2) shall interfere with the requirement that parties to an action for legal separation, annulment, absolute divorce or separate maintenance incorporate a parenting plan into the final decree or decree modifying an existing custody order.
(iv) Nothing in this subsection (a) shall imply a mandatory modification to the child support order.
(C) If the issue before the court is a modification of the court’s prior decree pertaining to a residential parenting schedule, then the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a material change of circumstance affecting the child’s best interest. A material change of circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child. A material change of circumstance for purposes of modification of a residential parenting schedule may include, but is not limited to, significant changes in the needs of the child over time, which may include changes relating to age; significant changes in the parent’s living or working condition that significantly affect parenting; failure to adhere to the parenting plan; or other circumstances making a change in the residential parenting time in the best interest of the child.
(3)(A) Except when the court finds it not to be in the best interests of the affected child, each order pertaining to the custody or possession of a child arising from an action for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board or annulment shall grant to each parent the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(B)(i)-(vi) during periods when the child is not in that parent’s possession or shall incorporate such rights by reference to a prior order. Other orders pertaining to custody or possession of a child may contain the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(B)(i)-(vi).
(B) The referenced rights are as follows:
(i) The right to unimpeded telephone or, if available, video conference conversations with the child at least twice a week at reasonable times and for reasonable durations. The parent exercising parenting time shall furnish the other parent with a telephone number or, if available, video conferencing information where the child may be reached at the days and time specified in a parenting plan or other court order or, where days and times are not specified, at reasonable times;
(ii) The right to send mail to the child which the other parent shall not destroy, deface, open or censor. The parent exercising parenting time shall deliver all letters, packages and other material sent to the child by the other parent as soon as received and shall not interfere with their delivery in any way, unless otherwise provided by law or court order;
(iii) The right to receive notice and relevant information as soon as practicable but within twenty-four (24) hours of any hospitalization, major illness or injury, or death of the child. The parent exercising parenting time when such event occurs shall notify the other parent of the event and shall provide all relevant healthcare providers with the contact information for the other parent;
(iv) The right to receive directly from the child’s school any educational records customarily made available to parents. Upon request from one (1) parent, the parent enrolling the child in school shall provide to the other parent as soon as available each academic year the name, address, telephone number and other contact information for the school. In the case of children who are being homeschooled, the parent providing the homeschooling shall advise the other parent of this fact along with the contact information of any sponsoring entity or other entity involved in the child’s education, including access to any individual student records or grades available online. The school or homeschooling entity shall be responsible, upon request, to provide to each parent records customarily made available to parents. The school may require a written request which includes a current mailing address and may further require payment of the reasonable costs of duplicating such records. These records include copies of the child’s report cards, attendance records, names of teachers, class schedules, and standardized test scores;
(v) Unless otherwise provided by law, the right to receive copies of the child’s medical, health or other treatment records directly from the treating physician or healthcare provider. Upon request from one (1) parent, the parent who has arranged for such treatment or health care shall provide to the other parent the name, address, telephone number and other contact information of the physician or healthcare provider. The keeper of the records may require a written request including a current mailing address and may further require payment of the reasonable costs of duplicating such records. No person who receives the mailing address of a requesting parent as a result of this requirement shall provide such address to the other parent or a third person;
(vi) The right to be free of unwarranted derogatory remarks made about such parent or such parent’s family by the other parent to or in the presence of the child;
(vii) The right to be given at least forty-eight (48) hours’ notice, whenever possible, of all extracurricular school, athletic, church activities and other activities as to which parental participation or observation would be appropriate, and the opportunity to participate in or observe them. The parent who has enrolled the child in each such activity shall advise the other parent of the activity and provide contact information for the person responsible for its scheduling so that the other parent may make arrangements to participate or observe whenever possible, unless otherwise provided by law or court order;
(viii) The right to receive from the other parent, in the event the other parent leaves the state with the minor child or children for more than forty-eight (48) hours, an itinerary which shall include the planned dates of departure and return, the intended destinations and mode of travel and telephone numbers. The parent traveling with the child or children shall provide this information to the other parent so as to give that parent reasonable notice; and
(ix) The right to access and participation in the child’s education on the same basis that are provided to all parents including the right of access to the child during lunch and other school activities; provided, that the participation or access is legal and reasonable; however, access must not interfere with the school’s day-to-day operations or with the child’s educational schedule.
(C) Any of the foregoing rights may be denied in whole or in part to one or both parents by the court upon a showing that such denial is in the best interests of the child. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the court from ordering additional rights where the facts and circumstances so require.
(D) All parenting plans submitted to the court by one (1) party only shall contain the notarized signature of that party. All parenting plans submitted to the court by both parties jointly shall contain the notarized signature of both parties.
(4) Notwithstanding any common law presumption to the contrary, a finding under former § 36-6-106(a)(8), that child abuse, as defined in § 39-15-401 or § 39-15-402, or child sexual abuse, as defined in § 37-1-602, has occurred within the family shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interests of the child to award sole custody, joint legal or joint physical custody to the perpetrator of such abuse.
(5) If the issue before the court is modification of a prior decree pertaining to custody pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(B) or a residential parenting schedule pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(C), and the parties either announce to the court and place on the record an agreement specifying the terms of the modification, or execute a permanent parenting plan modifying a prior order of the court with respect to custody or a residential parenting schedule which is approved through entry of an agreed order, then the court is not required to inquire further and make an independent determination as to whether the modification is in the best interest of the child. An order of the court approving the agreement and stating that the modification is made by agreement of the parties satisfies the requirements of Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The court is not required to accept an agreement of the parties modifying a permanent parenting plan, and this subdivision (a)(5) does not diminish the authority of the court to make inquiry and ensure that the modification of the permanent parenting plan is in the best interest of the child, is entered into freely and voluntarily by both parents, and is not the product of duress, coercion, or undue influence.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, the party, or parties, or other person awarded custody and control of such child or children shall be entitled to enforce the court’s decree concerning the suitable support of such child or children in the appropriate court of any county in this state in which such child or children reside; provided, that such court shall have divorce jurisdiction, if service of process is effectuated upon the obligor within this state. Jurisdiction to modify or alter such decree shall remain in the exclusive control of the court that issued such decree.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter, modify or restrict the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to § 37-1-103.
(d) It is the legislative intent that the gender of the party seeking custody shall not give rise to a presumption of parental fitness or cause a presumption or constitute a factor in favor or against the award of custody to such party.
(e)(1) In an action for dissolution of marriage involving minor children, or in a post-judgment proceeding involving minor children, if the court finds, on a case by case basis, that it would be in the best interest of the minor children, the court may on its own motion, or on the motion of either party, order the parties, excluding the minor children, to attend an educational seminar concerning the effects of the dissolution of marriage on the children. The program may be divided into sessions, which in the aggregate shall not exceed four (4) hours in duration. The program shall be educational in nature and not designed for individual therapy.
(2) The fees or costs of the educational sessions under this section, which shall be reasonable, shall be borne by the parties and may be assessed by the court as it deems equitable. Fees may be waived upon motion for indigent persons.
(3) No court shall deny the granting of a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for failure of a party or both parties to attend the educational session. Refusal to attend the educational session may be punished by contempt and may be considered by the court as evidence of the parent’s lack of good faith in proceedings under part 4 of this chapter.
(a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who has been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, aggravated statutory rape pursuant to § 39-13-506, or statutory rape by an authority figure pursuant to § 39-13-532, from which crime a child was conceived shall not have custody or visitation rights, or the rights of inheritance with respect to that child.
(2) A person who is originally charged with an offense listed in subdivision (a)(1), but is convicted of or pleads guilty or no contest to a lesser included offense, from which crime a child was conceived shall not have custody or visitation rights, or the rights of inheritance with respect to that child.
(b) The other parent of the child may waive the protection afforded under subsection (a) regarding visitation and request that the court grant reasonable visitation rights with the child if paternity has been acknowledged.(c) Unless waived by the other parent and, if contributing toward support of the child, the department of human services, a court shall establish a child support obligation against the father of the child pursuant to chapter 5, part 1 of this title.
(a) In a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child. In taking into account the child’s best interest, the court shall order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child consistent with the factors set out in this subsection (a), the location of the residences of the parents, the child’s need for stability and all other relevant factors. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following, where applicable:
(1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;
(2) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and the court shall further consider any history of either parent or any caregiver denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order;
(3) Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be considered by the court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings;
(4) The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care;
(5) The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental responsibilities;
(6) The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child;
(7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;
(8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it relates to their ability to parent the child. The court may order an examination of a party under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, if necessary for the conduct of the proceedings, order the disclosure of confidential mental health information of a party under § 33-3-105(3). The court order required by § 33-3-105(3) must contain a qualified protective order that limits the dissemination of confidential protected mental health information to the purpose of the litigation pending before the court and provides for the return or destruction of the confidential protected mental health information at the conclusion of the proceedings;
(9) The child’s interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child’s involvement with the child’s physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities;
(10) The importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;
(11) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent, or to any other person, including the child’s siblings. The court may, where appropriate, refer any issues of abuse to juvenile court for further proceedings;
(12) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or frequents the home of a parent and such person’s interactions with the child;
(13) The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preference of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children;
(14) Each parent’s employment schedule, and the court may make accommodations consistent with those schedules;
(15) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court; and
(16) Whether a parent has failed to pay court-ordered child support for a period of three (3) years or more.
(b) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the court has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination regarding a minor child or may modify a prior order of child custody upon finding that the custodial parent has been convicted of or found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child’s other parent or legal guardian.
(c) As used in this section, “caregiver” has the meaning ascribed to that term in § 37-5-501.
(d) Nothing in subsections (a) and (c) shall be construed to affect or diminish the constitutional rights of parents that may arise during and are inherent in custody proceedings.
(e) The disability of a parent alone shall not be considered for or against awarding custody to such a party unless the disability impacts the parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child.
(f) If the petitioner knows whether a child has ever been adjudicated by a court as a dependent and neglected or abused child or whether any party to the action has ever been adjudicated by a court as the perpetrator of dependency and neglect or abuse of a minor child, any petition regarding child custody shall include an affirmative statement setting out all applicable adjudications. If an adjudication has occurred as a result of a child protective services investigation, the court may order the department of children’s services to disclose information regarding the investigation to protect the child from abuse or neglect consistent with § 37-1-612(h). The court shall consider any such information as a factor in determining the child’s best interest.
(g) As required by § 36-6-404(b), only if the limitations of § 36-6-406 are not dispositive of the child’s residential schedule, then the court shall consider the factors found in subdivisions (a)(1)-(15).
(a) In any proceeding concerning the custody of a child, if an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or if there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer either party to mediation only if:
(1) Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence;
(2) Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and
(3) The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim’s choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a non-attorney advocate for attendance at mediation.
(b) Where the court makes findings of child abuse or child sexual abuse under § 36-6-106(a)(8), the court may only award visitation under circumstances that guarantee the safety of the child. In order to guarantee the safety of the child, the court may order:
(1) That all visits be supervised by a responsible adult or agency, the costs to be primarily borne by the perpetrating parent;
(2) That the perpetrating parent attend and complete a program of counseling or other intervention as a precondition to visitation;
(3) That overnight visitation be prohibited until such time that the perpetrating parent has completed court ordered counseling or intervention, or otherwise demonstrated a change in circumstances that guarantees the safety of the child;
(4) That the address of the child and the non-perpetrating parent be kept confidential; and
(5) Any other conditions the court deems necessary and proper to guarantee the safety of the child.
(a) After custody or co-parenting has been established by the entry of a permanent parenting plan or final order, if a parent who is spending intervals of time with a child desires to relocate outside the state or more than fifty (50) miles from the other parent within the state, the relocating parent shall send a notice to the other parent at the other parent’s last known address by registered or certified mail. Unless excused by the court for exigent circumstances, the notice shall be mailed not later than sixty (60) days prior to the move. The notice shall contain the following:
(1) Statement of intent to move;
(2) Location of proposed new residence;
(3) Reasons for proposed relocation; and
(4) Statement that absent agreement between the parents or an objection by the non-relocating parent within thirty (30) days of the date notice is sent by registered or certified mail in accordance with subsection (a), the relocating parent will be permitted to do so by law.
(b) Absent agreement by the parents on a new visitation schedule within thirty (30) days of the notice or upon a timely objection in response to the notice, the relocating parent shall file a petition seeking approval of the relocation. The non-relocating parent has thirty (30) days to file a response in opposition to the petition. In the event no response in opposition is filed within thirty (30) days, the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so.
(c)(1) If a petition in opposition to relocation is filed, the court shall determine whether relocation is in the best interest of the minor child.
(2) In determining whether relocation is in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall consider the following factors:
(A) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life;
(B) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the child;
(C) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties;
(D) The child’s preference, if the child is twelve (12) years of age or older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preference of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children;
(E) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of the relocating parent, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the non-relocating parent;
(F) Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the general quality of life for both the relocating parent and the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity;
(G) The reasons of each parent for seeking or opposing the relocation; and
(H) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child, including those enumerated in § 36-6-106(a).
(3) If, upon consideration of factors in subdivision (c)(2), the court finds that relocation is in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall modify the permanent parenting plan as needed to account for the distance between the non-relocating parent and the relocating parent.
(4) If the court finds that relocation is not in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall deny the petition for approval and, utilizing the factors provided in § 36-6-106(a), enter a modified permanent parenting plan that shall become effective only if the parent proposing to relocate elects to do so despite the court’s decision denying the parent’s petition for approval.
(d) In fashioning a modified parenting plan under subdivisions (c)(3) and (4), the court shall consider and utilize available alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child’s relationship with and access to the other parent. The court shall also assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation, and determine whether a deviation from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors, including, but not limited to, additional costs incurred for transporting the child for visitation.
(e) Nothing in this section shall prohibit either parent from petitioning the court at any time to address issues other than a change of custody related to the move, including, but not limited to, visitation.
(f) Either parent in a parental relocation matter may recover reasonable attorney fees and other litigation expenses from the other parent in the discretion of the court.
(g) The procedure and best interest standard of this section shall also apply to a parent who is subject to an injunction pursuant to § 36-6-116(a)(4) or § 36-4-106(d)(5).
(h) Deleted by 2018 Pub.Acts, c. 853, § 2, eff. July 1, 2018.
(i) Deleted by 2018 Pub.Acts, c. 853, § 2, eff. July 1, 2018.(j) Deleted by 2018 Pub.Acts, c. 853, § 2, eff. July 1, 2018.6; 2018 Pub.Acts, c. 853, §§ 1, 2, eff. July 1, 2018.
(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Protective Parent Reform Act.”
(b) If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent shall not be deprived of custody, visitation, or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation, or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief.
(c)(1) If an allegation that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court shall consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall not place a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that child.
(2) A parent is presumed to present a substantial risk of harm to the child if the parent is under indictment for the offense of aggravated child abuse under § 39-15-402, child sexual abuse under § 37-1-602, or severe child sexual abuse under § 36-1-113(g)(11). The parent shall remain a risk of harm during the pendency of the indictment; provided, however, that the court may grant the parent supervised visitation with the child.
After making an award of custody, the court shall, upon request of the non-custodial parent, grant such rights of visitation as will enable the child and the non-custodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health. In granting any such rights of visitation, the court shall designate in which parent’s home each minor child shall reside on given days of the year, including provisions for holidays, birthdays of family members, vacations and other special occasions. If the court finds that the non-custodial parent has physically or emotionally abused the child, the court may require that visitation be supervised or prohibited until such abuse has ceased or until there is no reasonable likelihood that such abuse will recur. The court may not order the department of children’s services to provide supervision of visitation pursuant to this section except in cases where the department is the petitioner or intervening petitioner in a case in which the custody or guardianship of a child is at issue.
In any proceeding concerning the visitation of a child, if an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or if there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer either party to mediation only if:
(1) Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence;
(2) Mediation is provided by a certified mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and
(3) The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim’s choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a non-attorney advocate for attendance at mediation.
(a) Any of the following circumstances, when presented in a petition for grandparent visitation to the circuit, chancery, general sessions courts with domestic relations jurisdiction, other courts with domestic relations jurisdiction or juvenile court in matters involving children born out of wedlock of the county in which the petitioned child currently resides, necessitates a hearing if such grandparent visitation is opposed by the custodial parent or parents or custodian or if the grandparent visitation has been severely reduced by the custodial parent or parents or custodian:
(1) The father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased;
(2) The child’s father or mother are divorced, legally separated, or were never married to each other;
(3) The child’s father or mother has been missing for not less than six (6) months;
(4) The court of another state has ordered grandparent visitation;
(5) The child resided in the home of the grandparent for a period of twelve (12) months or more and was subsequently removed from the home by the parent, parents, or custodian (this grandparent-grandchild relationship establishes a rebuttable presumption that denial of visitation may result in irreparable harm to the child); or
(6) The child and the grandparent maintained a significant existing relationship for a period of twelve (12) months or more immediately preceding severance or severe reduction of the relationship, this relationship was severed or severely reduced by the parent, parents, or custodian for reasons other than abuse or presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child, and severance or severe reduction of this relationship is likely to occasion substantial emotional harm to the child.
(b)(1) In considering a petition for grandparent visitation, the court shall first determine the presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child. Such finding of substantial harm may be based upon cessation or severe reduction of the relationship between an unmarried minor child and the child’s grandparent if the court determines, upon proper proof, that:
(A) The child had such a significant existing relationship with the grandparent that loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child;
(B) The grandparent functioned as a primary caregiver such that cessation or severe reduction of the relationship could interrupt provision of the daily needs of the child and thus occasion physical or emotional harm; or
(C) The child had a significant existing relationship with the grandparent and loss or severe reduction of the relationship presents the danger of other direct and substantial harm to the child.
(2) For purposes of this section, a grandparent shall be deemed to have a significant existing relationship with a grandchild if:
(A) The child resided with the grandparent for at least six (6) consecutive months;
(B) The grandparent was a full-time caretaker of the child for a period of not less than six (6) consecutive months; or
(C) The grandparent had frequent visitation with the child who is the subject of the suit for a period of not less than one (1) year.
(3) A grandparent is not required to present the testimony or affidavit of an expert witness in order to establish a significant existing relationship with a grandchild or that the loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child. Instead, the court shall consider whether the facts of the particular case would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a significant existing relationship between the grandparent and grandchild or that the loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child.
(4) For the purposes of this section, if the child’s parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation is the parent of that deceased parent, there shall be a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation or severe reduction of the relationship between the child and grandparent.
(c) Upon an initial finding of danger of substantial harm to the child, the court must then determine whether grandparent visitation would be in the best interests of the child based upon the factors in § 36-6-307. Upon such determination, reasonable visitation may be ordered. Reasonable visitation must constitute, at a minimum, sufficient contact to reasonably permit a strong and meaningful relationship to be established with the child.
(d)(1) Notwithstanding § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts a child, this section applies.
(2) If a person other than a relative or a stepparent adopts a child, any visitation rights granted pursuant to this section before the adoption of the child shall automatically end upon such adoption.
(e) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, as used in this part, with regard to the petitioned child, the word “grandparent” includes, but is not limited to:
(1) A biological grandparent;
(2) The spouse of a biological grandparent;
(3) A parent of an adoptive parent; or
(4) A biological or adoptive great-grandparent or the spouse thereof.
(f) For purposes of this section, “severe reduction” or “severely reduced” means reduction to no contact or token visitation as defined in § 36-1-102.
As used in this part, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Dispute resolution” means the mediation process or alternative dispute resolution process in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31 unless the parties agree otherwise. For the purposes of this part, such process may include: mediation, the neutral party to be chosen by the parties or the court; arbitration, the neutral party to be chosen by the parties or the court; or a mandatory settlement conference presided over by the court or a special master;
(2) “Parenting responsibilities” means those aspects of the parent-child relationship in which the parent makes decisions and performs duties necessary for the care and growth of the child. “Parenting responsibilities,” the establishment of which is the objective of a permanent parenting plan, include:
(A) Providing for the child’s emotional care and stability, including maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child and supervising the child to encourage and protect emotional, intellectual, moral, and spiritual development;
(B) Providing for the child’s physical care, including attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feeding, clothing, physical care, and grooming, supervision, health care, and day care, and engaging in other activities that are appropriate to the developmental level of the child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the particular family;
(C) Providing encouragement and protection of the child’s intellectual and moral development, including attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or other education essential to the best interests of the child;
(D) Assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate interpersonal relationships;
(E) Exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child’s welfare, consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances; and
(F) Providing any financial security and support of the child in addition to child support obligations;
(3) “Permanent parenting plan” means a written plan for the parenting and best interests of the child, including the allocation of parenting responsibilities and the establishment of a residential schedule, as well as an award of child support consistent with chapter 5 of this title;
(4) “Primary residential parent” means the parent with whom the child resides more than fifty percent (50%) of the time;
(5) “Residential schedule” is the schedule of when the child is in each parent’s physical care, and the residential schedule must designate a primary residential parent when the child is scheduled to reside with one (1) parent more than fifty percent (50%) of the time; in addition, the residential schedule must designate in which parent’s home each minor child shall reside on given days of the year, including provisions for holidays, birthdays of family members, vacations, and other special occasions, consistent with the criteria of this part; provided, that nothing contained herein modifies any provision of § 36-6-108; and
(6) “Temporary parenting plan” means a plan for the temporary parenting and the best interests of the child, including the establishment of a temporary residential schedule, and the establishment of temporary financial support designed to maintain the financial status quo to the extent possible, consistent with chapter 5 of this title, and the guidelines thereunder.
Except as may be specifically provided otherwise herein, a temporary parenting plan shall be incorporated in any temporary order of the court in actions for absolute divorce, legal separation, annulment, or separate maintenance involving a minor child. A temporary parenting plan shall comply with those provisions for a permanent parenting plan under § 36-6-404(a) that are applicable for the time frame and shall include a residential schedule as described in § 36-6-404(b). The court shall approve a temporary parenting plan as follows:
(1) If the parties can agree to a temporary parenting plan, no written temporary parenting plan is required to be entered; or
(2) If the parties cannot agree to a temporary parenting plan, either or both parties may request the court to order dispute resolution. The court may immediately order the parties to participate in dispute resolution to establish a temporary parenting plan unless one (1) of the restrictions in § 36-6-406(a) exists. If dispute resolution is not available, either party may request and the court may order an expedited hearing to establish a temporary parenting plan. In either mediation or in a hearing before the court each party shall submit a proposed temporary parenting plan and a verified statement of income as defined by chapter 5 of this title, and a verified statement that the plan is proposed in good faith and is in the best interest of the child. If only one (1) party files a proposed temporary parenting plan in compliance with this section, that party may petition the court for an order adopting that party’s plan by default, upon a finding by the court that the plan is in the child’s best interest. In determining whether the proposed temporary parenting plan serves the best interests of the child, the court shall be governed by the allocation of residential time and support obligations contained in the child support guidelines and related provisions in chapter 5 of this title.
(a) Any final decree or decree of modification in an action for absolute divorce, legal separation, annulment, or separate maintenance involving a minor child shall incorporate a permanent parenting plan; provided, however, that this part shall be inapplicable to parties who were divorced prior to July 1, 1997, and thereafter return to court to enter an agreed order modifying terms of the previous court order. A permanent parenting plan shall:
(1) Provide for the child’s changing needs as the child grows and matures, in a way that minimizes the need for further modifications to the permanent parenting plan;
(2) Establish the authority and responsibilities of each parent with respect to the child, consistent with the criteria in this part;
(3) Minimize the child’s exposure to harmful parental conflict;
(4) Provide for a process for dispute resolution, before court action, unless precluded or limited by § 36-6-406; provided, that state agency cases are excluded from the requirement of dispute resolution as to any child support issue involved. In the process for dispute resolution:
(A) Preference shall be given to carrying out the parenting plan;
(B) The parents shall use the designated process to resolve disputes relating to the implementation of the plan;
(C) A written record shall be prepared of any agreement reached in mediation, arbitration, or settlement conference and shall be provided to each party to be drafted into a consent order of modification;
(D) If the court finds that a parent willfully failed to appear at a scheduled dispute resolution process without good reason, the court may, upon motion, award attorney fees and financial sanctions to the prevailing parent;
(E) This subsection (a) shall be set forth in the decree; and
(F) Nothing in this part shall preclude court action, if required to protect the welfare of the child or a party;
(5) Allocate decision-making authority to one (1) or both parties regarding the child’s education, health care, extracurricular activities, and religious upbringing. The parties may incorporate an agreement related to the care and growth of the child in these specified areas, or in other areas, into their plan, consistent with the criteria in this part. Regardless of the allocation of decision making in the parenting plan, the parties may agree that either parent may make emergency decisions affecting the health or safety of the child;
(6) Provide that each parent may make the day-to-day decisions regarding the care of the child while the child is residing with that parent;
(7) Provide that when mutual decision making is designated but cannot be achieved, the parties shall make a good-faith effort to resolve the issue through the appropriate dispute resolution process, subject to the exception set forth in subdivision (a)(4)(F);
(8) Require the obligor to report annually on a date certain to the obligee, and the department of human services or its contractor in Title IV-D cases, on a form provided by the court, the obligor’s income as defined by the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title; and
(9) Specify that if the driver license of a parent is currently expired, canceled, suspended or revoked or if the parent does not possess a valid driver license for any other reason, the parent shall make acceptable transportation arrangements as may be necessary to protect and ensure the health, safety and welfare of the child when such child is in the custody of such parent.
(b) Any permanent parenting plan shall include a residential schedule as defined in § 36-6-402. The court shall make residential provisions for each child, consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances, which encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child. The child’s residential schedule shall be consistent with this part. If the limitations of § 36-6-406 are not dispositive of the child’s residential schedule, the court shall consider the factors found in § 36-6-106(a)(1)-(15).
(c) The court shall approve a permanent parenting plan as follows:
(1) Upon agreement of the parties:
(A) With the entry of a final decree or judgment; or
(B) With a consent order to modify a final decree or judgment involving a minor child;
(2) If the parties cannot reach agreement on a permanent parenting plan, upon the motion of either party, or upon its own motion, the court may order appropriate dispute resolution proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 31, to determine a permanent parenting plan; or
(3) If the parties have not reached agreement on a permanent parenting plan on or before forty-five (45) days before the date set for trial, each party shall file and serve a proposed permanent parenting plan, even though the parties may continue to mediate or negotiate. Failure to comply by a party may result in the court’s adoption of the plan filed by the opposing party if the court finds such plan to be in the best interests of the child. In determining whether the proposed plan is in the best interests of the child, the court may consider the allocation of residential time and support obligations contained in the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title. Each parent submitting a proposed permanent parenting plan shall attach a verified statement of income pursuant to the child support guidelines and related provisions contained in chapter 5 of this title, and a verified statement that the plan is proposed in good faith and is in the best interest of the child.
(d) The administrative office of the courts shall develop a “parenting plan” form1 that shall be used consistently by each court within the state that approves parenting plans pursuant to § 36-6-403 or this section on and after July 1, 2005. The administrative office of the courts shall be responsible for distributing such form for the use of those courts no later than June 1, 2005. The administrative office of the courts shall be responsible for updating such form as it deems necessary, in consultation with the Tennessee family law commission, the domestic relations committee of the Tennessee judicial conference, and other knowledgeable persons.
(a) The permanent parenting plan and the mechanism for approval of the permanent parenting plan shall not utilize dispute resolution, and a parent’s residential time as provided in the permanent parenting plan or temporary parenting plan shall be limited if the limitation is found to be in the best interest of the minor child and if the court determines, based upon a prior order or other reliable evidence, that a parent has engaged in any of the following conduct:
(1) Willful abandonment that continues for an extended period of time or substantial refusal to perform parenting responsibilities; or
(2) Physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.
(b) The parent’s residential time with the child shall be limited if it is determined by the court, based upon a prior order or other reliable evidence, that the parent resides with a person who has engaged in physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.
(c) If a parent has been convicted as an adult of a sexual offense under § 39-15-302, title 39, chapter 17, part 10, or §§ 39-13-501 – 39-13-511, or has been found to be a sexual offender under title 39, chapter 13, part 7, the court shall restrain the parent from contact with a child that would otherwise be allowed under this part. If a parent resides with an adult who has been convicted, or with a juvenile who has been adjudicated guilty of a sexual offense under § 39-15-302, title 39, chapter 17, part 10, or §§ 39-13-501 – 39-13-511, or who has been found to be a sexual offender under title 39, chapter 13, part 7, the court shall restrain that parent from contact with the child unless the contact occurs outside the adult’s or juvenile’s presence and sufficient provisions are established to protect the child.
(d) A parent’s involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child’s best interest, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of a parenting plan, if any of the following limiting factors are found to exist after a hearing:
(1) A parent’s neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting responsibilities;
(2) An emotional or physical impairment that interferes with the parent’s performance of parenting responsibilities as defined in § 36-6-402;
(3) An impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of parenting responsibilities;
(4) The absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties between the parent and the child;
(5) The abusive use of conflict by the parent that creates the danger of damage to the child’s psychological development;
(6) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a protracted period without good cause;
(7) A parent’s criminal convictions as they relate to such parent’s ability to parent or to the welfare of the child; or
(8) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child.
(e) In entering a permanent parenting plan, the court shall not draw any presumptions from the temporary parenting plan.
(f)(1) In all Title IV-D child or spousal support cases in which payment of support is to be made by income assignment, or otherwise, and in all cases where payments made by income assignment based upon support orders entered on or after January 1, 1994, that are not Title IV-D support cases but must be made to the central collection and disbursement unit as provided by § 36-5-116, and, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), the court shall only approve a temporary or permanent parenting plan involving the payment of support that complies with the requirements for central collection and disbursement as required by § 36-5-116. Prior to approval of a parenting plan in which payments are to be made directly to the spouse or the court clerk or to some other person or entity, there shall be filed with the plan presented to the court a written certification, under oath if filed by a party, or signed by the party’s counsel, stating whether the case for which the plan is to be approved is a Title IV-D support case subject to enforcement by the department of human services or is otherwise subject to collection through the department’s central collection and disbursement unit established by § 36-5-116.
(2) Any provision of any parenting plan, agreement or court order providing for any other payment procedure contrary to the requirements of § 36-5-116, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), whether or not approved by the court, shall be void and of no effect. No credit for support payments shall be given by the court, the court clerk or the department of human services for child or spousal support payments required by the support order that are made in contravention of such requirements; provided, however, the department may make any necessary adjustments to the balances owed to account for changes in the Title IV-D or central collection and disbursement status of the support case.
(g) Forms used by parties as parenting plans or adopted by the court for their use shall conform to all substantive language requirements established by the administrative office of the courts at such time as parenting plan forms1 are promulgated and approved by that office.
(a) For purposes of this part and §§ 8-7-109, 37-1-152, 37-1-403, 37-1-406, 37-1-413 and 49-7-117, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Child care agency” is as defined in §§ 71-3-501 and 37-5-501;
(2) “Child protection team” means the investigation team created by § 37-1-607;
(3)(A) “Child sexual abuse” means the commission of any act involving the unlawful sexual abuse, molestation, fondling or carnal knowledge of a child under thirteen (13) years of age that prior to November 1, 1989, constituted the criminal offense of:
(i) Aggravated rape under § 39-2-603 [repealed];
(ii) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-2-606 [repealed];
(iii) Assault with intent to commit rape or attempt to commit rape or sexual battery under § 39-2-608 [repealed];
(iv) Begetting child on wife’s sister under § 39-4-307 [repealed];
(v) Crimes against nature under § 39-2-612 [repealed];
(vi) Incest under § 39-4-306 [repealed];
(vii) Promotion of performance including sexual conduct by minor under § 39-6-1138 [repealed];
(viii) Rape under § 39-2-604 [repealed];
(ix) Sexual battery under § 39-2-607 [repealed]; or
(x) Use of minor for obscene purposes under § 39-6-1137 [repealed];
(B) “Child sexual abuse” also means the commission of any act involving the unlawful sexual abuse, molestation, fondling or carnal knowledge of a child under thirteen (13) years of age that on or after November 1, 1989, constituted the criminal offense of:
(i) Aggravated rape under § 39-13-502;
(ii) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504;
(iii) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1004;
(iv) Criminal attempt as provided in § 39-12-101 for any of the offenses in (a)(3)(B)(i)-(iii);
(v) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1005;
(vi) Incest under § 39-15-302;
(vii) Rape under § 39-13-503;
(viii) Sexual battery under § 39-13-505; or
(ix) Sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1003;
(C) “Child sexual abuse” also means one (1) or more of the following acts:
(i) Any penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anal opening of one (1) person by the penis of another person, whether or not there is the emission of semen;
(ii) Any contact between the genitals or anal opening of one (1) person and the mouth or tongue of another person;
(iii) Any intrusion by one (1) person into the genitals or anal opening of another person, including the use of any object for this purpose, except that it shall not include acts intended for a valid medical purpose;
(iv) The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of either the child or the perpetrator, except that it shall not include:
(a) Acts that may reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities, interactions with, or affection for a child; or
(b) Acts intended for a valid medical purpose;
(v) The intentional exposure of the perpetrator’s genitals in the presence of a child, or any other sexual act intentionally perpetrated in the presence of a child, if such exposure or sexual act is for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, aggression, degradation, or other similar purpose;
(vi) The sexual exploitation of a child, which includes allowing, encouraging, or forcing a child to:
(a) Solicit for or engage in prostitution; or
(b) Engage in an act prohibited by § 39-17-1003;
(vii) The commission of any act towards the child prohibited by § 39-13-309; and
(D) For the purposes of the reporting, investigation, and treatment provisions of §§ 37-1-603 – 37-1-615 “child sexual abuse” also means the commission of any act specified in subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(C) against a child thirteen (13) years of age through seventeen (17) years of age if such act is committed against the child by a parent, guardian, relative, person residing in the child’s home, or other person responsible for the care and custody of the child;
(4) “Department” means the department of children’s services;
(5) “Guardian ad litem” means a responsible adult who is appointed by the court to represent the best interests of a child in a proceeding as provided for by law, who shall be a party to any judicial proceeding as a representative of the child, and who shall serve until discharged by the court;
(6) “Institutional child sexual abuse” means situations of known or suspected child sexual abuse in which the person allegedly perpetrating the child sexual abuse is an employee of a public or private child care agency, public or private school, or any other person responsible for the child’s care;
(7) “Mental injury” means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function within the child’s normal range of performance and behavior, with due regard to the child’s culture; and
(8) “Other person responsible for a child’s care or welfare” includes, but is not limited to, the child’s legal guardian, legal custodian, or foster parent; an employee of a public or private child care agency, public or private school; or any other person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential setting.
(b) Harm to a child’s health or welfare can occur when the parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare:
(1) Commits, or allows to be committed, child sexual abuse as defined in subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(C); or
(2) Exploits a child under eighteen (18) years of age, or allows such child to be exploited, as provided in §§ 39-17-1003 – 39-17-1005.
(a) A person commits assault who:
(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
(2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or
(3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.
(A) Subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by incarceration and a fine not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
(B) Subdivision (a)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor; and
(C) Subdivision (a)(3) is a Class B misdemeanor.
(2) Any conduct by an inmate against a correctional officer, guard, jailer, or other full-time employee of a penal institution, local jail, or workhouse, that would constitute an assault under subdivision (a)(1) shall be reported by the managing authority of the institution to the appropriate district attorney general for prosecution.
(3) In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601 , and if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant’s ability to pay, but no less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. Such appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.
(c) For purposes of this section and § 39-13-102, “health care provider” means a person who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or permitted by the laws of this state to administer health care in the ordinary course of business in the practicing of a profession.
(a)(1) A person commits aggravated assault who:
(A) Intentionally or knowingly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101, and the assault:
(i) Results in serious bodily injury to another;
(ii) Results in the death of another;
(iii) Involved the use or display of a deadly weapon; or
(iv) Involved strangulation or attempted strangulation; or
(B) Recklessly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101(a)(1), and the assault:
(i) Results in serious bodily injury to another;
(ii) Results in the death of another; or
(iii) Involved the use or display of a deadly weapon.
(2) For purposes of subdivision (a)(1)(A)(iv), “strangulation” means intentionally or knowingly impeding normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by blocking the nose and mouth of another person, regardless of whether that conduct results in any visible injury or whether the person has any intent to kill or protractedly injure the victim.
(b) A person commits aggravated assault who, being the parent or custodian of a child or the custodian of an adult, intentionally or knowingly fails or refuses to protect the child or adult from an aggravated assault as defined in subdivision (a)(1) or aggravated child abuse as defined in § 39-15-402.
(c) A person commits aggravated assault who, after having been enjoined or restrained by an order, diversion or probation agreement of a court of competent jurisdiction from in any way causing or attempting to cause bodily injury or in any way committing or attempting to commit an assault against an individual or individuals, intentionally or knowingly attempts to cause or causes bodily injury or commits or attempts to commit an assault against the individual or individuals.
(d) Deleted by 2018 Pub.Acts, c. 925, § 2, eff. July 1, 2018.
(e)(1)(A) Aggravated assault under:
(i) Deleted by 2018 Pub.Acts, c. 925, § 3, eff. July 1, 2018.
(ii) Subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i), (iii), or (iv) is a Class C felony;
(iii) Subdivision (a)(1)(A)(ii) is a Class C felony;
(iv) Subdivision (b) or (c) is a Class C felony;
(v) Subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) or (iii) is a Class D felony;
(vi) Subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) is a Class D felony.
(B) Notwithstanding the authorized fines established in § 40-35-111, a violation of this section is punishable by a fine not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), in addition to any other punishment authorized by § 40-35-111.
(2) In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, and if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant’s ability to pay, but not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. Such appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.
(3)(A) In addition to any other punishment authorized by this section, the court shall order a person convicted of aggravated assault under the circumstances set out in this subdivision (e)(3) to pay restitution to the victim of the offense. Additionally, the judge shall order the warden, chief operating officer, or workhouse administrator to deduct fifty percent (50%) of the restitution ordered from the inmate’s commissary account or any other account or fund established by or for the benefit of the inmate while incarcerated. The judge may authorize the deduction of up to one hundred percent (100%) of the restitution ordered.
(B) Subdivision (e)(3)(A) applies if:
(i) The victim of the aggravated assault is a correctional officer, guard, jailer, or other full-time employee of a penal institution, local jail, or workhouse;
(ii) The offense occurred while the victim was in the discharge of official duties and within the victim’s scope of employment; and
(iii) The person committing the assault was at the time of the offense, and at the time of the conviction, serving a sentence of incarceration in a public or private penal institution as defined in § 39-16-601.
(4) In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, the court shall assess each person convicted an electronic monitoring indigency fee of ten dollars ($10.00). All proceeds collected pursuant to this subdivision (e)(4) shall be transmitted to the treasurer for deposit in the electronic monitoring indigency fund, established in § 55-10-419.
(5) Notwithstanding this subsection (e), a person convicted of a violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i), or (a)(1)(B)(ii) shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is otherwise provided if:
(A) The violation was committed by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle, as defined by § 55-1-103; and
Currentness
(a) It is an offense to knowingly violate:
(1) An order of protection issued pursuant to title 36, chapter 3, part 6; or
(2) A restraining order issued to a victim as defined in § 36-3-601.
(b) A person violating this section may be arrested with or without a warrant as provided in § 36-3-611, and the arrest shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of § 36-3-619.
(c) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section shall be considered within the provisions of § 40-11-150(a) and subject to the twelve-hour holding period authorized by § 40-11-150(h).
(d) After a person has been arrested for a violation of this section, the arresting officer shall inform the victim that the person has been arrested and that the person may be eligible to post bond for the offense and be released until the date of trial for the offense.
(e) Neither an arrest nor the issuance of a warrant or capias for a violation of this section in any way affects the validity or enforceability of any order of protection, restraining order, or no contact order.
(f) In order to constitute a violation of subsection (a):
(1) The person must have received notice of the request for an order of protection or restraining order;
(2) The person must have had an opportunity to appear and be heard in connection with the order of protection or restraining order; and
(3) The court made specific findings of fact in the order of protection or restraining order that the person committed domestic abuse, sexual assault, or stalking as defined in § 36-3-601 or was convicted of a felony offense under chapter 13, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 of this title.
(g) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding § 40-35-111(e)(1), a violation of subsection (a) is punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), and any sentence of incarceration imposed shall be served consecutively to the sentence for any other offense that is based in whole or in part on the same factual allegations. However, the sentencing judge or magistrate may specifically order the sentences for the offenses arising out of the same facts to be served concurrently.
(h)(1) It is an offense and a violation of an order of protection for a person to knowingly possess a firearm while an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is entered against that person and in effect, or any successive order of protection containing the language of § 36-3-606(f) and that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is entered against that person and in effect.
(2) For purposes of this subsection (h), the determination of whether a person possesses firearms shall be based upon the factors set out in § 36-3-625(f) if the firearms constitute the business inventory or are subject to the National Firearms Act, (26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq.).
(3) A violation of this subsection (h) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation constitutes a separate offense.
(4) If a violation of subsection (h) also constitutes a violation of § 36-3-625(h) or § 39-17-1307(f), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.
(i)(1) It is an offense to knowingly violate a no contact order, issued prior to a defendant’s release on bond, following the defendant’s arrest for any criminal offense defined in this chapter, in which the alleged victim of the offense is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601.(2) A violation of subdivision (i)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. A sentence imposed must be served consecutively to the sentence for the offense for which the defendant was originally arrested, unless the sentencing judge or magistrate specifically orders the sentences for the offenses to be served concurrently.
(a) It is the offense of custodial interference for a natural or adoptive parent, step-parent, grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew of a child younger than eighteen (18) years of age to:
(1) Remove the child from this state knowing that the removal violates a child custody determination as defined in § 36-6-205, the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or a temporary or permanent judgment or court order regarding the custody or care of the child;
(2) Detain the child within this state or remove the child from this state after the expiration of the noncustodial natural or adoptive parent or guardian’s lawful period of visitation, with the intent to violate the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order regarding the custody or care of the child;
(3) Harbor or hide the child within or outside this state, knowing that possession of the child was unlawfully obtained by another person in violation of the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order;
(4) Act as an accessory to any act prohibited by this section;
(5) Detain the child within or remove the child from this state during the noncustodial parent’s lawful period of visitation, with the intent to violate the court-ordered visitation of the noncustodial parent, or a temporary or permanent judgment regarding visitation with the child; or
(6) Harbor or hide the child within or outside this state, knowing that the child has been placed in the custody of the department of children’s services pursuant to a protective custody order or an emergency custody order entered by a court. It is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision (a)(6) that the person harboring or hiding the child has not been served with an actual copy of a protective custody order or emergency custody order.
(b) It is also the offense of custodial interference for a natural or adoptive parent, step-parent, grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew of an incompetent person to:
(1) Remove the incompetent person from this state knowing that the removal violates a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order regarding the custody or care of the incompetent person;
(2) Harbor or hide the incompetent person within or outside this state, knowing that possession of the incompetent person was unlawfully obtained by another person in violation of a temporary or permanent judgment or a court order; or
(3) Act as an accessory to any act prohibited by this section.
(c) It is a defense to custodial interference:
(1) That the person who removed the child or incompetent person reasonably believed that, at the time the child or incompetent was removed, the failure to remove the child or incompetent person would have resulted in a clear and present danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the child or incompetent person; or
(2) That the individual detained or moved in contravention of the rightful custody of a mother as defined in § 36-2-303, or of the order of custody or care, was returned by the defendant voluntarily and before arrest or the issuance of a warrant for arrest.
(d) If conduct that is in violation of this section is also a violation of § 39-13-304 or § 39-13-305(a)(1), (a)(3), or (a)(4), the offense may be prosecuted under any of the applicable statutes.
(e)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (e)(2), custodial interference is a Class E felony, unless the person taken from lawful custody is returned voluntarily by the defendant, in which case custodial interference is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) Custodial interference under subdivision (a)(5) is a Class C misdemeanor.
(a) A person commits the offense of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act who:
(1) Knowingly subjects, attempts to subject, benefits from, or attempts to benefit from another person’s provision of a commercial sex act;
(2) Recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, purchases, or obtains by any other means, another person for the purpose of providing a commercial sex act; or
(3) Commits the acts in this subsection (a) when the intended victim of the offense is a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.
(b) For purposes of subdivision (a)(2), such means may include, but are not limited to:
(1) Causing or threatening to cause physical harm to the person;
(2) Physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain the person;
(3) Abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process;
(4) Knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of the person;
(5) Using blackmail or using or threatening to cause financial harm for the purpose of exercising financial control over the person; or
(6) Facilitating or controlling a person’s access to a controlled substance.
(c)(1) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B felony, except as provided in subdivision (c)(2).
(2) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A felony if the victim of the offense is a child more than twelve (12) years of age but less than eighteen (18) years of age.
(d) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
(1) The intended victim of the offense is a law enforcement officer;
(2) The victim of the offense is a minor who consented to the act or acts constituting the offense;
(3) The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense; or
(4) The person charged was ignorant or mistaken as to the age of a minor.
(e) Notwithstanding this section to the contrary, if it is determined after a reasonable detention for investigative purposes that a victim of trafficking for a commercial sex act under this section is under eighteen (18) years of age, then that person is immune from prosecution for prostitution as a juvenile or adult. A law enforcement officer who takes a person under eighteen (18) years of age into custody as a suspected victim under this section shall, upon determination that the person is a minor, provide the minor with the telephone number for the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline, notify the department of children’s services, and release the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian or transport the minor to a shelter facility designated by the juvenile court judge to facilitate the release of the minor to the custody of a parent or guardian.
(f) It is a defense to prosecution under this section, including as an accomplice or co-conspirator, that a minor charged with a violation of this section was so charged for conduct that occurred because the minor is also a victim of an act committed in violation of this section or § 39-13-307, or because the minor is also a victim as defined by the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. § 7102).
As used in §§ 39-13-501 – 39-13-511, except as specifically provided in § 39-13-505, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Coercion” means threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be performed immediately or in the future or the use of parental, custodial, or official authority over a child less than fifteen (15) years of age;
(2) “Intimate parts” includes semen, vaginal fluid, the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock or breast of a human being;
(3) “Mentally defective” means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of the person’s conduct;
(4) “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling the person’s conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic or other substance administered to that person without the person’s consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person without the person’s consent;
(5) “Physically helpless” means that a person is unconscious, asleep or for any other reason physically or verbally unable to communicate unwillingness to do an act;
(6) “Sexual contact” includes the intentional touching of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification;
(7) “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s body, but emission of semen is not required; and(8) “Victim” means the person alleged to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct and includes the spouse of the defendant.
(a) Aggravated rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
(1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act and the defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon;
(2) The defendant causes bodily injury to the victim;
(3) The defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other persons; and
(A) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act; or
(B) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is:
(i) Mentally defective;
(ii) Mentally incapacitated;
(iii) Physically helpless; or
(iv) A vulnerable adult, as defined in § 39-15-501, with an intellectual disability.
(4) The defendant knows that the defendant is infected with HIV. As used in this subdivision (a)(4), “HIV” means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome;
(b)(1) Aggravated rape is a Class A felony.
(2) Notwithstanding title 40, chapter 35, a person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished as a Range II offender; however, the sentence imposed upon such person may, if appropriate, be within Range III but in no case shall it be lower than Range II.
(a) Rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
(1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;
(2) The sexual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent;
(3) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is:
(A) Mentally defective;
(B) Mentally incapacitated;
(C) Physically helpless; or
(D) A vulnerable adult, as defined in § 39-15-501, with an intellectual disability; or
(4) The sexual penetration is accomplished by fraud.
(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subdivision (b)(1)(B), rape is a Class B felony.
(B) If the victim of the offense is at least thirteen (13) years of age but less than eighteen (18) years of age, rape is a Class B felony and, notwithstanding title 40, chapter 35, the defendant shall be punished as a Range II offender; however, the sentence imposed upon the defendant may, if appropriate, be within Range III but in no case shall it be lower than Range II.
(2) Notwithstanding title 40, chapter 35, a person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished as a Range II offender; however, the sentence imposed upon such person may, if appropriate, be within Range III but in no case shall it be lower than Range II.
(a) Aggravated sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
(1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act and the defendant is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon;
(2) The defendant causes bodily injury to the victim;
(3) The defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other persons; and
(A) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act; or
(B) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or
(4) The victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age.
(b) Aggravated sexual battery is a Class B felony.
(a) Sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following circumstances:
(1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act;
(2) The sexual contact is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the contact that the victim did not consent;
(3) The defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or
(4) The sexual contact is accomplished by fraud.
(b) As used in this section, “coercion” means the threat of kidnapping, extortion, force or violence to be performed immediately or in the future.
(c) For purposes of this section, a victim is incapable of consent if:
(1) The sexual contact with the victim occurs during the course of a consultation, examination, ongoing treatment, therapy, or other provision of professional services described in subdivision (c)(2); and
(2) The defendant, whether licensed by the state or not, is a member of the clergy, healthcare professional, or alcohol and drug abuse counselor who was treating the victim for a mental, emotional, or physical condition.(d) Sexual battery is a Class E felony.
(a) Mitigated statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant, or of the defendant by the victim when the victim is at least fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least four (4) but not more than five (5) years older than the victim.
(b) Statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by the victim when:
(1) The victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than fifteen (15) years of age and the defendant is at least four (4) years but less than ten (10) years older than the victim; or
(2) The victim is at least fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is more than five (5) but less than ten (10) years older than the victim.
(c) Aggravated statutory rape is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant, or of the defendant by the victim when the victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least ten (10) years older than the victim.
(d)(1) Mitigated statutory rape is a Class E felony.
(2)(A) Statutory rape is a Class E felony.
(B) In addition to the punishment provided for a person who commits statutory rape for the first time, the trial judge may order, after taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense, including the offense for which the person was originally charged and whether the conviction was the result of a plea bargain agreement, that the person be required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to title 40, chapter 39, part 2.
(3) Aggravated statutory rape is a Class D felony.
(a) It is an offense for a defendant to engage in unlawful sexual contact with a minor when:
(1) The minor is less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(2) The defendant is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and
(3) The defendant was, at the time of the offense, in a position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the minor by virtue of the defendant’s legal, professional, or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual contact; or
(4) The defendant had, at the time of the offense, parental or custodial authority over the minor and used the authority to accomplish the sexual contact.
(b) As used in this section, “sexual contact” means the defendant intentionally touches or kisses the minor’s lips with the defendant’s lips if such touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.
(c) Sexual contact by an authority figure is a Class A misdemeanor with a mandatory minimum fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(d) Each instance of unlawful sexual contact shall be considered a separate offense.
(a)(1) A person commits the offense of indecent exposure who:
(A) In a public place or on the private premises of another, or so near thereto as to be seen from the private premises:
(i) Intentionally:
(a) Exposes the person’s genitals or buttocks to another; or
(b) Engages in sexual contact or sexual penetration as defined in § 39-13-501; and
(ii) Reasonably expects that the acts will be viewed by another and the acts:
(a) Will offend an ordinary viewer; or
(b) Are for the purpose of sexual arousal and gratification of the defendant; or
(B)(i) Knowingly invites, entices or fraudulently induces the child of another into the person’s residence for the purpose of attaining sexual arousal or gratification by intentionally engaging in the following conduct in the presence of the child:
(a) Exposure of such person’s genitals, buttocks or female breasts; or
(b) Masturbation; or
(ii) Knowingly engages in the person’s own residence, in the intended presence of any child, for the defendant’s sexual arousal or gratification the following intentional conduct:
(a) Exposure of the person’s genitals, buttocks or female breasts; or
(b) Masturbation.
(iii) Knowingly invites, entices, or fraudulently induces a minor into the person’s residence for the purpose of attaining sexual arousal or gratification by intentionally engaging in the following conduct in the presence of the minor without the consent of the minor:
(a) Exposure of such person’s genitals, buttocks, or female breasts; or
(b) Masturbation; or
(iv) Knowingly engages in the person’s own residence, in the intended presence of any minor, without the consent of the minor, for the defendant’s sexual arousal or gratification the following intentional conduct:
(a) Exposure of the person’s genitals, buttocks, or female breasts; or
(b) Masturbation.
(2) No prosecution shall be commenced for a violation of subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii)(a) based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a witness who shares with the accused any of the relationships described in § 36-3-601(5).
(3)(A) For subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) or (a)(1)(B)(ii) to apply, the defendant must be eighteen (18) years of age or older and the child victim must be less than thirteen (13) years of age.
(B) For subdivision (a)(1)(B)(iii) or (a)(1)(B)(iv) to apply, the defendant must be eighteen (18) years of age or older and the child victim must be at least thirteen (13) but no more than seventeen (17) years of age.
(b)(1) “Indecent exposure,” as defined in subsection (a), is a Class B misdemeanor, unless subdivision (b)(2), (b)(3) or (b)(4) applies.
(2) If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, indecent exposure is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the defendant has any combination of two (2) or more prior convictions under this section or § 39-13-517, or is a sexual offender, violent sexual offender or violent juvenile sexual offender, as defined in § 40-39-202, the offense is a Class E felony.
(4) If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the offense occurs on the property of any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center or other child care facility during a time at which a child or children are likely to be present on the property, the offense is a Class E felony.
(c)(1) A person confined in a penal institution, as defined in § 39-16-601, commits the offense of indecent exposure who with the intent to abuse, torment, harass or embarrass a guard or staff member:
(A) Intentionally exposes the person’s genitals or buttocks to the guard or staff member; or
(B) Engages in sexual contact as defined in § 39-13-501.
(2) For purposes of this subsection (c):
(A) “Guard” means any sheriff, jailer, guard, correctional officer, or other authorized personnel charged with the custody of the person; and
(B) “Staff member” means any other person employed by a penal institution or who performs ongoing services in a penal institution, including, but not limited to, clergy, educators, and medical professionals.
(3)(A) Notwithstanding subsection (b), a violation of this subsection (c) is a Class E felony.
(B) A sentence imposed for a violation of this subsection (c) must include a mandatory minimum sentence of fourteen (14) days of incarceration to be served consecutive to any other sentence the person is serving at the time of the offense.
(C) If a person is convicted of more than one (1) violation of this subsection (c), then the sentence imposed for each violation must be served consecutive to any other sentence imposed.
(d) This section does not apply to a mother who is breastfeeding her child in any location, public or private.
(e) As used in this section, “public place” means a place to which the public or a group of persons has access and includes, but is not limited to, highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, places of business, playgrounds and hallways, lobbies, and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence, and a restroom, locker room, dressing room, or shower, designated for multi-person, single-sex use. An act is deemed to occur in a public place if it produces its offensive or proscribed consequences in a public place.
As used in §§ 39-13-512 – 39-13-515, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “House of prostitution” means any place where prostitution or the promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one (1) or more persons under the control, management or supervision of another;
(2) “Inmate” means, within the meaning of this part concerning prostitution, a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency of a house of prostitution;
(3) “Patronizing prostitution” means soliciting or hiring another person with the intent that the other person engage in prostitution, or entering or remaining in a house of prostitution for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity;
(4)(A) “Promoting prostitution” means:
(i) Owning, controlling, managing, supervising, or in any way keeping, alone or in association with others, a business for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, or a house of prostitution;
(ii) Procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution;
(iii) Encouraging, inducing, or otherwise purposely causing another to become a prostitute;
(iv) Soliciting a person to patronize a prostitute;
(v) Procuring a prostitute for a patron; or
(vi) Soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive any benefit for engaging in any of the activities defined in subdivisions (4)(A)(i)-(v); and
(B) “Promoting prostitution” does not include a person who solicits, procures, induces, encourages, or attempts to cause another to patronize a prostitute if:
(i) The person promoting the prostitute and the prostitute being promoted are the same person; and
(ii) The intent of the promotion is the solicitation of business for only the prostitute engaging in the promotion;
(5) “Promoting prostitution of a minor” means engaging in any of the activities described in subdivision (4) when one (1) or more of the persons engaged in prostitution is less than eighteen (18) years of age or has an intellectual disability;
(6) “Prostitution” means engaging in, or offering to engage in, sexual activity as a business or being an inmate in a house of prostitution or loitering in a public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity; and
(7) “Sexual activity” means any sexual relations including homosexual sexual relations.
(a) A person commits an offense under this section who engages in prostitution.
(b)(1) Prostitution is a Class B misdemeanor.
(2) Prostitution committed within one hundred feet (100′) of a church or within one and one-half (1 ½ ) miles of a school, such distance being that established by § 49-6-2101, for state-funded school transportation, is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) A person convicted of prostitution within one and one-half (1 ½ ) miles of a school shall, in addition to any other authorized punishment, be sentenced to at least seven (7) days of incarceration and be fined at least one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(c) As used in subsection (b), “school” means all public and private schools that conduct classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12).
(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if it is determined after a reasonable detention for investigative purposes, that a person suspected of or charged with a violation of this section is under eighteen (18) years of age, that person is immune from prosecution for prostitution as a juvenile or adult. A law enforcement officer who takes a person under eighteen (18) years of age into custody for a suspected violation of this section shall, upon determination that the person is a minor, provide the minor with the telephone number for the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline, notify the department of children’s services, and release the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian or transport the minor to a shelter care facility designated by the juvenile court judge to facilitate the release of the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian.(e) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that a person charged with a violation of this section was so charged for conduct that occurred because the person was a victim of an act committed in violation of § 39-13-307 or § 39-13-309, or because the person was a victim as defined under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. § 7102).
(a) A person commits an offense under this section:
(1) Who patronizes prostitution; or
(2) When a person patronizes prostitution where the subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer or a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.
(b)(1) Patronizing prostitution is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) Patronizing prostitution within one and one-half (1.5) miles of a school shall, in addition to any other authorized punishment, be punished by no less than seven (7) days of incarceration and by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(3)(A) Patronizing prostitution from a person who is younger than eighteen (18) years of age, has an intellectual disability, or is a law enforcement officer posing as a minor is punishable as trafficking for commercial sex acts under § 39-13-309.
(B) Nothing in this subdivision (b)(3) shall be construed as prohibiting prosecution under any other applicable law.
(c) As used in subsection (b), “school” means all public and private schools that conduct classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12).
(d) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
(1) The subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer;
(2) The victim of the offense is a minor and consented to the offense; or
(3) The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense.
(a) A person commits an offense under this section:
(1) Who promotes prostitution; or
(2) Who promotes prostitution where the subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer or is a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), promoting prostitution is a Class E felony.
(c) Promoting prostitution of a person more than twelve (12) years of age but less than eighteen (18) years of age or a person with an intellectual disability as defined in § 33-1-101 is a Class A felony.
(d) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
(1) The subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer;
(2) The victim of the offense is a minor and consented to the offense; or
(3) The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or a law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense.
(a) A person commits aggravated prostitution when, knowing that such person is infected with HIV, the person engages in sexual activity as a business or is an inmate in a house of prostitution or loiters in a public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity.
(b) For the purposes of this section, “HIV” means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that an infection with HIV has occurred in order for a person to have committed aggravated prostitution.
(d) Aggravated prostitution is a Class C felony.
(a) As used in this section:
(1) “Nudity” or “state of nudity” means the showing of the bare human male or female genitals or pubic area with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of the areola, or the showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. Nudity or state of nudity does not include a mother in the act of nursing the mother’s baby; and
(2)(A)(i) “Public place” means any location frequented by the public, or where the public is present or likely to be present, or where a person may reasonably be expected to be observed by members of the public. Public place includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, beaches, business and commercial establishments, whether for profit or not-for-profit and whether open to the public at large or where entrance is limited by a cover charge or membership requirement, bottle clubs, hotels, motels, restaurants, night clubs, country clubs, cabarets and meeting facilities utilized by any religious, social, fraternal or similar organizations;
(ii) For purposes of subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), “public place” includes a public restroom, whether single sex or not;
(B) Premises used solely as a private residence, whether permanent or temporary in nature, are not deemed to be a public place. Public place does not include enclosed single sex functional showers, locker or dressing room facilities, enclosed motel rooms and hotel rooms designed and intended for sleeping accommodations, doctors’ offices, portions of hospitals and similar places in which nudity or exposure is necessarily and customarily expected outside of the home and the sphere of privacy constitutionally protected therein; nor does it include a person appearing in a state of nudity in a modeling class operated by a proprietary school, licensed by this state, a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or partly by taxation, or a private college or university where such private college or university maintains and operates educational programs in which credits are transferable to a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or partly by taxation or an accredited private college. Public place does not include a private facility that has been formed as a family-oriented clothing optional facility, properly licensed by the state.
(b) A person commits the offense of public indecency who, in a public place, knowingly or intentionally:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation, or other ultimate sex acts;
(2) Fondles the genitals of the person, or another person; or
(3) Appears in a state of nudity or performs an excretory function.
(c) A person does not violate subsection (b) if the person makes intentional and reasonable attempts to conceal the person from public view while performing an excretory function, and the person performs the function in an unincorporated area of the state.
(d) Public indecency is punishable as follows:
(1) A first or second offense is a Class B misdemeanor punishable only by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500) unless otherwise specified under subdivision (d)(3);
(2) Unless subdivision (d)(3) applies, a third or subsequent offense is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) or confinement for not more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, or both; and
(3)(A) Notwithstanding subdivisions (d)(1) and (2), where the offense involves the defendant engaging in masturbation by self-stimulation, or the use of an inanimate object, on the property of any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center, or other child care facility, and the defendant knows or reasonably should know that a child or children are likely to be present on the property at the time of the conduct, the offense is a Class E felony;
(B) Where a person is charged with a violation under subdivision (d)(3)(A), and the court grants judicial diversion under § 40-35-313, the court shall order, as a condition of probation, that the person be enrolled in a satellite-based monitoring program for the full extent of the person’s term of probation, in a manner consistent with the requirements of § 40-39-302.
(e) If a person is arrested for public indecency while working as an employee or a contractor, the employer or principal may be held liable for a fine imposed by subdivision (d); provided, however, the employer may not be held liable under this section unless it is shown the employer knew or should have known the acts of the employee or contractor were in violation of this section.
(f) This section does not apply to any theatrical production that contains nudity performed in a theater by a professional or amateur theatrical or musical company that has serious artistic merit; provided, that the production is not in violation of chapter 17, part 9 of this title.
(g) This section shall not affect in any fashion the ability of local jurisdictions or this state to regulate any activity where alcoholic beverages, including malt beverages, are sold for consumption.
(a) As used in this section:
(1) “Multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child” means:
(A)(i) Engaging in three (3) or more incidents of sexual abuse of a child involving the same minor child on separate occasions; provided, that at least one (1) such incident occurred within the county in which the charge is filed and that one (1) such incident occurred on or after July 1, 2014;
(ii) Engaging in at least one (1) incident of sexual abuse of a child upon three (3) or more different minor children on separate occasions; provided, that at least one (1) such incident occurred within the county in which the charge is filed and that one (1) such incident occurred on or after July 1, 2014; or
(iii) Engaging in five (5) or more incidents of sexual abuse of a child involving two (2) or more different minor children on separate occasions; provided, that at least one (1) such incident occurred within the county in which the charge is filed and that one (1) such incident occurred on or after July 1, 2014; and
(B) The victims of the incidents of sexual abuse of a child share distinctive, common characteristics, qualities or circumstances with respect to each other or to the person committing the offenses, or there are common methods or characteristics in the commission of the offense, allowing otherwise individual offenses to merge into a single continuing offense involving a pattern of criminal activity against similar victims. Common characteristics, qualities or circumstances for purposes of this subdivision (a)(1)(B) include, but are not limited to:
(i) The victims are related to the defendant by blood or marriage;
(ii) The victims reside with the defendant; or
(iii) The defendant was an authority figure, as defined in § 39-13-527(a)(3), to the victims and the victims knew each other; and
(2) “Sexual abuse of a child” means to commit an act upon a minor child that is a violation of:
(A) Aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(B) Rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(C) Aggravated sexual battery pursuant to § 39-13-504;
(D) Rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522;
(E) Sexual battery by an authority figure pursuant to § 39-13-527;
(F) Soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor pursuant to § 39-13-529(a);
(G) Aggravated rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-531;
(H) Statutory rape by an authority figure pursuant to § 39-13-532;
(I) Trafficking for a commercial sex act pursuant to § 39-13-309, if the victim is a minor; or
(J) Promoting prostitution pursuant to § 39-13-515, if the victim is a minor.
(b) A person commits continuous sexual abuse of a child who:
(1) Over a period of ninety (90) days or more, engages in multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child as defined in subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) or (a)(1)(A)(ii); or
(2) Over a period of less than ninety (90) days, engages in multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child as defined in subdivision (a)(1)(A)(iii).
(c)(1) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class A felony if three (3) or more of the acts of sexual abuse of a child constitute violations of the following offenses:
(A) Aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(B) Rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, if the child is more than thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(C) Aggravated sexual battery pursuant to § 39-13-504;
(D) Rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522;
(E) Soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor pursuant to § 39-13-529(a);
(F) Aggravated rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-531;
(G) Trafficking for a commercial sex act pursuant to § 39-13-309, if the victim is a minor; or
(H) Promoting prostitution pursuant to § 39-13-515, if the victim is a minor.
(2) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class B felony if two (2) of the acts of sexual abuse of a child constitute violations of offenses listed in subdivision (c)(1).
(3) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C felony if one (1) of the acts of sexual abuse of a child constitutes a violation of an offense listed in subdivision (c)(1).
(4) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class C felony if at least three (3) of the acts of sexual abuse of a child constitute violations of the offenses of sexual battery by an authority figure pursuant to § 39-13-527 or statutory rape by an authority figure pursuant to § 39-13-532.
(d) At least thirty (30) days prior to trial, the state shall file with the court a written notice identifying the multiple acts of sexual abuse of a child upon which the violation of this section is based. The notice shall include the identity of the victim and the statutory offense violated. Upon good cause, and where the defendant was unaware of the predicate offenses listed in the notice, the trial court may grant a continuance to facilitate proper notification of the incidents of sexual abuse of a child and for preparation by the defense of such incidents specified in the statement.
(e) The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant:
(1)(A) During a period of ninety (90) or more days in duration, committed three (3) or more acts of sexual abuse of a child; or
(B) During a period of less than ninety (90) days in duration, committed five (5) or more acts of sexual abuse of a child against at least two (2) different children; and
(2) Committed at least three (3) of the same specific acts of sexual abuse within the specified time period if prosecution is under subdivision (e)(1)(A) and at least five (5) of the same specific acts of sexual abuse within the specified time period if prosecution is under subdivision (e)(1)(B).
(f) The state may charge alternative violations of this section and of the separate offenses committed within the same time period. The separate incidents shall be alleged in separate counts and joined in the same action. A person may be convicted either of one (1) criminal violation of this section, or for one (1) or more of the separate incidents of sexual abuse of a child committed within the county in which the charges were filed, but not both. The state shall not be required to elect submission to the jury of the several counts. The jury shall be instructed to return a verdict on all counts in the indictment. In the event that a verdict of guilty is returned on a separate count that was included in the notice of separate incidents of sexual abuse of a child and the jury returns a verdict of guilty for a violation of this section, at the sentencing hearing the trial judge shall merge the separate count into the conviction under this section and only impose a sentence under this section. A conviction for a violation of this section bars the prosecution of the individual incidents of sexual abuse of a child as separate offenses described in the pretrial notice filed by the state and presented to the jury. A prosecution for a violation of this section does not bar a prosecution in the same action for individual incidents of sexual abuse not identified in the state’s pretrial notice. The state shall be required to elect as to those individual incidents of sexual abuse not contained in the pretrial notice prior to submission to the jury. A conviction for such elected offenses shall not be subject to merger at sentencing.
(g) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment and shall be sentenced from within the full range of punishment for the offense of which the defendant was convicted, regardless of the range for which the defendant would otherwise qualify.
(a) Rape of a child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if the victim is more than eight (8) years of age but less than thirteen (13) years of age.
(b) Rape of a child is a Class A felony and shall be punished as follows:
(1) If the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense, then the defendant shall be punished as a Range II offender; however the sentence imposed may, if appropriate, be within Range III, but in no case shall it be lower than Range II; and
(2) If the defendant was an adult at the time of the offense, then the sentence must be:
(A) Death;
(B) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or
(C) Imprisonment for life.
(a) Sexual battery by an authority figure is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by the following circumstances:
(1) The victim was, at the time of the offense, thirteen (13) years of age or older but less then eighteen (18) years of age; or
(2) The victim was, at the time of the offense, mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, regardless of age; and,
(3)(A) The defendant was at the time of the offense in a position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the defendant’s legal, professional or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual contact; or
(B) The defendant had, at the time of the offense, parental or custodial authority over the victim and used the authority to accomplish the sexual contact.
(b) Sexual battery by an authority figure is a Class C felony.
(a) It is an offense for a person eighteen (18) years of age or older, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, electronic mail or internet services, directly or through another, to intentionally command, request, hire, persuade, invite or attempt to induce a person whom the person making the solicitation knows, or should know, is less than eighteen (18) years of age, or solicits a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, and whom the person making the solicitation reasonably believes to be less than eighteen (18) years of age, to engage in conduct that, if completed, would constitute a violation by the soliciting adult of one (1) or more of the following offenses:
(1) Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
(2) Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
(3) Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;
(4) Aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-504;
(5) Sexual battery by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-527;
(6) Sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-505;
(7) Statutory rape, pursuant to § 39-13-506;
(8) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1005;
(9) Sexual activity involving a minor, pursuant to § 39-13-529;
(10) Trafficking for commercial sex acts, pursuant to § 39-13-309;
(11) Patronizing prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-514;
(12) Promoting prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-515; or
(13) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1004.
(b) It is no defense that the solicitation was unsuccessful, that the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or that the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense. It is no defense that the minor solicited was unaware of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited.
(c) A violation of this section shall constitute an offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious crime solicited, unless the offense solicited was a Class E felony, in which case the offense shall be a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person solicited the conduct of a minor located in this state, or solicited a law enforcement officer posing as a minor located within this state.
(a) It is an offense for a person eighteen (18) years of age or older, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, electronic mail or internet service, including webcam communications, directly or through another, to intentionally command, hire, persuade, induce or cause a minor to engage in simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or in sexual activity, where such simulated sexual activity or sexual activity is observed by that person or by another.
(b) It is unlawful for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, directly or by means of electronic communication, electronic mail or internet service, including webcam communications, to intentionally:
(1) Engage in simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or in sexual activity for the purpose of having the minor view the simulated sexual activity or sexual activity, including circumstances where the minor is in the presence of the person, or where the minor views such activity via electronic communication, including electronic mail, internet service and webcam communications;
(2) Display to a minor, or expose a minor to, any material containing simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or sexual activity if the purpose of the display can reasonably be construed as being for the sexual arousal or gratification of the minor or the person displaying the material; or
(3) Display to a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, and whom the person making the display reasonably believes to be less than eighteen (18) years of age, any material containing simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive or sexual activity, if the purpose of the display can reasonably be construed as being for the sexual arousal or gratification of the intended minor or the person displaying the material.
(4)(A) Except as provided in subdivision (b)(4)(B), it is an exception to the application of this subsection (b) that the victim is at least fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is no more than four (4) years older than the victim.
(B) Subdivision (b)(4)(A) shall not apply or be an exception to the application of this subsection (b), if the defendant intentionally commanded, hired, induced or caused the victim to violate this subsection (b).
(c) A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the conduct involved a minor located in this state or the solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor located in this state.
(d) As used in this section:
(1) “Community” means the judicial district, as defined by § 16-2-506, in which a violation is alleged to have occurred;
(2) “Material” means:
(A) Any picture, drawing, photograph, undeveloped film or film negative, motion picture film, videocassette tape or other pictorial representation;
(B) Any statue, figure, theatrical production or electrical reproduction;
(C) Any image stored on a computer hard drive, a computer disk of any type, or any other medium designed to store information for later retrieval; or
(D) Any image transmitted to a computer or other electronic media or video screen, by telephone line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method that is capable of further transmission, manipulation, storage or accessing, even if not stored or saved at the time of transmission;
(3) “Patently offensive” means that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters; and
(4) “Sexual activity” means any of the following acts:
(A) Vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, whether done with another person or an animal;
(B) Masturbation, whether done alone or with another human or an animal;
(C) Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, physical contact with or touching of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or breasts in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or sexual abuse;
(D) Sadomasochistic abuse, including flagellation, torture, physical restraint, domination or subordination by or upon a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of any person;
(E) The insertion of any part of a person’s body or of any object into another person’s anus or vagina, except when done as part of a recognized medical procedure by a licensed professional;
(F) Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, conduct, representations, depictions or descriptions of excretory functions; or
(G) Exhibition of the female breast, genitals, buttocks, anus, or pubic or rectal area of any person that can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of the sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant or another.
(e)(1) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class B felony.
(2) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony; provided, that, if the minor is less than thirteen (13) years of age, the violation is a Class C felony.
(f) It shall not be a defense to a violation of this section that a minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.
(a) Aggravated rape of a child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if the victim is eight (8) years of age or less.
(b) Aggravated rape of a child is a Class A felony and shall be punished as follows:
(1) If the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense, then the sentence must be from within Range III, as set forth in title 40, chapter 35; and
(2) If the defendant was an adult at the time of the offense, then the sentence must be:
(A) Death; or
(B) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.
(a) Statutory rape by an authority figure is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by the victim when:
(1) The victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age;
(2) The defendant is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and
(3)(A) The defendant was, at the time of the offense, in a position of trust, or had supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the defendant’s legal, professional, or occupational status and used the position of trust or power to accomplish the sexual penetration; or
(B) The defendant had, at the time of the offense, parental or custodial authority over the victim by virtue of the defendant’s legal, professional, or occupational status and used the position to accomplish the sexual penetration.
(b) Statutory rape by an authority figure is a Class B felony.
(c) No person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to the offense shall be eligible for probation pursuant to § 40-35-303 or judicial diversion pursuant to § 40-35-313.
(a) A person commits the offense of promoting travel for prostitution if the person sells or offers to sell travel services that the person knows to include travel for the purpose of engaging in what would be prostitution if occurring in the state.
(b) “Travel services” means, but is not limited to, transportation by air, sea, road or rail, related ground transportation, hotel accommodations, or package tours, whether offered on a wholesale or retail basis.
(c) Promoting travel for prostitution is a Class D felony.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit prosecution under any other law.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in §§ 39-13-601–39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3, a person commits an offense who:
(A) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(B) Intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when:
(i) The device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or
(ii) The device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of the communication;
(C) Intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection (a); or
(D) Intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication in violation of this subsection (a).
(2) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) shall be punished as provided in § 39-13-602 and shall be subject to suit as provided in § 39-13-603.
(b)(1) It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601–39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communications service, or a telecommunications company, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the normal course of employment while engaged in any activity that is necessary to the rendition of service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service. Nothing in §§ 39-13-601–39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 shall be construed to prohibit a telecommunications or other company from engaging in service observing for the purpose of maintaining service quality standards for the benefit of consumers.
(2) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communications service, their officers, employees, or agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications, if the provider, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian or other specified person has been provided with a court order signed by the authorizing judge of competent jurisdiction that:
(A) Directs the assistance;
(B) Sets forth a period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, or technical assistance is authorized; and
(C) Specifies the information, facilities, or technical assistance required.
(3) No provider of wire or electronic communications service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or landlord, custodian or other specified person shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court order, except as may otherwise be required by legal process, and then only after prior notification to the attorney general and reporter or to the district attorney general or any political subdivision of a district, as may be appropriate. Any such disclosure shall render the person liable for the civil damages provided for in § 39-13-603. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communications service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order under §§ 39-13-601 – 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3.
(4) It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 – 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for a person acting under the color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.
(5) It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 – 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of this state.
(6) It is unlawful to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication for the purpose of committing a criminal act.
(7) It is lawful, unless otherwise prohibited by state or federal law, for any person:
(A) To intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that the electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;
(B) To intercept any radio communication that is transmitted by:
(i) Any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;
(ii) Any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
(iii) Any station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or
(iv) Any marine or aeronautical communications system;
(C) To intercept any wire or electronic communication, the transmission of which is causing harmful interference with any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or
(D) For other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted.
(c)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (c)(2), a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication, other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof, while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.
(2) A person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may divulge the contents of any such communication:
(A) As otherwise authorized in subdivisions (b)(1)-(3) or § 40-6-306;
(B) With the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended recipient of such communication;
(C) To a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to forward such communication to its destination; or
(D) That were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if the divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.
(d)(1) To clarify existing law, this section does not:
(A) Apply to a person who installs software on a computer the person owns if the software is intended solely to monitor and record the use of the internet by a minor child of whom the person is a parent or legal guardian;
(B) Restrict a business from selecting the business’s vendors and disclosing communications to those vendors, by interception or otherwise, in the normal course of business;
(C) Restrict a business in how the business develops websites and mobile applications, which may allow disclosure of communications to vendors, by interception or otherwise, in the normal course of business; or
(D) Restrict the technology that a business can use on the business’s website or mobile applications, including, but not limited to, cookies and pixels provided by vendors.
(2) As used in this subsection (d), “vendor” means a person or entity providing goods, services, information, or analysis to a business, with or without compensation.
(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be photographed, an individual without the prior effective consent of the individual, or in the case of a minor, without the prior effective consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian, if the photograph:
(1)(A)(i) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if the person appeared in the photograph; or
(ii) Is focused on the intimate area of the individual and would be considered offensive or embarrassing by the individual; and
(B) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant; or
(2)(A) Includes the unclothed intimate area of the individual and would be considered offensive or embarrassing by the individual;
(B) Was taken for the purpose of offending, intimidating, embarrassing, ridiculing, or harassing the victim; and
(C) Was disseminated by the defendant, the defendant threatened to disseminate the photograph, or the defendant permitted the dissemination of the photograph, to another person.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) “Photograph” means any photograph or photographic reproduction, whether taken using digital media or conventional film, still or moving, or any videotape, live television transmission, or social media broadcast of any individual; and
(2) “Intimate area” means the naked or clothed genitals, pubic area, anus, buttocks, or female breast of a person.
(c) All photographs taken in violation of this section shall be confiscated and, after their use as evidence, destroyed.
(d)(1)(A) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(B) A first violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class E felony if:
(A) The defendant disseminates or permits the dissemination of the photograph to any other person; or
(B) The victim of the offense is under thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the offense.
(3) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class D felony if:
(A) The defendant disseminates or permits the dissemination of the photograph to any other person; and
(B) The victim of the offense is under thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the offense.
(e) Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section, including chapter 17, parts 9 and 10 of this title.
(f) In addition to the punishment provided for a person who commits the misdemeanor unlawful photographing pursuant to subdivision (a)(1), the trial judge may order, after taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense, including the offense for which the person was originally charged and whether the conviction was the result of a plea bargain agreement, that the person be required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004, compiled in title 40, chapter 39, part 2.
(a)(1)(A) Except as provided in subsection (b), it is an offense for a person to knowingly install, conceal or otherwise place an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle without the consent of all owners of the vehicle for the purpose of monitoring or following an occupant or occupants of the vehicle.
(B) It is an offense for a person who leases a motor vehicle to knowingly install, conceal, or otherwise place an electronic tracking device in or on the motor vehicle without the consent of the lessee of the vehicle.
(2) As used in this section:
(A) “Lease” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-14-147;
(B) “Owner” includes a person who has purchased a motor vehicle using a loan; and
(C) “Person” does not include the manufacturer of the motor vehicle.
(b)(1) It shall not be a violation if the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a law enforcement officer in furtherance of a criminal investigation and is carried out in accordance with applicable state and federal law.
(2) If the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a parent or legal guardian who owns or leases the vehicle, and if the device is used solely for the purpose of monitoring the minor child of the parent or legal guardian when the child is an occupant of the vehicle, then the installation, concealment or placement of the device in or on the vehicle without the consent of any or all occupants in the vehicle shall not be a violation.
(3) It shall also not be a violation of this section if the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is for the purpose of tracking the location of stolen goods being transported in the vehicle or for the purpose of tracking the location of the vehicle if it is stolen.
(c) This section shall not apply to a tracking system installed by the manufacturer of a motor vehicle.
(d) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly spy upon, observe or otherwise view an individual, when the individual is in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent of the individual, if the viewing:
(1) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if the person knew the person was being viewed; and
(2) Was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant.
(b) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that the defendant was lawfully on the premises where the offense occurred.
(c) If the person being viewed is a minor, this section is violated regardless of whether the minor or the minor’s parent or guardian consented to the viewing.
(d)(1) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) A violation of this section is a Class E felony if the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age at the time the offense is committed.
(e) Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section.
(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful photographing when the person knowingly photographs, or causes to be photographed a minor, when the minor has a reasonable expectation of privacy, if the photograph:
(1) Depicts the minor in a state of nudity; and
(2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) “Nudity” has the meaning given in § 39-17-901; and
(2) “Photograph” has the meaning given in § 39-13-605.
(c) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class C felony.
(d) Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section, including chapter 17, parts 9 and 10 of this title.
(a) A person commits extortion who uses coercion upon another person with the intent to:
(1) Obtain property, services, any advantage or immunity;
(2) Restrict unlawfully another’s freedom of action; or
(3)(A) Impair any entity, from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of Tennessee, the United States Constitution or the laws of the state, in an effort to obtain something of value for any entity;
(B) For purposes of this section, “something of value” includes, but is not limited to, a neutrality agreement, card check agreement, recognition, or other objective of a corporate campaign;
(C) For purposes of this section, “corporate campaign” means any organized effort to unlawfully bring pressure on an entity, other than through collective bargaining, or any other activity protected by federal law.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for extortion that the person reasonably claimed:
(1) Appropriate restitution or appropriate indemnification for harm done; or
(2) Appropriate compensation for property or lawful services.
(c) Extortion is a Class D felony.
(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Identity Theft Victims’ Rights Act of 2004.”
(b) (1) A person commits the offense of identity theft who knowingly obtains, possesses, buys, or uses, the personal identifying information of another:
(A) With the intent to commit any unlawful act including, but not limited to, obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of such other person; and
(B)
(i) Without the consent of such other person;
(ii) Without the lawful authority to obtain, possess, buy or use that identifying information; or
(iii) To commit a violation of § 53-11-402 or § 53-11-416 by using a prescription for a controlled substance represented as having been issued by a physician, nurse practitioner, or other health care provider.
(2) For purposes of the offense of identity theft, an activity involving a possession, use or transfer that is permitted by the Tennessee Financial Records Privacy Act, compiled in title 45, chapter 10; Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102; or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactional Act, (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) shall not be considered an “unlawful act”.
(c) (1) A person commits the offense of identity theft trafficking who knowingly sells, transfers, gives, trades, loans or delivers, or possesses with the intent to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, the personal identifying information of another:
(A) With the intent that the information be used by someone else to commit any unlawful act including, but not limited to, obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of the other person; or
(B) Under circumstances such that the person should have known that the identifying information would be used by someone else to commit any unlawful act including, but not limited to, obtaining or attempting to obtain credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of the other person; and
(C) The person does not have the consent of the person who is identified by the information to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, or possess with the intent to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, that information; and
(D) The person does not have lawful authority to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver, or possess with the intent to sell, transfer, give, loan or deliver, the personal identifying information.
(2) For purposes of the offense of identity theft trafficking, an activity involving a possession, use or transfer that is permitted by the Tennessee Financial Records Privacy Act, compiled in title 45, chapter 10; Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102; or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactional Act, (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) shall not be considered an “unlawful act”.
(d) In a prosecution under subsection (c), the trier of fact may infer from the defendant’s simultaneous possession of the personal identifying information of five (5) or more different individuals that the defendant possessed the personal identifying information with the intent to sell, transfer, give, trade, loan or deliver the information. However, if the defendant had the consent of one (1) or more of the individuals to possess the personal identifying information of that individual, the consenting individual shall not be counted in determining whether an inference of possession for sale may be drawn by the trier of fact.
(e) As used in this section, “personal identifying information” means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including:
(1) Name, social security number, date of birth, official state or government issued driver license or identification number, alien registration number, passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;
(2) Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation;
(3) Unique electronic identification number, address, routing code or other personal identifying data which enables an individual to obtain merchandise or service or to otherwise financially encumber the legitimate possessor of the identifying data;
(4) Telecommunication identifying information or access device; or
(5) Any name, number, information, medical prescribing pad, electronic message, or form used by a physician, nurse practitioner, or other health care provider for prescribing a controlled substance.
(f)
(1) The general assembly recognizes that an offense under this section may result in more than one (1) victim. While a company or business that loses money, merchandise, or other things of value as a result of the offense is a victim, it is equally true that the person whose identity is stolen is also a victim. The person whose identity is stolen suffers definite and measurable losses including expenses necessary to cancel, stop payment on, or replace stolen items such as credit cards, checks, driver licenses, and other documents, costs incurred in discovering the extent of the identity theft, in repairing damage from the theft such as credit ratings and reports and preventing further damages from the theft, long distance telephone charges to law enforcement officials, government offices, and businesses in regard to the theft, and lost wages from the time away from work required to obtain new personal identifying information and complete all of the tasks set out in this subdivision (f)(1). In addition to measurable losses, the person whose identity is stolen also suffers immeasurable damages such as stress and anxiety as well as possible health problems resulting from or aggravated by the offense.
(2) For the reasons set out in subdivision (f)(1), the general assembly declares that any person whose identity is unlawfully obtained in violation of subsection (b) or (c) is a victim of crime within the meaning of Article 1, § 35 of the Constitution of Tennessee and title 40, chapter 38.
(g) (1) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if a private entity or business maintains a record that contains any of the personal identifying information set out in subdivision (g)(2) concerning one of its customers, and the entity, by law, practice or policy discards such records after a specified period of time, any record containing the personal identifying information shall not be discarded unless the business:
(A) Shreds or burns the customer’s record before discarding the record;
(B) Erases the personal identifying information contained in the customer’s record before discarding the record;
(C) Modifies the customer’s record to make the personal identifying information unreadable before discarding the record; or
(D) Takes action to destroy the customer’s personal identifying information in a manner that it reasonably believes will ensure that no unauthorized persons have access to the personal identifying information contained in the customer’s record for the period of time between the record’s disposal and the record’s destruction.(2) As used in this subsection (g), “personal identifying information” means a customer’s:
(A) Social security number;
(B) Driver license identification number;
(C) Savings account number;
(D) Checking account number;
(E) PIN (personal identification number) or password;
(F) Complete credit or debit card number;
(G) Demand deposit account number;
(H) Health insurance identification number; or
(I) Unique biometric data.
(3)
(A) A violation of this subsection (g) shall be considered a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, compiled in title 47, chapter 18, and may be punishable by a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) for each record containing a customer’s personal identifying information that is wrongfully disposed of or discarded; provided, however, that no total penalty may exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for any one (1) customer.
(B) It is an affirmative defense to any civil penalty imposed pursuant to this subsection (g) that the business used due diligence in its attempt to properly dispose of or discard the records.
(4) The methods of destroying the personal identifying information of a customer set out in this subsection (g) shall be considered the minimum standards. If a private entity or business by law, practice or policy currently is required to have or otherwise has in place more stringent methods and procedures for destroying the personal identifying information in a customer’s record than are required by this subsection (g), the private entity or business may continue to destroy the identifying information in the more stringent manner.
(5) To the extent that this subsection (g) conflicts with applicable federal law, this subsection (g) shall not apply to an entity that is subject to the enforcement authority of the federal banking agencies, the national credit union administration, the federal trade commission or the securities and exchange commission. For any such entity, the applicable federal law shall govern the proper disposition of records containing consumer information, or any compilation of consumer information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose.
(6) Notwithstanding subdivision (g)(5), this subsection (g) shall not apply to any financial institution that is subject to the privacy and security provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et. seq., as amended, and as it existed on January 31, 2002.
(h) (1) The following property shall be subject to seizure and judicial forfeiture to the state in the manner provided:
(A) Any property, real or personal, directly or indirectly acquired by or received in violation of this section;
(B) Any property, real or personal, received as an inducement to violate this section;
(C) Any property, real or personal, traceable to the proceeds from the violation;
(D) Any property, real or personal, used in connection with or to facilitate a violation of this section; and
(E) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, in the commission of or escape from a violation of this section and any money, merchandise or other property contained in those conveyances.
(2) Property seized pursuant to this subsection (h) shall be seized and forfeited pursuant to the procedure set out in chapter 11, part 7 of this title.
(3) Notwithstanding § 39-11-713, property seized pursuant to this subsection (h) shall be disposed of as follows:
(A) All property ordered forfeited shall be sold at public auction. The proceeds from all property forfeited and sold at public auction shall be disposed of by the court as directed by this section. The attorney general and reporter shall first be compensated for all expenses incident to the litigation, as approved by the court. Any costs for appeals shall be provided for by the trial court upon conclusion of the litigation. The attorney general and reporter shall then direct that any public agency be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses resulting from the investigation, seizure and storage of the forfeited property;
(B) Out of the proceeds remaining, the court shall order restitution be made to the person or persons whose identity was stolen for any identifiable losses resulting from the offense; and
(C) The court shall then award the remainder of the funds as follows:
(i) In the event that the investigating and seizing agency was a state agency, then ten percent (10%) of the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer who shall deposit the funds in a designated account for the agency to be used in its identity theft operations;
(ii) In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is the Tennessee bureau of investigation, then ten (10%) of the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer who shall deposit the funds in a designated account for the agency to be used in its identity theft operations;
(iii) In the event that the investigating and seizing agency is a local public agency, then twenty-five percent (25%) of the funds shall be distributed to its local government for distribution to the law enforcement agency for use in the enforcement of this section. When more than one (1) local public agency participated in the investigation and seizure of forfeited property as certified by the attorney general and reporter, then the court shall order a distribution of ten percent (10%) of the funds according to the participation of each local public agency. Accounting procedures for the financial administration of the funds shall be in keeping with those prescribed by the comptroller of the treasury; and
(iv) The remainder of the funds shall be distributed to the state treasurer who shall deposit the funds in the general fund to defray the incarceration costs associated with the offense of identity theft trafficking defined in subsection (c).
(4) For purposes of this subsection (h), a “local public agency” includes any county or municipal law enforcement agency or commission, the district attorney general, or any department or agency of local government authorized by the attorney general and reporter to participate in the investigation.
(5) Funds awarded under this section may not be used to supplement salaries of any public employee or law enforcement officer. Funds awarded under this section may not supplant other local or state funds.
(i)
(1) Identity theft as prohibited by subsection (b) is a Class D felony.
(2) Identity theft trafficking as prohibited by subsection (c) is a Class C felony.
(j)
(1) For purposes of this subsection (j), “victim” means the person whose personal identifying information was obtained, possessed, bought or used in violation of subsection (b), or sold, transferred, given, traded, loaned, delivered or possessed in violation of subsection (c).
(2) Identity theft is a continuing offense because the offense involves an unlawful taking and use of personal identifying information that remains in the lawful possession of a victim wherever the victim currently resides or is found. As provided in this section, such unlawful taking and use are elements of the offense of identity theft and occur wherever the victim resides or is found.
(3) Pursuant to § 39-11-103 and subdivision (j)(2), if a victim of identity theft resides or is found in this state, an essential element of the offense is committed in this state and a defendant is subject to prosecution in this state, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in this state.
(4) Venue for the offense of identity theft shall be in any county where an essential element of the offense was committed, including but not limited to, in any county where the victim resides or is found, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in such county.
(k) (1) For purposes of this subsection (k):
(A) “Reencoder” means an electronic device that places encoded information from the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card, driver license or state or local government-issued identification card, onto the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a different payment card, driver license, or state or local government-issued identification card, or any other electronic medium that allows an authorized transaction to occur; and
(B) “Scanning device” means a scanner, reader or any other electronic device that is used to access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card, driver license, or state or local government-issued identification card.(2)
(A) It is an offense for a person to use a scanning device or reencoder without the permission of the holder of the card or license from which information is being scanned or reencoded with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any criminal offense.
(B) It is an offense for a person who possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, software, material, good, property, or supply that is designed or adapted for use as a scanning device or reencoder with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any criminal offense.
(C) A violation of this subsection (k) is a class A misdemeanor.
(a) A person commits incest who engages in sexual penetration as defined in § 39-13-501, with a person, knowing the person to be, without regard to legitimacy:
(1) The person’s natural parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, stepparent, stepchild, adoptive parent, adoptive child; or
(2) The person’s brother or sister of the whole or half-blood or by adoption.
(b) Incest is a Class C felony.
(a) Any person who knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury commits a Class A misdemeanor; provided, however, that, if the abused child is eight (8) years of age or less, the penalty is a Class D felony.
(b) Any person who knowingly abuses or neglects a child under eighteen (18) years of age, so as to adversely affect the child’s health and welfare, commits a Class A misdemeanor; provided, that, if the abused or neglected child is eight (8) years of age or less, the penalty is a Class E felony.
(c)(1) A parent or custodian of a child eight (8) years of age or less commits child endangerment who knowingly exposes such child to or knowingly fails to protect such child from abuse or neglect resulting in physical injury or imminent danger to the child.
(2) Unless § 40-39-211(c) applies, a parent or guardian of a child under eighteen (18) years of age who knowingly allows the child to be under the care or supervision of a person who is an offender, as defined in § 40-39-202, and required to register pursuant to title 40, chapter 39, part 2, or allows the child to be unaccompanied with a person who is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to title 40, chapter 39, part 2, commits a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) A violation of this subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(d)(1) Any person who negligently, by act or omission, engages in conduct that places a child in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental impairment, commits a Class A misdemeanor; except that, if the abused child is eight (8) years of age or less, the penalty is a Class B felony.
(2) For purposes of this subsection (d), a person engages in conduct that places a child in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental impairment if the person’s conduct related to the controlled substance methamphetamine or any other controlled substance listed in chapter 17, part 4 of this title, except a Schedule VI controlled substance, exposes the child to the controlled substance and an analysis of a specimen of the child’s blood, hair, fingernail, urine, or other bodily substance indicates the presence of methamphetamine or any other controlled substance listed in chapter 17, part 4 of this title, except a Schedule VI controlled substance, in the child’s body.
(e)(1) Any court having reasonable cause to believe that a person is guilty of violating this section shall have the person brought before the court, either by summons or warrant. No arrest warrant or summons shall be issued by any person authorized to issue the warrant or summons, nor shall criminal charges be instituted against a child’s parent, guardian or custodian for a violation of subsection (a), based upon the allegation that unreasonable corporal punishment was administered to the child, unless the affidavit of complaint also contains a copy of the report prepared by the law enforcement official who investigated the allegation, or independent medical verification of injury to the child.
(2)(A) As provided in this subdivision (e)(2), juvenile courts, courts of general session, and circuit and criminal courts, shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear violations of this section.
(B) If the person pleads not guilty, the juvenile judge or general sessions judge shall have the power to bind the person over to the grand jury, as in cases of misdemeanors under the criminal laws of this state. Upon being bound over to the grand jury, the person may be prosecuted on an indictment filed by the district attorney general and, notwithstanding § 40-13-103, a prosecutor need not be named on the indictment.
(C) On a plea of not guilty, the juvenile court judge or general sessions judge shall have the power to proceed to hear the case on its merits, without the intervention of a jury, if the person requests a hearing in juvenile court or general sessions court and expressly waives, in writing, indictment, presentment, grand jury investigation and a jury trial.
(D) If the person enters a plea of guilty, the juvenile court or general sessions court judge shall sentence the person under this section.
(E) Regardless of whether the person pleads guilty or not guilty, the circuit court or criminal court shall have the power to proceed to hear the case on its merits, and, if found guilty, to sentence the person under this section.
(f) Except as expressly provided, this section shall not be construed as repealing any provision of any other statute, but shall be supplementary to any other provision and cumulative of any other provision.
(g) A violation of this section may be a lesser included offense of any kind of homicide, statutory assault, or sexual offense, if the victim is a child and the evidence supports a charge under this section. In any case in which conduct violating this section also constitutes assault, the conduct may be prosecuted under this section or under § 39-13-101 or § 39-13-102, or both.
(h) As used in this section, “adversely affect the child’s health and welfare” may include, but is not limited to, adverse effects on the emotional and mental health and welfare of the child, the natural effects of starvation or dehydration, or acts of female genital mutilation, as defined in § 39-13-110.
(i) The court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order a person convicted of child abuse to refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense, including, but not limited to, attempted contact through internet services or social networking websites; provided, that the person has no parental rights to such victim at the time of the court’s order.
(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aggravated child endangerment, who commits child abuse, as defined in § 39-15-401(a); child neglect, as defined in § 39-15-401(b); or child endangerment, as defined in § 39-15-401(c) and:
(1) The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment results in serious bodily injury to the child;
(2) A deadly weapon, dangerous instrumentality, controlled substance or controlled substance analogue is used to accomplish the act of abuse, neglect or endangerment;
(3) The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, or involved the infliction of torture to the victim; or
(4) The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment results from the knowing exposure of a child to the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine as described in § 39-17-435.
(b) A violation of this section is a Class B felony; provided, however, that, if the abused, neglected or endangered child is eight (8) years of age or less, or is vulnerable because the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or suffers from a physical disability, the penalty is a Class A felony.
(c) “Serious bodily injury to the child” includes, but is not limited to, second- or third-degree burns, a fracture of any bone, a concussion, subdural or subarachnoid bleeding, retinal hemorrhage, cerebral edema, brain contusion, injuries to the skin that involve severe bruising or the likelihood of permanent or protracted disfigurement, including those sustained by whipping children with objects.
(d) A “dangerous instrumentality” is any item that, in the manner of its use or intended use as applied to a child, is capable of producing serious bodily injury to a child, as serious bodily injury to a child is defined in this section.
(e) This section shall be known and may be cited as “Haley’s Law”.
(f) The court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order a person convicted of aggravated child abuse to refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense, including, but not limited to, attempted contact through internet services or social networking websites; provided, that the person has no parental rights to such victim at the time of the court’s order.
As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Abandonment” means the knowing desertion or forsaking of an elderly or vulnerable adult by a caregiver under circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that physical harm could occur;
(2) “Abuse” means the infliction of physical harm;
(3) “Adult protective services” means the division of adult protective services of the department of human services;
(4) “Caregiver”:
(A)(i) Means a relative or person who has a legal duty to provide care for an elderly or vulnerable adult, whether such duty arises by the relative or person’s claim or conduct, contract, or in any other fashion; or
(ii) Means a person who is married to or in a dating, romantic, or sexual relationship with someone who qualifies as a caregiver under subdivision (4)(A)(i) and resides with or has regular contact with the elderly or vulnerable adult; and
(B) Does not include a financial institution as a caregiver of property, funds, or other assets unless the financial institution has entered into an agreement, or has been appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, to act as a trustee with regard to the property of the adult;
(5) “Confinement”:
(A) Means the knowing and unreasonable restriction of movement of an elderly or vulnerable adult by a caregiver;
(B) Includes, but is not limited to:
(i) Placing a person in a locked room;
(ii) Involuntarily separating a person from the person’s living area;
(iii) The use of physical restraining devices on a person; or
(iv) The provision of unnecessary or excessive medications to a person; and
(C) Does not include the use of the methods or devices described in subdivision (5)(B) if used in a licensed facility in a manner that conforms to state and federal standards governing confinement and restraint;
(6) “Elderly adult” means a person seventy (70) years of age or older;
(7) “Financial exploitation” means:
(A) The use of deception, intimidation, undue influence, force, or threat of force to obtain or exert unauthorized control over an elderly or vulnerable adult’s property with the intent to deprive the elderly or vulnerable adult of property;
(B) The breach of a fiduciary duty to an elderly or vulnerable adult by the person’s guardian, conservator, or agent under a power of attorney which results in an appropriation, sale, or transfer of the elderly or vulnerable adult’s property; or
(C) The act of obtaining or exercising control over an elderly or vulnerable adult’s property, without receiving the elderly or vulnerable adult’s effective consent, by a caregiver or accomplice committed with the intent to benefit the caregiver or other third party;
(8)(A) “Neglect” means:
(i) The failure of a caregiver to provide the care, supervision, or services necessary to maintain the physical health of an elderly or vulnerable adult, including, but not limited to, the provision of food, water, clothing, medicine, shelter, medical services, a medical treatment plan prescribed by a healthcare professional, basic hygiene, or supervision that a reasonable person would consider essential for the well-being of an elderly or vulnerable adult;
(ii) The failure of a caregiver to make a reasonable effort to protect an elderly or vulnerable adult from abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation by others;
(iii) Abandonment; or
(iv) Confinement; and
(B) Neglect can be the result of repeated conduct or a single incident;
(9) “Physical harm” means an action, regardless of gravity or duration, that:
(A) Causes pain or injury; or
(B) Would cause a reasonable person to suffer pain or injury;
(10) “Relative” means a current or former spouse; child, including stepchild, adopted child, or foster child; parent, including stepparent, adoptive parent, or foster parent; sibling of the whole or half-blood; step-sibling; grandparent, of any degree; grandchild, of any degree; and aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew, of any degree, who:
(A) Resides with or has frequent or prolonged contact with the elderly or vulnerable adult; and
(B) Knows or reasonably should know that the elderly or vulnerable adult is unable to adequately provide for the adult’s own care or financial resources;
(11) “Serious physical harm” means physical harm of such gravity that:
(A) Would normally require medical treatment or hospitalization;
(B) Involves acute pain of such duration that it results in substantial suffering;
(C) Involves any degree of prolonged pain or suffering; or
(D) Involves any degree of prolonged incapacity;
(12) “Serious psychological injury” means any mental harm that would normally require extended medical treatment, including hospitalization or institutionalization, or mental harm involving any degree of prolonged incapacity;
(13) “Sexual exploitation” means an act committed upon or in presence of an elderly or vulnerable adult, without that adult’s effective consent, that is committed for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, or for the purpose of dissemination to others by a person who knew or should have known the act would offend or embarrass a reasonable person. “Sexual exploitation” includes, but is not limited to, sexual contact, as defined in § 39-13-501; exposure of genitals to an elderly or vulnerable adult; exposure of sexual acts to an elderly or vulnerable adult; exposure of an elderly or vulnerable adult’s sexual organs; an intentional act or statement by a person intended to shame, degrade, humiliate, or otherwise harm the personal dignity of an elderly or vulnerable adult; or an act or statement by a person who knew or should have known the act or statement would cause shame, degradation, humiliation, or harm to the personal dignity of an elderly or vulnerable adult. “Sexual exploitation” does not include any act intended for a valid medical purpose, or any act reasonably intended to be a normal caregiving act, such as bathing by appropriate persons at appropriate times; and(14) “Vulnerable adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who, because of intellectual disability or physical dysfunction, is unable to fully manage the person’s own resources, carry out all or a portion of the activities of daily living, or fully protect against neglect, exploitation, or hazardous or abusive situations without assistance from others.
(a) It is an offense for any person to knowingly financially exploit an elderly or vulnerable adult.
(b) A violation of this section shall be punished as theft pursuant to § 39-14-105; provided, however, that the violation shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is otherwise provided in § 39-14-105.
©(1) If a person is charged with financial exploitation that involves the taking or loss of property valued at more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), a prosecuting attorney may file a petition with the circuit, general sessions, or chancery court of the county in which the defendant has been charged to freeze the funds, assets, or property of the defendant in an amount up to one hundred percent (100%) of the alleged value of funds, assets, or property in the defendant’s pending criminal proceeding for purposes of restitution to the victim. The hearing on the petition may be held ex parte if necessary to prevent additional exploitation of the victim.
(2) Upon a showing of probable cause in the ex parte hearing, the court shall issue an order to freeze or seize the funds, assets, or property of the defendant in the amount calculated pursuant to subdivision ©(1). A copy of the freeze or seize order shall be served upon the defendant whose funds, assets, or property has been frozen or seized.
(3) The court’s order shall prohibit the sale, gifting, transfer, or wasting of the funds, assets, or property of the elderly or vulnerable adult, both real and personal, owned by, or vested in, such person, without the express permission of the court.
(4) At any time within thirty (30) days after service of the order to freeze or seize funds, assets, or property, the defendant or any person claiming an interest in the funds, assets, or property may file a motion to release the funds, assets, or property. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion no later than ten (10) days from the date the motion is filed.
(d) In any proceeding to release funds, assets, or property, the state has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show that the defendant used, was using, is about to use, or is intending to use any funds, assets, or property in any way that constitutes or would constitute an offense under subsection (a). If the court finds that any funds, assets, or property were being used, are about to be used, or are intended to be used in any way that constitutes or would constitute an offense under subsection (a), the court shall order the funds, assets, or property frozen or held until further order of the court.
(e) If the prosecution of a charge under subsection (a) is dismissed or a nolle prosequi is entered, or if a judgment of acquittal is entered, the court shall vacate the order to freeze or seize the funds, assets, or property.
(f) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an elderly or vulnerable adult in that person’s own right, or by conservator or next friend, has a right of recovery in a civil action for financial exploitation or for theft of the person’s money or property whether by fraud, deceit, coercion, or otherwise. The right of action against a wrongdoer shall not abate or be extinguished by the death of the elderly or vulnerable adult, but passes as provided in § 20-5-106, unless the alleged wrongdoer is a relative, in which case the cause of action passes to the victim’s personal representative.
(a) A caregiver commits the offense of aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult who commits neglect pursuant to § 39-15-507, and the act:
(1) Results in serious physical harm; or
(2) Results in serious bodily injury.
(b) In order to convict a person for a violation of subdivision (a)(1), it is not necessary for the state to prove the elderly or vulnerable adult sustained serious bodily injury as required by § 39-13-102, but only that the neglect resulted in serious physical harm.
(c) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C felony.
(d) A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B felony.
(a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly abuse an elderly or vulnerable adult.
(b) The offense of abuse of an elderly adult is a Class E felony.
(c) The offense of abuse of a vulnerable adult is a Class D felony.
(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated abuse of an elderly or vulnerable adult who knowingly commits abuse pursuant to § 39-15-510, and:
(1) The act results in serious psychological injury or serious physical harm;
(2) A deadly weapon is used to accomplish the act or the abuse involves strangulation as defined in § 39-13-102; or
(3) The abuse results in serious bodily injury.
(b) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C felony.
(c) A violation of subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3) is a Class B felony.
(a) A person commits an offense who intentionally:
(1) Communicates a threat to another person, and the person communicating the threat:
(A) Intends the communication to be a threat of harm to the victim; and
(B) A reasonable person would perceive the communication to be a threat of harm;
(2) Communicates with another person without lawful purpose, anonymously or otherwise, with the intent that the frequency or means of the communication annoys, offends, alarms, or frightens the recipient and, by this action, annoys, offends, alarms, or frightens the recipient;
(3) Communicates to another person, with intent to harass that person, that a relative or other person has been injured or killed when the communication is known to be false;
(4) Communicates with another person or transmits or displays an image without legitimate purpose with the intent that the image is viewed by the victim by any method described in subdivision (a)(1) and the person:
(A) Maliciously intends the communication to be a threat of harm to the victim; and
(B) A reasonable person would perceive the communication to be a threat of harm; or
(5) Engages in bullying or cyber-bullying.
(b)(1) A person convicted of a criminal offense commits an offense if, while incarcerated, on pretrial diversion, probation, community correction or parole, the person intentionally communicates in person with the victim of the person’s crime if the communication is:
(A) Anonymous or threatening or made in an offensively repetitious manner or at hours known to be inconvenient to the victim;
(B) Made for no legitimate purpose; and
(C) Made knowing that it will alarm or annoy the victim.
(2) If the victim of the person’s offense died as the result of the offense, this subsection (b) shall apply to the deceased victim’s next-of-kin.
(c)(1) Except as provided in subsection (d), a violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony.
(d)(1) A violation by a minor of subdivision (a)(4) is a delinquent act and shall be punishable only by up to thirty (30) hours of community service, without compensation, for charitable or governmental agencies as determined by the court.
(2) A violation by a minor of subdivision (a)(5) is a delinquent act and shall be punished as provided in § 37-1-131.
(e) As used in this section:
(1) “Communicate” means contacting a person in writing or print or by telephone, wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, photooptical, or electronic means, and includes text messages, facsimile transmissions, electronic mail, instant messages, and messages, images, video, sound recordings, or intelligence of any nature sent through or posted on social networks, social media, or websites;
(2) “Electronic communications service” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system;
(3) “Image” includes, but is not limited to, a visual depiction, video clip or photograph of another person;
(4) “Log files” mean computer-generated lists that contain various types of information regarding the activities of a computer, including, but not limited to, time of access to certain records, processes running on a computer or the usage of certain computer resources; and
(5) “Social network” means any online community of people who share interests and activities, or who are interested in exploring the interests and activities of others, and which provides ways for users to interact.
(6) “Bullying” means an act committed by a student that substantially interferes with another student’s educational benefits, opportunities, or performance; and:
(A) If the act takes place on school grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on school-provided equipment or transportation or at any official school bus stop, the act has the effect of:
(i) Physically harming the other student or damaging the other student’s property; or
(ii) Knowingly placing the other student or students in reasonable fear of physical harm to the other student or damage to the student’s property; or
(B) If the act takes place off school property or outside of a schoolsponsored activity, it is directed specifically at another student or students and has the effect of creating a substantial disruption to the education environment or learning process;
(7) “Cyber-bullying” means bullying undertaken through the use of electronic devices;
(8) “Official report” means a written report made by a law enforcement officer in the course of the law enforcement officer’s official duties that the parent of a minor child who is identified as a victim in the report may obtain from the law enforcement officer’s employing law enforcement agency;
(9) “School” means a public or private school that conducts classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12);
(10) “Student” means a person, regardless of age, enrolled in a public or private school that conducts classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12);
(f)(1) The offense described in this section shall not apply to an entity providing an electronic communications service to the public acting in the normal course of providing that service.
(2) The service providers described in this subsection (f) shall not be required to maintain any record not otherwise kept in the ordinary course of that service provider’s business; provided, however, that if any electronic communications service provider operates a website that offers a social network service and the electronic communications service provider provides services to consumers in this state, any log files and images or communications that have been sent, posted, or displayed on the social network service’s website and maintained by the electronic communications service provider shall be disclosed to any governmental entity responsible for enforcing this section only if the governmental entity:
(A) Obtains a warrant issued using this state’s warrant procedures by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) Obtains a court order for the disclosure under subdivision (f)(4); or
(C) Has the consent of the person who sent, posted, or displayed any log files and images or communications on the social network service’s website maintained by the electronic communications service provider.
(3) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of an electronic communications service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order or warrant.
(4) A court order for disclosure under subdivision (f)(2)(B) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of an electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. A court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of this state. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify the order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with the order otherwise would cause an undue burden on the provider.
(g)(1) A law enforcement officer who has knowledge that a minor is the victim of an incident of bullying or cyberbullying shall:
(A) Make an official report of the incident; and
(B) Provide the minor’s parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian with notice of the bullying or cyberbullying and instructions concerning how to obtain a copy of the report made pursuant to subdivision (g)(1)(A).
(2) This subsection (g) does not apply to incidents reported to the department of safety through the SafeTN application or a successor application.
(a) The general assembly finds and declares that it is the right of every person regardless of race, color, ancestry, religion or national origin, to be secure and protected from fear, intimidation, harassment and bodily injury caused by the activities of groups and individuals. It is not the intent of this section to interfere with the exercise of rights protected by the constitution of the United States. The general assembly recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any subject whatsoever and to associate with others who share similar beliefs. The general assembly further finds that the advocacy of unlawful acts by groups or individuals against other persons or groups for the purpose of inciting and provoking damage to property and bodily injury or death to persons is not constitutionally protected, poses a threat to public order and safety, and should be subject to criminal sanctions.
(b) A person commits the offense of intimidating others from exercising civil rights who:
(1) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;
(2) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;
(3) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee; or
(4) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee.
(c) It is an offense for a person to wear a mask or disguise with the intent to violate subsection (b).
(d) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class D felony. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(e) The penalties provided in this section for intimidating others from exercising civil rights do not preclude victims from seeking any other remedies, criminal or civil, otherwise available under law.
(a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Course of conduct”:
(A) Means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of two (2) or more separate, noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose, including, but not limited to, acts in which the defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to a person, or interferes with a person’s property;
(B) Notwithstanding subdivision (a)(1)(A), includes one (1) instance of placing an electronic tracking device, without the consent of a person, on the person or in or on the person’s property; and
(C) Does not include the installing, concealing, or placing of an electronic tracking device by or at the direction of a law enforcement officer in furtherance of a criminal investigation that is carried out in accordance with applicable state or federal law;
(2) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling;
(3) “Harassment”:
(A) Means:
(i) Conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact;
(ii) The conduct is committed with reckless disregard for whether the victim will suffer emotional distress as a result of the conduct; and
(iii) The victim suffers emotional distress as a result of the conduct; and
(B) Does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose;
(4) “Stalking” means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested;
(5) “Unconsented contact” means any contact with another person that is initiated or continued without that person’s consent, or in disregard of that person’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:
(A) Following or appearing within the sight of that person;
(B) Approaching or confronting that person in a public place or on private property;
(C) Appearing at that person’s workplace or residence;
(D) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by that person;
(E) Contacting that person by telephone;
(F) Sending to that person mail or any electronic communications, including, but not limited to, electronic mail, text messages, or any other type of electronic message sent using the internet, websites, or a social media platform; or
(G) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by that person; and
(6) “Victim” means an individual who is the target of a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment.
(b)(1) A person commits an offense who intentionally engages in stalking.
(2) Stalking is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) Stalking is a Class E felony if the defendant, at the time of the offense, was required to or was registered with the Tennessee bureau of investigation as a sexual offender, violent sexual offender or violent juvenile sexual offender, as defined in § 40-39-202.
(c)(1) A person commits aggravated stalking who commits the offense of stalking as prohibited by subsection (b), and:
(A) In the course and furtherance of stalking, displays a deadly weapon;
(B)(i) The victim of the offense was less than eighteen (18) years of age at any time during the person’s course of conduct, and the person is five (5) or more years older than the victim; or
(ii) The victim of the offense was sixty-five (65) years of age or older at any time during the person’s course of conduct;
(C) Has previously been convicted of stalking within seven (7) years of the instant offense;
(D) Makes a credible threat to the victim, the victim’s child, sibling, spouse, parent or dependents with the intent to place any such person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury; or
(E) At the time of the offense, was prohibited from making contact with the victim under a restraining order or injunction for protection, an order of protection, or any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the victim or the victim’s property, and the person knowingly violates the injunction, order or court-imposed prohibition.
(2) Aggravated stalking is a Class E felony.
(d)(1) A person commits especially aggravated stalking who:
(A) Commits the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking, and has previously been convicted of stalking or aggravated stalking involving the same victim of the instant offense;
(B) Commits the offense of aggravated stalking, and intentionally or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to the victim of the offense or to the victim’s child, sibling, spouse, parent or dependent; or
(C) Commits the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking, the person is eighteen (18) years of age or older, and the victim of the offense was less than twelve (12) years of age at any time during the person’s course of conduct.
(2) Especially aggravated stalking is a Class C felony.
(e) Notwithstanding any other law, if the court grants probation to a person convicted of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking, the court may keep the person on probation for a period not to exceed the maximum punishment for the appropriate classification of offense. Regardless of whether a term of probation is ordered, the court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order the defendant to do the following:
(1) Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation;
(2) Refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense or the victim’s child, sibling, spouse, parent or dependent;
(3) Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or social counseling, and, if determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric, psychological or social counseling at the defendant’s own expense;
(4) If, as the result of such treatment or otherwise, the defendant is required to take medication, order that the defendant submit to drug testing or some other method by which the court can monitor whether the defendant is taking the required medication; and
(5) Submit to the use of an electronic tracking device, with the cost of the device and monitoring the defendant’s whereabouts, to be paid by the defendant.
(f) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented contact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the conduct or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further unconsented contact with the victim, is prima facie evidence that the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(g)(1) If a person is convicted of aggravated or especially aggravated stalking, or another felony offense arising out of a charge based on this section, the court may order an independent professional mental health assessment of the defendant’s need for mental health treatment. The court may waive the assessment, if an adequate assessment was conducted prior to the conviction.
(2) If the assessment indicates that the defendant is in need of and amenable to mental health treatment, the court may include in the sentence a requirement that the offender undergo treatment, and that the drug intake of the defendant be monitored in the manner best suited to the particular situation. Monitoring may include periodic determinations as to whether the defendant is ingesting any illegal controlled substances or controlled substance analogues, as well as determinations as to whether the defendant is complying with any required or recommended course of treatment that includes the taking of medications.
(3) The court shall order the offender to pay the costs of assessment under this subsection (g), unless the offender is indigent under § 40-14-202.
(h) Any person who reasonably believes they are a victim of an offense under this section, regardless of whether the alleged perpetrator has been arrested, charged or convicted of a stalking-related offense, shall be entitled to seek and obtain an order of protection in the same manner, and under the same circumstances, as is provided for victims of domestic abuse by title 36, chapter 3, part 6.
(i) When a person is charged and arrested for the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking, the arresting law enforcement officer shall inform the victim that the person arrested may be eligible to post bail for the offense and to be released until the date of trial for the offense.
(j) If a law enforcement officer or district attorney general believes that the life of a possible victim of stalking is in immediate danger, unless and until sufficient evidence can be processed linking a particular person to the offense, the district attorney general may petition the judge of a court of record having criminal jurisdiction in that district to enter an order expediting the processing of any evidence in a particular stalking case. If, after hearing the petition, the court is of the opinion that the life of the victim may be in immediate danger if the alleged perpetrator is not apprehended, the court may enter such an order, directed to the Tennessee bureau of investigation, or any other agency or laboratory that may be in the process of analyzing evidence for that particular investigation.
(k)(1) For purposes of determining if a course of conduct amounting to stalking is a single offense or multiple offenses, the occurrence of any of the following events breaks the continuous course of conduct, with respect to the same victim, that constitutes the offense:
(A) The defendant is arrested and charged with stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking;
(B) The defendant is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have violated an order of protection issued to prohibit the defendant from engaging in the conduct of stalking; or
(C) The defendant is convicted of the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking.
(2) If a continuing course of conduct amounting to stalking engaged in by a defendant against the same victim is broken by any of the events set out in subdivision (k)(1), any such conduct that occurs after that event commences a new and separate offense.
(l) Stalking may be prosecuted pursuant to § 39-11-103(d).
(m) This section does not prohibit prosecution and conviction under another criminal statute.
(a) A person commits unlawful exposure who, with the intent to cause emotional distress, distributes an image of the intimate part or parts of another identifiable person or an image of an identifiable person engaged in sexually explicit conduct if:
(1) The image was photographed or recorded under circumstances where the parties agreed or understood that the image would remain private; and
(2) The person depicted in the image suffers emotional distress.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) “Emotional distress” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-17-315;
(2) “Identifiable person” means a person who is identifiable from the image itself or from information transmitted in connection with the image;
(3) “Intimate part” means any portion of the primary genital area, buttock, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola that is either uncovered or visible through less than fully opaque clothing; and
(4) “Sexually explicit conduct” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-13-301.
(c) Nothing in this section precludes punishment under any other section of law providing for greater punishment.
(d) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Community” means the judicial district, as defined by § 16-2-506, in which a violation is alleged to have occurred;
(2) “Material” means:
(A) Any picture, drawing, photograph, undeveloped film or film negative, motion picture film, videocassette tape or other pictorial representation;
(B) Any statue, figure, theatrical production or electrical reproduction;
(C) Any image stored on a computer hard drive, a computer disk of any type, or any other medium designed to store information for later retrieval;
(D) Any image transmitted to a computer or other electronic media or video screen, by telephone line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method that is capable of further transmission, manipulation, storage or accessing, even if not stored or savedat the time of transmission; or
(E) Any computer image, or computer-generated image, including an image created, adapted, or modified by artificial intelligence, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means;
(3) “Minor” means any person who has not reached eighteen (18) years of age;
(4) “Patently offensive” means that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters;
(5) “Performance” means any play, motion picture, photograph, dance, or other visual representation that can be exhibited before an audience of one (1) or more persons;
(6) “Promote” means to finance, produce, direct, manufacture, issue, publish, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do those things;
(7) “Prurient interest” means a shameful or morbid interest in sex;
(8) “Sexual activity” means any of the following acts:
(A) Vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, whether done with another person or an animal;
(B) Masturbation, whether done alone or with another human or an animal;
(C) Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, physical contact with or touching of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or breasts in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or sexual abuse;
(D) Sadomasochistic abuse, including flagellation, torture, physical restraint, domination or subordination by or upon a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of any person;
(E) The insertion of any part of a person’s body or of any object into another person’s anus or vagina, except when done as part of a recognized medical procedure by a licensed professional;
(F) Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, conduct, representations, depictions or descriptions of excretory functions; or
(G) Exhibition of the breast, genitals, buttocks, anus, or pubic or rectal area of any minor that can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of the sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant or another;
(9) “Artificial intelligence”:
(A) Means a machine-based system that:
(i) Can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations, or decisions; influence real and virtual environments without significant human oversight; or that can learn from experience in an automated manner and improve such performance when exposed to data sets; or
(ii) Is developed in any context, including software or physical hardware, and solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action; and
(B) Includes generative artificial intelligence; and
(10) “Generative artificial intelligence” means an artificial intelligence system that is capable of creating new content or data, including text, images, audio, or video, when prompted by an individual.
(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess material that includes a minor engaged in:
(1) Sexual activity; or
(2) Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
(b) A person possessing material that violates subsection (a) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials possessed is greater than fifty (50), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subsection (d).
(c) In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly possessed the material, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
(d) A violation of this section is a Class D felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, that are possessed is more than fifty (50), then the offense shall be a Class C felony. If the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, exceeds one hundred (100), the offense shall be a Class B felony.
(e) In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.
(f) It shall not be a defense to a violation of this section that a minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.
(a)(1) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material, or possess with the intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material, that includes a minor engaged in:
(A) Sexual activity; or
(B) Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
(2) A person who violates subdivision (a)(1) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials involved in a violation under subdivision (a)(1) is greater than twenty-five (25), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subdivision (a)(4).
(3) In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed the material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
(4) A violation of this section is a Class C felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials that are promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange, is more than twenty-five (25), then the offense shall be a Class B felony.
(b)(1) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material that is obscene, as defined in § 39-17-901, or possess material that is obscene, with the intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange the material, which includes a minor engaged in:
(A) Sexual activity; or
(B) Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
(2) A person who violates subdivision (b)(1) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials involved in a violation under subdivision (b)(1) is greater than twenty-five (25), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subdivision (b)(4).
(3) In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed the material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
(4) A violation of this section is a Class C felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, that are promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange, is more than twenty-five (25), then the offense shall be a Class B felony.
(c) In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.
(d) A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material within this state.
(e) It shall not be a defense to a violation of subsection (a) that the minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.
(a) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, employ, use, assist, transport or permit a minor to participate in the performance of, or in the production of, acts or material that includes the minor engaging in:
(1) Sexual activity; or
(2) Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.
(b) A person violating subsection (a) may be charged in a separate count for each individual performance, image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation.
(c) In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, employed, used, assisted, transported or permitted a minor to participate in the performance of or in the production of acts or material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.
(d) A violation of this section is a Class B felony. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting prosecution for any other sexual offense under this chapter, nor shall a joint conviction under this section and any other related sexual offense, even if arising out of the same conduct, be construed as limiting any applicable punishment, including consecutive sentencing under § 40-35-115, or the enhancement of sentence under § 40-35-114.
(e) In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.
(f) A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person promoted, employed, assisted, transported or permitted a minor to engage in the performance of, or production of, acts or material within this state.
(g) It shall not be a defense to a violation of subsection (a) that the minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.
(a)(1) A person commits an offense who carries, with the intent to go armed, a firearm or a club.
(2)(A) The first violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C misdemeanor, and, in addition to possible imprisonment as provided by law, may be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).
(B) A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor.
(C) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor if the person’s carrying of a handgun occurred at a place open to the public where one (1) or more persons were present.
(b)(1) A person commits an offense who unlawfully possesses a firearm, as defined in § 39-11-106, and:
(A) Has been convicted of a felony crime of violence, an attempt to commit a felony crime of violence, or a felony involving use of a deadly weapon; or
(B) Has been convicted of a felony drug offense.
(2) An offense under subdivision (b)(1)(A) is a Class B felony.
(3) An offense under subdivision (b)(1)(B) is a Class C felony.
(c)(1) A person commits an offense who possesses a handgun and has been convicted of a felony unless:
(A) The person has been pardoned for the offense;
(B) The felony conviction has been expunged; or
(C) The person’s civil rights have been restored pursuant to title 40, chapter 29, and the restoration order does not specifically prohibit the person from possessing firearms.
(2) An offense under subdivision (c)(1) is a Class E felony.
(d)(1) A person commits an offense who possesses a deadly weapon other than a firearm with the intent to employ it during the commission of, attempt to commit, or escape from a dangerous offense as defined in § 39-17-1324.
(2) A person commits an offense who possesses any deadly weapon with the intent to employ it during the commission of, attempt to commit, or escape from any offense not defined as a dangerous offense by § 39-17-1324.
(3)(A) Except as provided in subdivision (d)(3)(B), a violation of this subsection (d) is a Class E felony.
(B) A violation of this subsection (d) is a Class E felony with a maximum fine of six thousand dollars ($6,000), if the deadly weapon is a switchblade knife.
(e)(1) It is an exception to the application of subsection (a) that a person is carrying or possessing a firearm, loaded firearm, or firearm ammunition in a motor vehicle or boat if the person:
(A) Is not prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or purchasing a firearm by § 39-17-1316; and
(B) Is in lawful possession of the motor vehicle or boat.
(2)(A) As used in this subsection (e):
(i) “Boat” means any watercraft, other than a seaplane on the water, designed and used primarily for navigation or transportation on the water; and
(ii) “Motor vehicle” has the same meaning as defined in § 55-1-103.
(B) This subsection (e) shall not apply to a motor vehicle or boat that is:
(i) Owned or leased by a governmental or private entity that has adopted a written policy prohibiting firearms, loaded firearms, or firearm ammunition not required for employment within the motor vehicle or boat; and
(ii) Provided by such entity to an employee for use during the course of employment.
(f)(1) A person commits an offense who possesses a firearm, as defined in § 39-11-106(a), and:
(A) Has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921, and is still subject to the disabilities of such a conviction;
(B) Is, at the time of the possession, subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); or
(C) Is prohibited from possessing a firearm under any other state or federal law.
(2) If the person is licensed as a federal firearms dealer or a responsible party under a federal firearms license, the determination of whether such an individual possesses firearms that constitute the business inventory under the federal license shall be determined based upon the applicable federal statutes or the rules, regulations and official letters, rulings and publications of the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives.
(3) For purposes of this section, a person does not possess a firearm, including, but not limited to, firearms registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq.), if the firearm is in a safe or similar container that is securely locked and to which the respondent does not have the combination, keys or other means of normal access.
(4) A violation of subdivision (f)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation constitutes a separate offense.
(5) If a violation of subdivision (f)(1) also constitutes a violation of § 36-3-625(h) or § 39-13-113(h), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.
(g) It is an exception to the application of subsection (a) that a person is carrying, whether openly or concealed, a handgun and:
(1)(A) The person is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; or
(B) The person is at least eighteen (18) years of age and:
(i) Is an honorably discharged or retired veteran of the United States armed forces;
(ii) Is an honorably discharged member of the army national guard, the army reserve, the navy reserve, the marine corps reserve, the air national guard, the air force reserve, or the coast guard reserve, who has successfully completed a basic training program; or
(iii) Is a member of the United States armed forces on active duty status or is a current member of the army national guard, the army reserve, the navy reserve, the marine corps reserve, the air national guard, the air force reserve, or the coast guard reserve, who has successfully completed a basic training program;
(2) The person lawfully possesses the handgun; and
(3) The person is in a place where the person is lawfully present.
(h)(1) A person commits an offense who carries, with the intent to go armed, a firearm and:
(A) Has been convicted of stalking as prohibited by § 39-17-315;
(B) Has been convicted of the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant in this or any other state two (2) or more times within the prior ten (10) years or one (1) time within the prior five (5) years;
(C) Has been adjudicated as a mental defective, judicially committed to or hospitalized in a mental institution pursuant to title 33, or had a court appoint a conservator for the person by reason of a mental defect; or
(D) Is otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm by 18 U.S.C. 922(g) as it existed on January 1, 2021.
(2) An offense under subdivision (h)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor.
(i)(1) A person commits an offense who carries or possesses a firearm and has been adjudicated as a mental defective or judicially committed to a mental institution.
(2) An offense under subdivision (i)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(j)(1) A person under twenty-five (25) years of age who possesses a firearm commits an offense if the person was adjudicated delinquent on or after July 1, 2024, for an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted one (1) or more of the following offenses:
(A) Aggravated assault, as defined in § 39-13-102;
(B) Aggravated assault against a first responder or nurse, as defined in § 39-13-116;
(C) A violation of chapter 13, part 2, of this title;
(D) A violation of chapter 13, part 4, of this title;
(E) A violation of chapter 13, part 10, of this title;
(F) Aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in § 39-14-212;
(G) A threat of mass violence, as defined in § 39-16-517; or
(H) A violation of this title involving the use or display of a firearm.
(2) An offense under subdivision (j)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) This subsection (j) does not apply if a court has reinstated the person’s right to possess a firearm pursuant to § 37-1-189(e).
(a)(1)(A) A person appropriately licensed by the federal government may stock and sell firearms to persons desiring firearms; however, sales are prohibited to persons who:
(i) Have been convicted of the offense of stalking, as prohibited by § 39-17-315;
(ii) Are addicted to alcohol;
(iii) Are ineligible to receive firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922;
(iv) Have been judicially committed to a mental institution pursuant to title 33 or adjudicated as a mental defective; or
(v) Are under twenty-five (25) years of age and are currently prohibited from purchasing a firearm as a result of having been adjudicated delinquent on or after July 1, 2024, for an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted one (1) or more of the following offenses:
(a) Aggravated assault, as defined in § 39-13-102;
(b) Aggravated assault against a first responder or nurse, as defined in § 39-13-116;
(c) A violation of chapter 13, part 2, of this title;
(d) A violation of chapter 13, part 4, of this title;
(e) A violation of chapter 13, part 10, of this title;
(f) Aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in § 39-14-212;
(g) A threat of mass violence, as defined in § 39-16-517; or
(h) A violation of this title involving the use or display of a firearm.
(B) For purposes of subdivision (a)(1)(A)(iii), the offense of violation of a protective order as prohibited by § 39-13-113 is considered a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921.
(2) The provisions of this subsection (a) prohibiting the sale of a firearm to a person convicted of a felony shall not apply if:
(A) The person was pardoned for the offense;
(B) The conviction has been expunged or set aside; or
(C) The person’s civil rights have been restored pursuant to title 40, chapter 29; and
(D) The person is not prohibited from possessing a firearm by § 39-17-1307.
(b)(1) As used in this section, “firearm” has the meaning as defined in § 39-11-106, including handguns, long guns, and all other weapons that meet the definition except “antique firearms” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921.
(2) As used in this section, “gun dealer” means a person engaged in the business, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921, of selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring a firearm, whether the person is a retail dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
(c) Except with respect to transactions between persons licensed as dealers under 18 U.S.C. § 923, a gun dealer shall comply with the following before a firearm is delivered to a purchaser:
(1) The purchaser shall present to the dealer current identification meeting the requirements of subsection (f);
(2) The gun dealer shall complete a firearms transaction record as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–929, and obtain the signature of the purchaser on the record;
(3) The gun dealer shall request by means designated by the bureau that the Tennessee bureau of investigation conduct a criminal history record check on the purchaser and shall provide the following information to the bureau:
(A) The federal firearms license number of the gun dealer;
(B) The business name of the gun dealer;
(C) The place of transfer;
(D) The name of the person making the transfer;
(E) The make, model, caliber and manufacturer’s number of the firearm being transferred;
(F) The name, gender, race, and date of birth of the purchaser;
(G) The social security number of the purchaser, if one has been assigned; and
(H) The type, issuer and identification number of the identification presented by the purchaser; and
(4) The gun dealer shall receive a unique approval number for the transfer from the bureau and record the approval number on the firearms transaction record.
(d) Upon receipt of a request of the gun dealer for a criminal history record check, the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall immediately, during the gun dealer’s telephone call or by return call:
(1) Determine, from criminal records and other information available to it, whether the purchaser is disqualified under subdivision (a)(1) from completing the purchase; and
(2) Notify the dealer when a purchaser is disqualified from completing the transfer or provide the dealer with a unique approval number indicating that the purchaser is qualified to complete the transfer.
(e)(1) The Tennessee bureau of investigation may charge a reasonable fee, not to exceed ten dollars ($10.00), for conducting background checks and other costs incurred under this section, and shall be empowered to bill gun dealers for checks run.
(2) Funds collected by the Tennessee bureau of investigation pursuant to this section shall be deposited in a continuing deferred interest-bearing revenue fund that is created in the state treasury. This fund will not revert to the general fund on June 30 of any year. This fund shall be used to offset the costs associated with conducting background checks. By February 1 of each year the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall report to the judiciary committee of the senate and the criminal justice committee of the house of representatives the amount of money collected pursuant to this section in excess of the costs associated with conducting background checks as required by this section. The excess money shall be appropriated by the general assembly to the Tennessee bureau of investigation for other law enforcement related purposes as it deems appropriate and necessary.
(f)(1) Identification required of the purchaser under subsection (c) shall include one (1) piece of current, valid identification bearing a photograph and the date of birth of the purchaser that:
(A) Is issued under the authority of the United States government, a state, a political subdivision of a state, a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental organization or an international quasi-governmental organization; and
(B) Is intended to be used for identification of an individual or is commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of an individual.
(2) If the identification presented by the purchaser under subdivision (f)(1)(A) does not include the current address of the purchaser, the purchaser shall present a second piece of current identification that contains the current address of the purchaser.
(g) The Tennessee bureau of investigation may require that the dealer verify the identification of the purchaser if that identity is in question by sending the thumbprints of the purchaser to the bureau.
(h) The Tennessee bureau of investigation shall establish a telephone number that shall be operational seven (7) days a week between the hours of eight o’clock a.m. and ten o’clock p.m. Central Standard Time (8:00 a.m.-10:00 p.m. (CST)), except Christmas Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Independence Day, for the purpose of responding to inquiries from dealers for a criminal history record check under this section.
(i) No public employee, official or agency shall be held criminally or civilly liable for performing the investigations required by this section; provided the employee, official or agency acts in good faith and without malice.
(j) Upon the determination that receipt of a firearm by a particular individual would not violate this section, and after the issuance of a unique identifying number for the transaction, the Tennessee bureau of investigation shall destroy all records (except the unique identifying number and the date that it was assigned) associating a particular individual with a particular purchase of firearms.
(k) A law enforcement agency may inspect the records of a gun dealer relating to transfers of firearms in the course of a reasonable inquiry during a criminal investigation or under the authority of a properly authorized subpoena or search warrant.
(l)(1) The following transactions or transfers are exempt from the criminal history record check requirement of subdivision (c)(3):
(A) Transactions between licensed:
(i) Importers;
(ii) Manufacturers;
(iii) Dealers; and
(iv) Collectors who meet the requirements of subsection (b) and certify prior to the transaction the legal and licensed status of both parties;
(B) Transactions or transfers between a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer and a bona fide law enforcement agency or the agency’s personnel. However, all other requirements of subsection (c) are applicable to a transaction or transfer under this subdivision (l)(1)(B); and
(C) Transactions by a gun dealer, as defined in subdivision (b)(2), making occasional sales, exchanges, or transfers of firearms that comprise all or part of the gun dealer’s personal collection of firearms.
(2) The burden of proving the legality of any transaction or transfer under this subsection (l) is upon the transferor.
(m) The director of the Tennessee bureau of investigation is authorized to make and issue all rules and regulations necessary to carry out this section.
(n) In addition to the other grounds for denial, the bureau shall deny the transfer of a firearm if the background check reveals information indicating that the purchaser has been charged with a crime for which the purchaser, if convicted, would be prohibited under state or federal law from purchasing, receiving, or possessing a firearm; and, either there has been no final disposition of the case, or the final disposition is not noted.
(o) Upon receipt of the criminal history challenge form indicating a purchaser’s request for review of the denial, the bureau shall proceed with efforts to obtain the final disposition information. The purchaser may attempt to assist the bureau in obtaining the final disposition information. If neither the purchaser nor the bureau is able to obtain the final disposition information within fifteen (15) calendar days of the bureau’s receipt of the criminal history challenge form, the bureau shall immediately notify the federal firearms licensee that the transaction that was initially denied is now a “conditional proceed.” A “conditional proceed” means that the federal firearms licensee may lawfully transfer the firearm to the purchaser.
(p) In any case in which the transfer has been denied pursuant to subsection (n), the inability of the bureau to obtain the final disposition of a case shall not constitute the basis for the continued denial of the transfer as long as the bureau receives written notice, signed and verified by the clerk of the court or the clerk’s designee, that indicates that no final disposition information is available. Upon receipt of the letter by the bureau, the bureau shall immediately reverse the denial.
(q)(1) It is an offense for a person to purchase or attempt to purchase a firearm knowing that the person is prohibited by state or federal law from owning, possessing or purchasing a firearm.
(2) It is an offense to sell or offer to sell a firearm to a person knowing that the person is prohibited by state or federal law from owning, possessing or purchasing a firearm.
(3) It is an offense to transfer a firearm to a person knowing that the person:
(A) Has been judicially committed to a mental institution or adjudicated as a mental defective unless the person’s right to possess firearms has been restored pursuant to title 16; or
(B) Is receiving inpatient treatment, pursuant to title 33, at a treatment resource, as defined in § 33-1-101, other than a hospital.
(4) It is an offense for a person to knowingly purchase or attempt to purchase a firearm if the person has been judicially committed to a mental institution or adjudicated as a mental defective.
(5) A violation of this subsection (q) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(r) The criminal history records check required by this section shall not apply to an occasional sale of a used or second-hand firearm by a person who is not engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 and 923.
(a) As used in this section and § 39-17-1320, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) “Handgun” means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length of the barrel of which, not including any revolving, detachable, or magazine breech, does not exceed twelve inches (12″); and
(2) “Juvenile” means any person less than eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) Except as provided in this section, it is an offense for a juvenile to knowingly possess a handgun.
(c)(1) Illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile is a delinquent act and, in addition to any other disposition authorized by law, the juvenile may be required to perform not more than one hundred (100) hours of community service work to be specified by the judge, and the juvenile’s driving privileges shall be suspended for a period of one (1) year in accordance with the procedure set out in title 55, chapter 10, part 7.
(2) A second or subsequent violation of this section is a delinquent act and, in addition to any other disposition authorized by law, the juvenile may be required to perform not less than one hundred (100) nor more than two hundred (200) hours of community service work to be specified by the judge, and the juvenile’s driving privileges shall be suspended for a period of two (2) years in accordance with the procedure set out in title 55, chapter 10, part 7.
(3) Any handgun illegally possessed in violation of this section shall be confiscated and disposed of in accordance with § 39-17-1317.
(d)(1) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the juvenile is:
(A) In attendance at a hunter’s safety course or a firearms safety course;
(B) Engaging in practice in the use of a firearm or target shooting at an established range authorized by the governing body of the jurisdiction in which such range is located or any other area where the discharge of a firearm is not prohibited;
(C) Engaging in an organized competition involving the use of a firearm, or participating in or practicing for a performance by an organized group which is exempt from federal income taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)), as amended, and which uses firearms as part of the performance;
(D) Hunting or trapping pursuant to a valid license issued to the juvenile pursuant to title 70;
(E) Accompanied by the juvenile’s parent or guardian and is being instructed by the adult or guardian in the use of the handgun possessed by the juvenile;
(F) On real property which is under the control of an adult and has the permission of that adult and the juvenile’s parent or legal guardian to possess a handgun;
(G) Traveling to or from any activity described in subdivision (d)(1) with an unloaded gun; or
(H) At the juvenile’s residence and with the permission of the juvenile’s parent or legal guardian, possesses a handgun and is justified in using physical force or deadly force.
(2) For purposes of subdivision (d)(1)(G), a handgun is “unloaded” if:
(A) There is not a cartridge in the chamber of the handgun;
(B) There is not a cartridge in the cylinder of the handgun if the handgun is a revolver; or
(C) The handgun, and the ammunition for the handgun, are not carried on the person of a juvenile or are not in such close proximity to the juvenile that the juvenile could readily gain access to the handgun and the ammunition and load the handgun.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part to the contrary, this section shall govern a juvenile who possesses a handgun.
(a) Notwithstanding whether a person has a permit issued pursuant to § 39-17-1315 or § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, it is an offense for a person to possess a handgun while under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substance or controlled substance analogue.
(b) It is an offense for a person to possess a firearm if the person is both:
(1) Within the confines of an establishment open to the public where liquor, wine or other alcoholic beverages, as defined in § 57-3-101(a), or beer, as defined in § 57-6-102, are served for consumption on the premises; and
(2) Consuming any alcoholic beverage listed in subdivision (b)(1).
(c)(1) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) In addition to the punishment authorized by subdivision (c)(1), if the violation is of subsection (a), occurs in an establishment described in subdivision (b)(1), and the person has a handgun permit issued pursuant to § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, such permit shall be suspended in accordance with § 39-17-1352 for a period of three (3) years.
(a) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any law enforcement officer may carry firearms at all times and in all places within Tennessee, on-duty or off-duty, regardless of the officer’s regular duty hours or assignments, except as provided by subsection (c), federal law, lawful orders of court or the written directives of the executive supervisor of the employing agency.
(b) The authority conferred by this section is expressly intended to and shall supersede restrictions placed upon law enforcement officers’ authority to carry firearms by other sections within this part.
(c) The authority conferred by this section shall not extend to a law enforcement officer:
(1) Who is not engaged in the actual discharge of official duties as a law enforcement officer and carries a firearm onto school grounds or inside a school building during regular school hours unless the officer immediately informs the principal that the officer will be present on school grounds or inside the school building and in possession of a firearm. If the principal is unavailable, the notice may be given to an appropriate administrative staff person in the principal’s office;
(2) Who is consuming beer or an alcoholic beverage or who is under the influence of beer, an alcoholic beverage, or a controlled substance or controlled substance analogue; or
(3) Who is not engaged in the actual discharge of official duties as a law enforcement officer while attending a judicial proceeding.
(d)(1) For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” means a person who is a full-time employee of the state in a position authorized by the laws of this state to carry a firearm and to make arrests for violations of some or all of the laws of this state, or a full-time police officer who has been certified by the peace officer standards and training commission, or a commissioned reserve deputy sheriff as authorized in writing by the sheriff, or a commissioned reserve or auxiliary police officer as authorized in writing by the chief of police, or a sheriff who has been certified by the peace officer standards and training commission, or a deputy sheriff employed by a county as a court officer or corrections officer as authorized in writing by the sheriff.
(2) For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means an inmate relations coordinator who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for an inmate relations coordinator, a correctional officer who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for a correctional officer, a person employed by the department of correction as a warden, deputy warden, associate warden, correctional administrator, assistant or deputy commissioner, or commissioner who has successfully completed any probationary period if required for those positions and who has successfully completed firearms training in accordance with department of correction standards, which standards shall include, at a minimum, forty (40) hours initial training and eight (8) hours annual in-service training in firearms qualification administered by an instructor with certification from the Tennessee Correction Academy’s firearms instructor program or from a police firearms instructor training program conducted or sanctioned by the federal bureau of investigation or the National Rifle Association.
(3) For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means a duly elected and sworn constable in a county where constables retain law enforcement powers and duties under § 8-10-108; provided, that the constable receives, at a minimum, forty (40) hours initial training, within one (1) year of election, and eight (8) hours annual in-service training in firearms qualification administered by a certified law enforcement firearms instructor.
(4)(A) For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means a person who has successfully completed firearms training in accordance with POST certification, which shall include, at a minimum, forty (40) hours initial training and eight (8) hours annual in-service training in firearms qualification administered by a POST-certified firearms training program and is:
(i) An elected district attorney general;
(ii) A full-time assistant district attorney general who has been authorized pursuant to subdivision (d)(4)(B);
(iii) The executive director or deputy director of the district attorneys general conference; or
(iv) A full-time, pro-tem prosecutor employed by the district attorneys general conference.
(B) Each elected district attorney general, at such district attorney general’s discretion, is authorized to determine if any assistant district attorney general in the district attorney general’s office or judicial district is authorized to carry a firearm pursuant to this section.
(C) The district attorneys general conference shall develop a uniform identification system clearly identifying that a person described in subdivision (d)(4)(A) is qualified under this section to carry a firearm at all times. Persons authorized by this subdivision (d)(4) to carry a firearm under this section shall carry this identification at all times the person is carrying a firearm.
(5) For purposes of this section, “law enforcement officer” also means a retired law enforcement officer carrying pursuant to §§ 38-8-116 and 39-17-1315.
(e) In counties having a population of not less than thirty thousand two hundred (30,200) nor more than thirty thousand four hundred seventy-five (30,475) or not less than one hundred eighteen thousand four hundred (118,400) nor more than one hundred eighteen thousand seven hundred (118,700), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the authority conferred by this section shall only apply to law enforcement officers who are law enforcement officers for those counties or law enforcement officers for municipalities located therein.
(f)(1) The secretary of state shall, in consultation with the commissioner of correction, design and issue to each requesting inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer who is employed by the department of correction and has completed the probationary period established for an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer, a state identification card certifying that the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is authorized to carry a firearm pursuant to this section.
(2) Any inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer desiring an identification card shall notify the secretary of state and shall provide the inmate relations coordinator’s or correctional officer’s full name and residential address. Upon receipt of the request, the secretary of state shall notify the commissioner of correction of the request. The commissioner of correction shall verify to the secretary of state whether the requesting inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is employed by the department of correction and has completed the appropriate probationary period and shall so certify in a letter to be maintained by the secretary.
(3) If the secretary of state receives certification that a requesting inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is employed by the department and has completed the appropriate probationary period, the secretary shall issue the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer an identification card so certifying. The card shall be valid for as long as the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer remains in the employment of the department of correction.
(4) An inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer issued a card pursuant to this subsection (f) shall carry the card at all times the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is carrying a firearm. The card shall be sufficient proof that the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer is authorized to carry a firearm pursuant to this section.
(5) If an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer who is employed by the department and has completed the appropriate probationary period resigns, is terminated, or is otherwise no longer employed by the department, the commissioner shall, within ten (10) days, so notify the secretary of state. Upon receiving the notice, the secretary of state shall revoke the identification card and send a letter of revocation to the inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer at the coordinator’s or officer’s last known address.
(6)(A) A person who is no longer an inmate relations coordinator or correctional officer employed by the department of correction but who still has an identification card issued by the secretary of state shall have ten (10) days from receipt of the letter of revocation from the secretary of state to return the card to the secretary.
(B) It is a Class C misdemeanor punishable by fine only of fifty dollars ($50.00) for a person to knowingly fail to return an identification card as required by subdivision (f)(6)(A).
(g) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a community corrections officer who holds a valid Tennessee handgun carry permit may carry a handgun at all times and in all places in Tennessee while in the course of employment and engaged in the actual discharge of official duties, except as provided by subsection (c), federal law, or lawful orders of court. This subsection applies to community corrections officers employed in counties having a population, according to the 2010 federal census or any subsequent federal census of:
not less than
nor more than
6,800
6,900
19,100
19,150
22,600
22,675
32,200
32,300
51,400
51,500
56,800
56,900
(a) In addition to the factors set out in § 40-11-118, in making a decision concerning the amount of bail required for the release of a defendant who is arrested for the offense of child abuse, child neglect, or child endangerment, as defined in § 39-15-401; the offense of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, or aggravated child endangerment, as defined in § 39-15-402; the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking, or especially aggravated stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315; a violation of § 39-15-507 or § 39-15-508, involving neglect or aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult; a violation of § 39-15-510 or § 39-15-511 involving abuse or aggravated abuse of an elderly or vulnerable adult; any criminal offense defined in title 39, chapter 13, in which the alleged victim of the offense is a victim as defined in § 36-3-601(5), (10), or (11), or is in violation of an order of protection as authorized by title 36, chapter 3, part 6, the magistrate shall review the facts of the arrest and detention of the defendant and determine whether the defendant is:
(1) A threat to the alleged victim;
(2) A threat to public safety; and
(3) Reasonably likely to appear in court.
(b) Before releasing a person arrested for or charged with an offense specified in subsection (a), or a violation of an order of protection, the magistrate shall make findings on the record, if possible, concerning the determination made in accordance with subsection (a), and shall impose one (1) or more conditions of release or bail on the defendant to protect the alleged victim of any such offense and to ensure the appearance of the defendant at a subsequent court proceeding. The conditions may include:
(1) An order enjoining the defendant from threatening to commit or committing specified offenses against the alleged victim;
(2) An order prohibiting the defendant from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the alleged victim, either directly or indirectly;
(3) An order directing the defendant to vacate or stay away from the home of the alleged victim and to stay away from any other location where the victim is likely to be;
(4) An order prohibiting the defendant from using or possessing a firearm or other weapon specified by the magistrate;
(5) An order prohibiting the defendant from possession or consumption of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogues;
(6) An order requiring the defendant to carry or wear a global positioning monitoring system device and, if able, pay the costs associated with operating that device and electronic receptor device provided to the victim, pursuant to § 40-11-152; and
(7) Any other order required to protect the safety of the alleged victim and to ensure the appearance of the defendant in court.
(c) Concurrent with the imposition of one (1) or more conditions of release, the magistrate shall:
(1) Issue a written order for conditional release containing the conditions of the release on a form prepared by the administrative office of the courts, in consultation with the Tennessee task force against domestic violence, and distributed to judges and magistrates by the administrative office of the courts;
(2) Immediately distribute a copy of the order to the law enforcement agency having custody of the defendant, which agency shall file and maintain the order in the same manner as is done for orders of protection; and
(3) Provide the law enforcement agency with any available information concerning the location of the victim in a manner that protects the safety of the victim.
(d) The law enforcement agency having custody of the defendant shall provide a copy of the conditions to the defendant upon the defendant’s release. Failure to provide the defendant with a copy of the conditions of release does not invalidate the conditions if the defendant has notice of such conditions.
(e) If conditions of release are imposed without a hearing, the defendant may request a prompt hearing before the court having jurisdiction of the offense for which the defendant was arrested or is charged to review the conditions. Upon such a request, the court shall hold a prompt hearing to review the conditions.
(f) When a defendant who is arrested for or charged with an offense specified in subsection (a) or with a violation of an order of protection is released from custody, the law enforcement agency having custody of the defendant shall:
(1) Use all reasonable means to immediately notify the victim of the alleged offense of the release and of the address and telephone number of the nearest source of assistance to victims of domestic violence, including, but not limited to, shelters, counseling centers or other appropriate community resources; and
(2) Send the victim at the victim’s last known address a copy of any conditions of release. If the victim is present at the time the conditions are imposed, a copy of the conditions may be given to the victim at that time; provided, that failure to furnish the victim a copy of any conditions of release shall not constitute negligence per se by the law enforcement agency.
(g) Release of a defendant who is arrested for or charged with a crime specified in subsection (a) or with a violation of an order of protection shall not be delayed because of the requirements of subsection (f).
(h)(1) Any offender arrested for the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking, or especially aggravated stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315, or any criminal offense defined in title 39, chapter 13, in which the alleged victim is a victim as defined in § 36-3-601, shall not be released within twelve (12) hours of the time of arrest. The magistrate or other official duly authorized to release the offender may, however, release the offender in less than twelve (12) hours if the official finds that the offender is not a threat to the alleged victim.
(2) The findings shall be reduced to writing. The written findings must be attached to the warrant and shall be preserved as a permanent part of the record. The arresting officer shall make official note of the time of the arrest in order to establish the beginning of the twelve-hour period required by this subsection (h).
(3) If the offender is released prior to the conclusion of the twelve-hour period, the official shall make all reasonable efforts to directly contact the victim and inform the victim that the person charged with the offense will be released prior to the conclusion of the twelve-hour period mandated in subdivision (h)(1).
(4) If an order of protection or restraining order has been issued against an offender arrested for an offense listed in subdivision (h)(1), but the offender has not been served with the order prior to incarceration, the offender shall be served whenever possible with the order prior to the offender’s release from incarceration. If an order has not been served on the offender at the conclusion of the offender’s twelve-hour holding period, the offender may be released, but the order shall be served as soon as possible after the release. Service remains valid on an offender if it is made after the offender is released from incarceration rather than while incarcerated for the twelve-hour hold period.
(i)(1) A person who violates a condition of release imposed pursuant to this section shall be subject to immediate arrest with or without a warrant as provided in § 40-7-103(b). If the violation of the condition of release also constitutes the offense of violation of a protective order as prohibited by § 39-13-113, the person shall be charged with the offense, and the bail of the person violating the condition of release may be revoked by the court having jurisdiction of the offense.
(2) If the violation of the condition of release does not also constitute a violation of § 39-13-113, then the release condition violation must be punished as provided in § 40-11-154. The bail of the person violating the condition of release may be revoked by the court having jurisdiction of the original offense.
(j)(1) If a defendant upon whom conditions of release have been imposed pursuant to this section is for any reason discharged or released from those conditions, the discharging or releasing court shall notify all law enforcement agencies within its jurisdiction that the defendant is no longer subject to the conditions originally imposed.
(2) The administrative office of the courts, in consultation with the domestic violence state coordinating council, shall prepare a discharge from conditions of release notification form to send to law enforcement agencies as required by subdivision (j)(1) and shall distribute the form to all courts with the authority to discharge or release a defendant from conditions of release.
(k)(1) A magistrate or other official shall not release an offender arrested for a violation of § 39-15-510 or § 39-15-511, involving abuse or aggravated abuse of an elderly or vulnerable adult, or for a violation of § 39-15-507 or § 39-15-508, involving neglect or aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult, within twelve (12) hours of the time of arrest. However, the magistrate or other official duly authorized to release the offender may release the offender in less than twelve (12) hours if the magistrate or other official finds that the offender is not a threat to the alleged victim.
(2) The findings shall be reduced to writing. The written findings must be attached to the warrant and shall be preserved as a permanent part of the record. The arresting officer shall make official note of the time of arrest in order to establish the beginning of the twelve-hour period required by this subsection (k).
(3) If the offender is released prior to the conclusion of the twelve-hour period, the official shall make all reasonable efforts to directly contact the victim and inform the victim that the person charged with the offense will be released prior to the conclusion of the twelve-hour period mandated in subdivision (k)(1).
(4)(A) A person who violates a condition of release imposed pursuant to this section shall be subject to immediate arrest with or without a warrant as provided in § 40-7-103(b). If the violation of the condition of release also constitutes the offense of violation of a protective order as prohibited by § 39-13-113, the person shall be charged with the offense, and the bail of the person violating the condition of release may be revoked by the court having jurisdiction of the offense.
(B) If the violation of the condition of release does not also constitute a violation of § 39-13-113, then the release condition violation must be punished as provided in § 40-11-154. The bail of the person violating the condition of release may be revoked by the court having jurisdiction of the original offense.
(l)(1)(A) Any officer who has reason to believe that a defendant under arrest may pose a substantial likelihood of serious harm to the defendant or to others may make a recommendation to the community mental health crisis response service that the defendant be evaluated by a member of such service to determine if the defendant is subject to admission to a hospital or treatment resource pursuant to § 33-6-403.
(B) The assessment of the defendant by a member of a community mental health crisis response service shall be completed within twelve (12) hours from the time the defendant is in custody or the magistrate or other official with the authority to determine bail shall set bail and admit the defendant to bail, when appropriate. However, if the assessment is being conducted at the end of the twelve-hour period, the member of the community mental health crisis response service may complete the assessment. The magistrate or other official duly authorized to release the defendant may, however, release the accused in less than twelve (12) hours if the official determines that sufficient time has or will have elapsed for the victim to be protected.
(C) If the assessment of the defendant by the member of the community mental health crisis response service indicates that the defendant does not meet the standards of § 33-6-403, the officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may pose a substantial likelihood of serious harm shall so report to the magistrate or other official with the authority to determine bail and such magistrate or official shall set bail and admit the defendant to bail, when appropriate.
(2) The officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may pose a substantial likelihood of serious harm shall note the time the defendant was taken into custody for purposes of beginning the twelve-hour assessment period provided in subdivision (l)(1)(B).
(m)(1) Following the arrest of a person for any criminal offense defined in title 39, chapter 13, in which the alleged victim of the offense is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, the court or magistrate shall make a finding whether there is probable cause to believe the respondent either:
(A) Caused serious bodily injury, as defined in § 39-11-106, to the alleged domestic abuse victim; or
(B) Used or displayed a deadly weapon, as defined in § 39-11-106.
(2) If the court or magistrate finds probable cause to believe that one (1) or both of the circumstances in subdivision (m)(1) did occur, unless the court or magistrate finds that the offender no longer poses a threat to the alleged victim or public safety, the court or magistrate shall impose the twelve-hour hold period and victim notification requirements in accordance with subsection (h).
(3) Prior to the offender’s release on bond, the court or magistrate shall issue a no contact order containing all of the bond conditions set out in this section that are applicable to the protection of a domestic abuse victim.
(n)(1) Following the arrest of a person for the offense of aggravated assault, under § 39-13-102(a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(iii), or (a)(1)(iv), in which the alleged victim of the offense is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601, the court or magistrate shall make a finding whether there is probable cause to believe the respondent:
(A) Caused serious bodily injury, as defined in § 39-11-106, to the alleged domestic abuse victim;
(B) Strangled or attempted to strangle the alleged domestic abuse victim; or
(C) Used or displayed a deadly weapon, as defined in § 39-11-106.
(2) If the court or magistrate finds probable cause to believe that one (1) or more of the circumstances in subdivision (n)(1) did occur, then unless the court or magistrate finds the offender no longer poses a threat to the alleged victim or public safety:
(A) The court or magistrate may, in addition to the twelve-hour hold period and victim notification requirements in subsection (h), extend the twelve-hour hold period up to twenty-four (24) hours after the time of arrest; and
(B) Prior to the defendant’s release on bond, the court or magistrate shall:
(i) Issue a no contact order containing all bond conditions set out in this section that are applicable to the protection of the domestic violence victim; and
(ii) Order the defendant to wear a global positioning monitoring system device as set forth in § 40-11-152(b)(2).
(a) Felonies are classified for the purpose of sentencing into five (5) categories:
(1) Class A felonies;
(2) Class B felonies;
(3) Class C felonies;
(4) Class D felonies; and
(5) Class E felonies.
(b) An offense designated a felony without specification as to category is a Class E felony.
(c) Misdemeanors are classified for the purpose of sentencing into three (3) categories:
(1) Class A misdemeanors;
(2) Class B misdemeanors; and
(3) Class C misdemeanors.
(d) An offense designated as a misdemeanor without specification as to category is a Class A misdemeanor.
(a) A sentence for a felony is a determinate sentence.
(b) The authorized terms of imprisonment and fines for felonies are:
(1) Class A felony, not less than fifteen (15) nor more than sixty (60) years. In addition, the jury may assess a fine not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), unless otherwise provided by statute;
(2) Class B felony, not less than eight (8) nor more than thirty (30) years. In addition, the jury may assess a fine not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), unless otherwise provided by statute;
(3) Class C felony, not less than three (3) years nor more than fifteen (15) years. In addition, the jury may assess a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), unless otherwise provided by statute;
(4) Class D felony, not less than two (2) years nor more than twelve (12) years. In addition, the jury may assess a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), unless otherwise provided by statute; and
(5) Class E felony, not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years. In addition, the jury may assess a fine not to exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000), unless otherwise provided by statute.
(c)(1) A sentence to pay a fine, when imposed on a corporation for an offense defined in title 39 or for any offense defined in any other title for which no special corporate fine is specified, is a sentence to pay an amount, not to exceed:
(A) Three hundred fifty thousand dollars ($350,000) for a Class A felony;
(B) Three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) for a Class B felony;
(C) Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) for a Class C felony;
(D) One hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000) for a Class D felony; and
(E) Fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for a Class E felony.
(2) If a special fine for a corporation is expressly specified in the statute that defines an offense, the fine fixed shall be within the limits specified in the statute.
(d) A sentence for a misdemeanor is a determinate sentence.
(e) The authorized terms of imprisonment and fines for misdemeanors are:
(1) Class A misdemeanor, not greater than eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days or a fine not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or both, unless otherwise provided by statute;
(2) Class B misdemeanor, not greater than six (6) months or a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), or both, unless otherwise provided by statute; and
(3) Class C misdemeanor, not greater than thirty (30) days or a fine not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00), or both, unless otherwise provided by statute.
(f) In order to furnish the general assembly with information necessary to make an informed determination as to whether the increase in the cost of living and changes in income for residents of Tennessee has resulted in the minimum and maximum authorized fine ranges no longer being commensurate with the amount of fine deserved for the offense committed, every five (5) years, on or before January 15, the fiscal review committee shall report to the chief clerks of the senate and the house of representatives of the general assembly the percentage of change in the average consumer price index (all items-city average) as published by the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics and shall inform the general assembly what the statutory minimum and maximum authorized fine for each offense classification would be if adjusted to reflect the compounded cost-of-living increases during the five-year period.
(a) A defendant shall be eligible for probation under this chapter if the sentence actually imposed upon the defendant is ten (10) years or less; however, no defendant shall be eligible for probation under this chapter if convicted of a violation of § 39-13-213(a)(2), § 39-13-304, § 39-13-402, § 39-13-504, § 39-13-532, § 39-15-402, § 39-17-417(b) or (i), § 39-17-1003, § 39-17-1004 or § 39-17-1005. A defendant shall also be eligible for probation pursuant to § 40-36-106(e)(3).
(b) A court shall have authority to impose probation as part of its sentencing determination at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. There shall be no petition for probation filed by the defendant and probation shall be automatically considered by the court as a sentencing alternative for eligible defendants; provided, that nothing in this chapter shall be construed as altering any provision of present statutory or case law requiring that the burden of establishing suitability for probation rests with the defendant.
(c)(1) If the court determines that a period of probation is appropriate, the court shall sentence the defendant to a specific sentence but shall suspend the execution of all or part of the sentence and place the defendant on supervised or unsupervised probation either immediately or after a period of confinement for a period of time no less than the minimum sentence allowed under the classification and up to and including the statutory maximum time for the class of the conviction offense. If the court imposes a period of probation for only one (1) conviction, then the period of probation shall not exceed eight (8) years, including instances where a period of probation is imposed after a period of confinement. If the court imposes a period of probation for more than one (1) conviction, then the total period of probation imposed shall not exceed ten (10) years.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subdivision (c)(2)(B), if probation is to be granted to a defendant convicted of any of the misdemeanor offenses set out in subdivision (c)(2)(C), subdivision (c)(1) shall govern the length of the term of probation.
(B) Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(2)(A), the judge may sentence a defendant convicted of any of the misdemeanor offenses set out in subdivision (c)(2)(C) to a period of probation not to exceed two (2) years, if the judge finds that the period of probation is necessary:
(i) For the defendant to complete any appropriate treatment program or programs, including, but not limited to, a sanctioned batterer’s intervention program, an anger management program or any court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program;
(ii) To make restitution to the victim of the offense;
(iii) To otherwise effect a change in the behavior of the defendant, including, but not limited to, imposing any of the conditions set forth in subsection (d); or
(iv) To protect and better ensure the safety of the victim or any other member of the victim’s family or household, as set out in subsections (m) and (n).
(C) The offenses to which this subdivision (c)(2) applies are:
(i) Domestic assault, as prohibited by § 39-13-111;
(ii) Assault as prohibited by § 39-13-101, vandalism as prohibited by § 39-14-408, or false imprisonment as prohibited by § 39-13-302, where the victim of the offense is a person identified in § 36-3-601(5);
(iii) Violation of a protective order, as prohibited by § 36-3-612;
(iv) Stalking, as prohibited by § 39-17-315; and
(v) A second or third violation of § 55-10-401 if the judge orders a substance abuse treatment program as a condition of probation pursuant to § 55-10-402(a)(2)(B) or (a)(3)(B).
(d) Whenever a court sentences an offender to supervised probation, the court shall specify the terms of the supervision and may require the offender to comply with certain conditions that may include, but are not limited to:
(1) Meet the offender’s family responsibilities;
(2) Devote the offender to a specific employment or occupation;
(3) Perform, without compensation, services in the community for charitable or governmental agencies;
(4) Undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment and enter and remain in a specified institution whenever required for that purpose by voluntary self-admission to the institution pursuant to § 33-6-201;
(5) Pursue a prescribed secular course of study or vocational training;
(6) Refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon;
(7) Remain within prescribed geographical boundaries and notify the court or the probation officer of any change in the offender’s address or employment;
(8) Submit to supervision by an appropriate agency or person and report as directed by the court;
(9) Satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the purpose of the offender’s sentence and not unduly restrictive of the offender’s liberty or incompatible with the offender’s freedom of conscience, or otherwise prohibited by this chapter;
(10) Make appropriate and reasonable restitution to the victim or the family of the victim involved pursuant to § 40-35-304;
(11)(A) Undergo an alcohol and drug assessment or treatment, or both an assessment and treatment, if the court deems it appropriate and licensed treatment service is available;
(B) Unless the court makes a specific determination that the person is indigent, the expense of the assessment and treatment shall be the responsibility of the person receiving it. If the court finds that the person is indigent under the same standards as used in § 55-10-402(j), the expense or some portion of the expense may be paid from the alcohol and drug addiction treatment fund provided in § 40-33-211, pursuant to a plan and procedures developed by the department of mental health and substance abuse services;
(12)(A) Use a transdermal monitoring device or other alternative monitoring device if the court determines that the defendant’s use of alcohol or drugs was a contributing factor in the defendant’s unlawful conduct and the defendant is granted probation on or after July 1, 2014. If the defendant is granted probation on or after July 1, 2016, and the court orders a monitoring device but determines that the person is indigent, the court shall order that the portion of the costs of the device that the person is unable to pay be paid by the electronic monitoring indigency fund, established in § 55-10-419;
(B) As used in this subdivision (d)(12), “transdermal monitoring device” means any device or instrument that is attached to the person, designed to automatically test the alcohol or drug content in a person by contact with the person’s skin at least once per one-half ( ½ ) hour regardless of the person’s location, and which detects the presence of alcohol or drugs and tampering, obstructing, or removing the device; or
(13) Participation in a day reporting center program, recovery and treatment program, or another appropriate community-based program.
(e) Probation shall be granted, if at all, at the time of the sentencing hearing except for sentences served in a local jail or workhouse, or except during the time a defendant sentenced to the department of correction is being housed in a local jail or workhouse awaiting transfer to the department as provided in § 40-35-212(d).
(f) The trial judge shall not have the authority to require that the defendant either secure or pay the costs accrued in the case at the instance of the state as a condition of conducting a hearing on the defendant’s request for suspension of sentence and probation.
(g) The powers granted in this section shall be exercised by the judge of the trial court presiding at the trial of original conviction or by any successor judge holding court in that jurisdiction.
(h) No probationer shall be allowed to leave the jurisdiction of the probationer’s probation officer without the express permission of the trial judge.
(i)(1) In misdemeanor cases, as a condition precedent, the defendant must pay not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than forty-five dollars ($45.00) per month as part payment of expenses incurred by the agency, department, program, group or association in supervising the defendant. The payment shall be made to the clerk of the court in which proceedings against the defendant were pending, to be sent to the agency, department, program, group or association responsible for the supervision of the defendant, unless the defendant is found to be indigent and without anticipated future funds with which to make the payment. The clerk of the court collecting the payment is permitted to retain five percent (5%) of the proceeds collected for the handling and receiving of the proceeds. The court may order the payments to be made directly to the agency, department, program, group or association responsible for the supervision of the defendant in lieu of making the payments to the clerk of the court.
(2) In addition to the costs imposed by subdivision (i)(1), the court may require the defendant to pay any or all costs for the defendant’s supervision, counseling or treatment in a specified manner, based on the defendant’s ability to pay.
(3) Willful failure to pay the supervision fee imposed by this subsection (i) to the supervising entity shall be grounds for revocation of probation and the supervising entity shall report all instances of nonpayment to the sentencing court.
(j) The provisions of this section relative to the payment of a supervision fee shall not apply to any person subject to chapter 28, part 2 of this title.
(k) The commissioner of correction, sheriff, warden, superintendent or other official having authority and responsibility for convicted defendants may contract with any appropriate public or private agency not under the commissioner’s, sheriff’s, warden’s, superintendent’s or other official’s control for custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment or training of the defendants. The cost of the contract services shall be paid by the appropriate state or local entity to the department or the local jail or workhouse.
(l) A probation officer shall make reasonable and diligent effort to notify a victim of any felony that involved violence or the threat of violence that the defendant convicted of that offense is statutorily eligible for probation and that a hearing will be held to determine whether the defendant should be granted probation. The notice shall be given at least three (3) days prior to the hearing. If the victim is less than eighteen (18) years of age or is otherwise unavailable, the probation officer shall make all reasonable and diligent efforts to so notify the family, if any, of the victim.
(m) In determining whether a person convicted of the offense of stalking, aggravated stalking or especially aggravated stalking, as defined in § 39-17-315, or any criminal offense defined in title 39, chapter 13, in which the victim falls within the definition set forth in § 36-3-601(5), should be granted probation, the court shall consider the safety and protection of the victim of the offense and of any other member of the victim’s family or household.
(n) If the court grants probation to a person convicted of an offense specified in subsection (m), it may condition the probation on compliance with one (1) or more orders of the court, including, but not limited to:
(1) Enjoining the perpetrator from threatening to commit or committing acts of violence against the victim or other household members;
(2) Prohibiting the perpetrator from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating, either directly or indirectly, with the victim;
(3) Requiring the perpetrator to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or a specified place frequented regularly by the victim and by any designated family or household member;
(4) Prohibiting the perpetrator from possessing or consuming alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogues; and
(5) Prohibiting the perpetrator from using or possessing a firearm or any other specified weapon and requiring the perpetrator to surrender and forfeit any weapon currently possessed.
(o)(1) Probation officers meeting the requirements of this subsection (o) shall have the authority to serve warrants and make arrests solely relating to their duties as probation officers. A probation officer shall also have the authority to bring probationers before the court when directed by the court to do so. While acting in the performance of their duties as probation officers, the probation officers shall have the same authority as a peace officer while serving warrants and making arrests that relate solely to their duties as probation officers.
(2) Subdivision (o)(1) shall only apply to a probation officer:
(A) In any county having a charter form of government with a population of less than five hundred thousand (500,000), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census;
(B) Employed by a probation office operated by a governmental entity;
(C) Who has completed training equal to the training required by the standards of the peace officer’s standards and training commission (POST); and
(D) Who successfully completes at least forty (40) hours of appropriate in-service training each year.
(3) Because a probation officer meets the standards and requirements of subdivision (o)(2) does not mean the officer is eligible for the pay supplement for state certified officers authorized in § 38-8-111.
(4) This subsection (o) shall not apply to a state probation officer employed by the department of correction and paid by the state of Tennessee.
(p)(1) If a defendant is granted probation pursuant to this section and is released to the department charged by law with the supervision of probationers, the department may contract with an approved private probation provider to furnish probation supervision and services to such defendant if:
(A) The defendant’s conviction offense was for a Class E felony; and
(B) The caseloads of state probation officers where the defendant is being supervised are high, resulting in the likelihood that the probationer may receive increased supervision and services from a private probation provider; or
(C) The private probation provider offers specialized services, treatment or training that would be beneficial to a probationer but would not be available if the probationer is supervised by the department.
(2) To contract with the department for the supervision of felons described in subdivision (p)(1)(A), a private probation provider shall:
(A) Meet all qualifications established by the private probation council for entities providing misdemeanor probation services;
(B) Keep all records in an electronic format that is accessible upon demand by an approved state agency;
(C) Maintain professional liability insurance of not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000) in addition to a general liability policy; and
(D)(i) Have been a private provider of misdemeanor probation services for courts exercising criminal jurisdiction in this state for at least fifteen (15) years; or
(ii) Have been a private provider of misdemeanor probation services for courts exercising criminal jurisdiction in this state for at least two (2) years and a state probation officer for at least thirteen (13) years.
(3)(A) A private probation provider who meets the requirements of subdivision (p)(2) and who wants to contract with the department to provide probation services to felons described in subdivision (p)(1)(A), may register with the department and the private probation council.
(B) At the time of registration, the private provider shall submit to the department and council:
(i) Such documentation as is necessary to demonstrate that it meets the requirements of subdivision (p)(2); and
(ii) A specific plan demonstrating how the use of such provider to supervise and provide services to felons described in subdivision (p)(1)(A), who have been granted probation will further the overall goal of reducing the recidivism rate of probationers. Such plan shall also contain statistics for misdemeanor probation services provided by the private provider for the previous ten (10) years. At a minimum, the statistics contained in the plan shall contain the same information required to be maintained by subdivision (p)(5).
(C) If the documentation and recidivism rate reduction plan presented by the private provider demonstrates that it meets the requirements of subdivision (p)(2), the department and council shall approve the private provider and place such provider on a list of companies eligible to contract with the department pursuant to this subsection (p).
(4) A supervision contract authorized by this section shall be between the private provider and the department. Once the court grants a person’s petition for probation, the department shall be the sole entity that determines who supervises the probationer. No probationer meeting the criteria set out in subdivision (p)(1)(A) shall be placed under the supervision of or supervised by a private provider that has not contracted with the department and is not on the list of companies approved by the department and the council.
(5) Any private provider who contracts with the department pursuant to this subsection (p) shall maintain statistics on the probationers supervised pursuant to this subsection (p) and shall submit a quarterly report of such statistics to the person or agency designated by the department. The statistics shall include, but not be limited to:
(A) The number of felony probationers described in subdivision (p)(1)(A) the private provider has contracted to supervise;
(B) The style of the case which resulted in the defendant being placed on probation;
(C) The number of felons described in subdivision (p)(1)(A), whose probation was revoked prior to the end of supervision; and
(D) The recidivism rate of the felony probationers supervised by the private provider under a contract authorized by this subsection (p).
(6)(A) A private provider contracting to supervise felons described in subdivision (p)(1)(A) may charge a supervision fee not to exceed sixty dollars ($60.00) per month. However, if a probationer cannot afford all or part of the supervision fee, the probationer may go before the court placing the defendant on probation and petition that it be waived or reduced. For good cause shown, the court may waive or reduce the supervision fee in appropriate cases.
(B) Willful nonpayment of the supervision fee to the private probation provider shall be grounds for revocation and the provider shall report instances of nonpayment to the department in the manner specified in the contract.
(7) No employee of a private provider of probation services shall supervise a felon described in subdivision (p)(1)(A) unless the employee has a bachelor of science degree from an accredited college or university or at least two (2) years of related work experience.
(8) This subsection (p) shall not apply to offenders who are governed by the Interstate Compact for Supervision of Adult Offenders, codified in § 40-28-401. The supervision of those offenders shall be controlled by the compact.
<Text of subsec. (q) as added by 2024 Pub.Acts, c. 760, § 1, eff. July 1, 2024,>
(q)(1) A probation officer shall set any required meetings at times and locations that reasonably accommodate the work schedule of the probationer. Upon approval from the department of correction, the probation officer may utilize a technology portal that allows communication between the probationer and the probation officer to occur in real time by voice and video in place of an in-person meeting between the probationer and the probation officer.
(2) The department shall promulgate rules governing a defendant’s eligibility for video reporting. Rules must be promulgated in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, and must include:
(A) Minimum standards and guidelines for the authorized technology;
(B) Minimum standards and guidelines for how the technology may be used; and
(C) Standards for determining the eligibility and suitability of a defendant to meet reporting requirements through the use of such technology.
(3) The eligibility and suitability standards under subdivision (q)(2)(C) must include consideration of the severity of the defendant’s underlying criminal conviction and the defendant’s criminal history, supervision level, and past supervision history.
<Text of subsec. (q) as added by 2024 Pub.Acts, c. 874, § 3, eff. July 1, 2024.>
(q)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (q)(2), if an offender is required as a condition of probation to submit to transdermal monitoring or other alternative monitoring, it is a Class B misdemeanor:
(A) For the offender to knowingly tamper with, remove, or vandalize the monitoring device; or
(B) For any person to knowingly aid, abet, or assist the offender in tampering with, removing, or vandalizing a monitoring device.
(2) If a person violates subdivision (q)(1) and the monitoring device is damaged as a result of the violation, then the offense may be punished as theft under § 39-14-105, after determining value under § 39-11-106.
(3) If an entity monitoring the device becomes aware that there has been an attempt to tamper with, disable, remove, or otherwise make the device ineffective, then the entity monitoring the device shall promptly give notice of the violation to the offender’s probation officer.
(a)(1)(A) Any relative, conservator, or agent of the department of disability and aging; designated agency or assign of the relative, conservator, or department; or attorney ad litem having personal knowledge that an adult has been the subject of a violation of § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512, or that such adult is threatened with or placed in fear of a violation of any of those sections, may seek relief for the adult pursuant to this section by filing a sworn petition with any court having jurisdiction under this part alleging that the respondent has violated or threatens to violate § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512, regardless of the existence of any other remedy at law.
(B) The petition must allege facts, based upon personal knowledge of the petitioner, that the adult either lacks the capacity to consent or that appearing in court to petition on the adult’s own behalf would pose an undue burden on the adult.
(C) An elderly or vulnerable adult, who has been the subject of a violation of § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512, or has been threatened with or placed in fear of a violation of any of those sections, may seek relief pursuant to this section by filing a sworn petition with any court having jurisdiction under this part alleging that the respondent has violated or threatens to violate § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512, regardless of the existence of any other remedy at law.
(D)(i) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (C), and for good cause shown, the court may issue an ex parte order of protection pursuant to this section upon a sworn petition filed by a law enforcement officer responding to an incident involving an elderly or vulnerable adult victim who asserts in the petition reasonable grounds to believe that the adult is in immediate and present danger of abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or sexual exploitation as defined in § 39-15-501, and that the adult either has consented to the filing or lacks the capacity to consent; provided, that the person on whose behalf the law enforcement officer seeks the ex parte order of protection is considered the petitioner for purposes of this section. The court may waive any court costs, taxes, or fees for obtaining an order of protection upon a finding that the individual for whose benefit an order of protection has been sought is indigent. If a third party seeking an order of protection represents to the court under oath that the individual for whose benefit the order of protection has been sought is indigent, the court will presume that the individual for whose benefit the order of protection has been sought is indigent absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(ii) The law enforcement officer may seek on behalf of the adult the ex parte order regardless of the time of day and regardless of whether an arrest has been made.
(iii) If an ex parte order is issued pursuant to this section outside of the court’s normal operating hours, the law enforcement officer, judge, or judicial official shall cause the petition and order to be filed with the court as soon as practicable after issuance, but no later than two (2) business days after issuance; and
(iv) Law enforcement officers shall not be subject to civil liability under this section for failure to file a petition or for any statement made or act performed in filing the petition, if done in good faith.
(E) Venue for a petition for an order of protection, and all other matters relating to orders of protection, is in the county where the respondent resides or the county in which the violation of § 39-15-502, § 39-15-507, § 39-15-508, § 39-15-510, § 39-15-511, or § 39-15-512 occurred or is threatened to occur. If the respondent is not a resident of this state, the petition may be filed in the county where the adult resides.
(2)(A) Pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A), the court may enter an immediate ex parte order of protection against the respondent if the petition alleges upon personal knowledge of the petitioner, and the court finds in its ex parte order, that the adult lacks capacity to consent or that the adult lacks the ability to be present to petition on their own behalf and is in immediate danger of abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or sexual exploitation.
(B) Pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(C), the court may enter an immediate ex parte order of protection against the respondent if the court finds in its ex parte order that the elderly adult is in immediate danger of abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or sexual exploitation.
(C) Pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(D), the court may enter an immediate ex parte order of protection against the respondent if the court finds in its ex parte order that the elderly adult is in immediate and present danger of abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or sexual exploitation, and that the adult has either consented to the filing or lacks the capacity to consent.
(3) The petition and any ex parte order issued pursuant to this section shall be personally served upon the respondent, and if filed pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(D), upon the adult. If the respondent is not a resident of this state, the ex parte order must be served pursuant to §§ 20-2-215 and 20-2-216.
(4) The clerk of the court shall send written notice of the filing of the petition and copies of the petition and the ex parte order of protection against the respondent, if any, to the adult protective services unit of the department of human services in the county where the petition is filed. The department is not responsible for court costs, costs of representation, or costs for a guardian ad litem related to a petition for an ex parte order of protection, or any ex parte order of protection issued pursuant to this section. The department has a right to intervene in the proceeding, but is not otherwise required to initiate any legal action as a result of such notice. The department may, at any time, file a petition pursuant to § 71-6-107 if the department determines the adult who is the subject of a petition for an order of protection is in need of protective services.
(5)(A) Within fifteen (15) days of service of an ex parte order of protection against the respondent, a hearing must be held, at which time the court shall either dissolve any ex parte order that has been issued, or shall, if the petitioner has proven the allegations made pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C), or (a)(1)(D), by a preponderance of the evidence, extend the order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year, unless a further hearing on the continuation of such order is requested by the adult, the respondent, or the petitioner; in which case, on proper showing of cause, such order may be continued for a further definite period of one (1) year.
(B) Any ex parte order of protection shall be in effect until the time of the hearing and, if the hearing is held within fifteen (15) days of service of such order, the ex parte order continues in effect until the entry of any subsequent order of protection, proceedings under title 34, chapters 1-3, are concluded, or the order of protection is dissolved. If no ex parte order of protection has been issued as of the time of the hearing, and the petitioner has proven the allegations made pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C), or (a)(1)(D) by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may, at that time, issue an order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year.
(C) The court shall cause a copy of the petition and notice of the date set for the hearing on such petition, as well as a copy of any ex parte order of protection, to be served upon the respondent, and if filed pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(D), upon the adult at least three (3) days prior to such hearing. Such notice shall advise the respondent and the adult that each may be represented by counsel. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem under § 34-1-107.
(D) Within the time the order of protection is in effect, any court with jurisdiction under this part may modify the order of protection, either upon the court’s own motion or upon motion of the adult, the respondent, or the petitioner.
(b) An order of protection granted pursuant to this section may:
(1) Order the respondent to refrain from committing a violation of this part or title 39, chapter 15, part 5 against an adult;
(2) Order the respondent to refrain from threatening to misappropriate or further misappropriating any moneys, state or federal benefits, retirement funds, or any other personal or real property belonging to the adult;
(3) Order the return to the adult, the adult’s caretaker, conservator, or other fiduciary any moneys, state or federal benefits, retirement funds, or any other personal or real property belonging to the adult obtained by the respondent as a result of exploitation of the adult or as a result of any other misappropriation of such funds or property of the adult by the respondent. The court may enter judgment against the respondent for the repayment or return to the adult or the adult’s caretaker, conservator, or other fiduciary of any moneys, government benefits, retirement funds, or any other personal or real property belonging to the adult that are under the control of or that have been obtained by the respondent as a result of exploitation or misappropriation from the adult. This subdivision (b)(3) does not preclude an action under § 71-6-120. The court may, if the amount in question exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), require any caretaker or custodian of funds appointed under this section to post a bond as required by § 34-1-105;
(4) Enjoin the respondent from providing care for an adult, or working in any situation involving the care of an adult, whether such action occurs in an institutional setting, in any type of group home or foster care arrangement serving adults, and regardless of whether such person, facility, or arrangement serving adults is licensed to provide care for adults;
(5) Prohibit the respondent from telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the adult, directly or indirectly; and
(6) Subject to the limitations otherwise stated in this section, grant any other relief deemed necessary by the court to protect an adult.
(c) All orders of protection shall be effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed one (1) year. The court may modify its order at any time upon subsequent motion filed by any party together with an affidavit showing a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the modification. The petitioner, respondent, adult, or the court on its own motion may commence a proceeding under title 34, chapters 1-3 to determine whether a fiduciary or conservator should be appointed, if any party alleges that the conditions giving rise to the order of protection continue or may continue beyond the one (1) year.
(d)(1) If the respondent and the adult have been served with a copy of the petition filed pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(D) and notice of hearing, the order of protection is effective when the order is entered. For purposes of this subdivision (d)(1), an order is considered entered once a hearing is conducted and such order is signed by:
(A) The judge and all parties or counsel;
(B) The judge and one (1) party or counsel and the order contains a certificate of counsel that a copy of the proposed order has been served on all other parties or counsel; or
(C) The judge and the order contains a certificate of the clerk that a copy has been served on all other parties or counsel.
(2) Service upon a party or counsel must be made by delivering to such party or counsel a copy of the order of protection, or by the clerk mailing it to the party’s last known address. In the event the party’s last known address is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry, the certificate of service must so state. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.
(3) If the respondent and the adult have been served with a copy of the petition filed pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(D) and notice of hearing, an order of protection issued pursuant to this part after a hearing shall be in full force and effect against the respondent from the time it is entered, regardless of whether the respondent is present at the hearing.
(4) A copy of any order of protection and any subsequent modifications or dismissal must be issued by the clerk of the court to the petitioner, the respondent, and the local law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction in the area where the adult resides. Upon receipt of the copy of the order of protection or dismissal from the issuing court or clerk’s office, the local law enforcement agency shall take any necessary action to immediately transmit it to the national crime information center.
(5) Upon violation of an order of protection entered pursuant to this section, a court may order any appropriate punishment or relief as provided for in § 36-3-610.
(e)(1) It is an offense to knowingly violate an order of protection issued pursuant to this section. A law enforcement officer may arrest a respondent who is the subject of an order of protection issued pursuant to this section with or without warrant.
(2) In order to constitute a violation of this section:
(A) The person must have received notice of the request for an order of protection;
(B) The person must have had an opportunity to appear and be heard in connection with the order of protection or restraining order; and
(C) The court must have made specific findings of fact in the order of protection that the person committed a violation of this part.
(3) Any law enforcement officer shall arrest the respondent without a warrant if:
(A) The officer has proper jurisdiction over the area in which the violation occurred;
(B) The officer has reasonable cause to believe the respondent has violated or is in violation of an order of protection; and
(C) The officer has verified that an order of protection is in effect against the respondent. If necessary, the law enforcement officer may verify the existence of an order of protection by telephone or radio communication with the appropriate law enforcement department.
(4) Any person arrested for a violation of an order of protection entered pursuant to this section shall be treated as a person arrested for a violation of an order of protection issued pursuant to title 36, chapter 3, part 6.
(5) A violation of this subsection (e) is a Class A misdemeanor, and any sentence imposed is to be served consecutively to the sentence for any other offense that is based in whole or in part on the same factual allegations, unless the sentencing judge or magistrate specifically orders the sentences for the offenses arising out of the same facts to be served concurrently.
(f) Notwithstanding § 71-6-102, for purposes of this section:
(1) “Abuse, neglect, or exploitation” includes:
(A) Abuse, neglect, and exploitation, as those terms are defined in § 71-6-102; and
(B) Abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, and sexual exploitation, as those terms are defined in § 39-15-501; and
(2) “Adult” means an adult as defined in § 71-6-102 or an elderly adult or vulnerable adult as those terms are defined in § 39-15-501.
All actions in law or equity shall be known as “civil actions.”
(a) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Papers may be electronically signed in accordance with Rule 5B. Each paper shall state, to the extent available, the signer’s address, telephone number, e-mail address, and Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility number. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Appearance of Counsel and Notification by Counsel Subject to Limited Scope Representation. An attorney providing limited scope representation to an otherwise unrepresented party shall file at the beginning of the representation an initial notice of limited scope representation with the court, simply stating that the representation is subject to a written limited scope representation agreement without disclosing the terms of the agreement. In addition to the initial notice of limited scope representation, when provided notice by another party, attorney or the court of a motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding that is outside of the scope of the services provided pursuant to the limited scope representation agreement, an attorney shall promptly file a notice of limited appearance that the attorney does not represent the otherwise unrepresented party for purposes of the motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding. The notice of limited appearance shall simply state that the limited scope representation does not include representation for purposes of the motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding noticed and shall not otherwise disclose the terms of the limited scope representation agreement. The notice of limited appearance shall provide the otherwise unrepresented client with the deadline(s), if any, for responding to the motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding and shall state the date, place and time of any hearing or other proceeding. If an initial notice of limited scope representation or a notice of limited appearance is filed, service shall be made as provided in Rule 5.02.
(c) Withdrawal of Counsel Upon Completion of a Limited Scope Representation. Upon the filing of a notice of completion of limited scope representation that is accompanied by a declaration from the attorney indicating that the attorney’s obligations under a limited scope representation agreement have been satisfied, and that the attorney provided the otherwise unrepresented person at least fourteen (14) days advance written notice of the filing of notice of completion of limited scope representation, the attorney shall have withdrawn from representation in the case.
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,–
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denial of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision 11.02 has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision 11.02 or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(a) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision 11.02. It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(b) On Court’s Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision 11.02 and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision 11.02 with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (a) and (b), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(a) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision 11.02(2).
(b) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court’s initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
Subdivisions 11.01 through 11.03 of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
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